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START MAKING SENSE: AN ANALYSIS 
AND PROPOSAL FOR INSIDER TRADING 
REGULATION* 
Jill E. Fisch** 
When Charles Dickens wrote "the law is a[n] ass ," 1  he might 
well have been describing the law governing insider trading.2  The 
history of government enforcement in this area, including the re­
cent litigation over broker Robert Chestman's trading in 
Waldbaum stock,3 demonstrates that the legal restrictions on trad­
ing securities while in possession of material non public information 
are confused and confusing. 4 The legal uncertainty has been attrib-
* Copyright by J ill E. F isch ,  1 99 1 .  The title refers to the TALKING HEADS film SToP 
MAKING SENSE (Columbia Pictures 1 984) and the album of the same name. 
* *  Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law; B.A.  1982,  Cornell University; 
J .D.  1985, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Victor Brudney, Roberta Karmel, Donald 
Langevoort, Roberta Romano, and Steve The! for reading and commenting on earlier drafts 
of this Article and to Gary Leibowitz for his research assistance. 
' CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 335 (Oxford Univ. Press 1 966) ( 1838) . 
2 The term i ns ider trading is generally used to describe trading in securities on the basis 
of material nonpublic information about the securities themselves, the issuer of the securi­
ties, or the market for the securities. In its broadest sense, insider trading can be conducted 
by those who are not typically considered corporate insiders and may include trading that 
does not violate existing law as well  as conduct that has been held to be unlawful .  Cf. DoN· 
ALD C. LANGEVOORT, I NSIDER TRADING REGULATION 5 ( 1991 )  (defining insider trading as "un· 
lawful trading in securities by persons who possess material nonpublic information about 
the company whose shares are traded or the market for its shares"). 
3 See United States v. C hestman, 903 F.2d 75  (2d Cir. 1 990), vaca ted in part on reh 'g, 
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir .  1991 )  ( en bane) . After the Second Circuit overturned his criminal 
conviction, Chestman attempted to modify his civil settlement with the Securities and Ex­
change Commission (SEC) on the basis that the decision in  the criminal case cast doubt on 
the legal basis for the civil action. The court refused to overturn the settlement agreement. 
SEC v. Chestman, 87 C iv. 7 1 48 (RJW) (S .D.N.Y.  1 99 1 ) ;  see Court Rejec ts Efforts by Ex· 
St ockbroker to Block Paymen t from Sett lement Fund,  23 Sec. Reg. & L .  Rep. (BNA) No. 
10, at 369 ( Mar. 8, 1 99 1 ) .  
' See, e.g . ,  SEC- CFTC Compromise to Receive Priority When Congress Convenes i n  '91, 
Dobb Says, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1 591 -98 ( Nov. 16 ,  1990) (reporting 
suggestion by panelists at Nov. 9, 1990 Annual Meeting of ABA Business Law Section on 
Federal Regulation of Securities Commission that Chestman decision could revive interest 
in a legislative definition of insider trading) . 
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uted to the absence of a statute defining the prohibited conduct.5 
Because the government has devoted increased time and resources 
to the battle against insider trading and has taken an aggressive 
l itigation posture whereby it seeks to draw an ever-greater scope of 
activity into the web of prohibited conduct,6 the ambiguity of the 
regulations is particularly troubling. 
• Many commentators have publicly expressed concern over the absence of clear statutory 
guidelines. See, e.g. , James D. Cox, Choices: Paving the Road Toward a "Definition" of 
Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REv. 381 ,  381 ( 1 988) (" [Ijt is imperative that Congress define 
insider trading.") ;  Donald C. Langevoort, Setting the Agenda for Legislative Reform: Some 
Fallacies, Anomalies, and Other Curiosities in  the Prevailing Law of Insider Trading, 39 
ALA. L. REv. 399, 409-13  (1 988) (calling for reform of insider trading regulation) ;  Richard M.  
Phi l l ips & Larry R. Lavoie, The SEC's Proposed Insider Trading Legis la t ion: Insider Trad- . 
ing Controls, Corpora te Secrecy, and Full Disclosure, 39 ALA. L. REv 439, 440 ( 1988) 
("  [T]he case-by-case approach has failed to produce a rational,  comprehensible definition 
that the average person can apply with predictability."); Richard M.  P hillips & Robert ,J. 
Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for Legislative Repair, 1 3  HoFSTRA L. REv. 65,  
7 1  ( 1984) (citing need for legislation to "strip insider trading restrictions from the rubric of 
fraud") ;  Iman Anabtawi, Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trading, 41 STAN. L. REv. 
377, 385 ( 1989) (arguing existing prohibition is  inconsistent and fails to consider i mpact on 
market efficiency of i nsider trading) ;  see a lso Elkan Abramowitz, Defin e  or A bs tain: The 
Congressiona l  Gap in Insider Trading, 204 N.Y L.J. 3, 3 ( 1 990) ( " [l ] ndividuals are subject 
to severe criminal sanctions for a crime that has never been defined or expressly p rohibited 
by federal statute . . . .  " ) ;  Roberta S .  Karmel, Defining Insider Trading, 198 N.Y L.J. 1, 34 
( 1 987) (stating that fai lure to define conduct which is subject of criminal sanctions violates 
due process) ;  Otto G. Obermaier, Who 's an Insider? Wha t 's Inside<, 196 N.Y L.J. 1, 2 ( 1986) 
(stating that "convoluted legal theorizing" about insider trading is necessary because of ab­
sence of statutory definition ) ;  H arvy L.  P itt & Karl  A .  Groskaufmanis,  Family Ties, Tip­
pees and the Chestman Decision: Time for a Principled Definition of Insider Trading, IN­
SIGHTS, July 1 990, at 7 (c iting "pressing need" for statutory definition of insider trading);  
Moncito Will iams, What 's Lega l-and What's Not ,  FoRTUNE, Dec. 22,  1986, at 36 (noting 
that insider trading rules are "amazingly vague"); SEC u. ?, WALL ST. J, Nov. 20, 1 986, at 34 
(bl aming SEC for lack of clear definition for insider trading) . 
When Congress promulgated the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1 984 it considered in­
cluding a definition of insider trading but decided not to  do so ,  believing that the  existing 
substantive law was adequately clear. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings o n  
H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Securities o f  the Senate  Comm. on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. ,  2d Sess. 33-39 ( 1984 ) ;  Definition of Insider Trading (Part 
!): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate  Comm. on Ba nking, Housing 
and Urban Affa irs, 100th Cong. , 1 st Sess. 3 ( 1987) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (call ing it 
"absolutely unrealistic to go by the standard which says, 'Well, I know it when I see it but I 
can't tell you what it is. I can't define it.' " ) ;  cj. 133  CoNG. REc. S8246 (dai ly ed .  June 17 ,  
1987) (statement of  Sen. Riegle) (" [ U]ncertainties in the  law are  bad for both the govern­
ment and law abiding market participants . . . .  [U ]ncertainty about what conduct is or is not 
i l l egal creates confusion,  causes needless anxiety for persons who desire to obey the law . . .  
and promotes d isrespect for the law. " ) .  
6 See infra notes 90- 1 1 3  a n d  accompanying text for examples of th is  expanded 
prohibition. 
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The lack of  clear guidelines can be  attributed, at least in  part, to 
the legislative policy of keeping the scope of prohibited conduct as 
broad as possible.' The consequence, however, is that traders are 
receiving prison sentences8 for conduct that, at the time of prose­
cution, presents judicial issues of first impression.9 The imposition 
of prison terms in such cases implicates obvious due process 
concerns. 1 0 
7 By defining insider trading, some legislators fear they wil l  be creating a " roadmap for 
fraud" by providing guidance to traders as to activities that do not fall within the statutory 
prohibition. See, e.g. , Stuart J .  K aswell, An Insider's View of the Insider Trading and Se­
curities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. LAw. 1 45 ,  1 50 ( 1989) ( detailing opposition 
of Chairman Dingell  of Subcommittee on Oversight and I nvestigations of H ouse Committee 
on Energy and Commerce to enacting statutory definition) .  Although the government's con­
cern that a definition will constrain enforcement attempts is valid, the alternative is expan­
sion of the criminal law through a form of judicial legislation, a process that is contrary to 
traditional con...titutional and historical l imitations on the development of criminal law. See 
John C.  Coffee, Jr . ,  The 'Tip ' of the Bunny 's Nose: Sniffing Out Crime Where None Exists, 
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 25,  1 989, at 34, 35 ( noting that law of insider trading is developing 
through after-the-fact judicial decisionmaking and that this practice violates separation-of­
powers doctrine) .  
The SEC has continually opposed the enactment of a statutory definition. See HR REP. 
No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st  Sess. 1 4, reprinted in 1 984 U.S .C .C.A.N. 2274,  2 287 ( relying on 
SEC recommendation that "any effort to define insider trading would result in . . .  a rule 
that leaves gaping holes") .  The General Accounting Office, however ,  recommended that 
Congress enact a statutory definition. UNITED STATES GENERAL AccouNTING O FFICE. REPORT 
TO THE CHAIRMAN, SuscoMM. ON OvERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS C oMM. oN ENERGY AND CoM­
MERCE. HOUSE OF  REPRESENTATIVES: SECURITIES REGULATION, EFFORTS TO DETECT, INVESTI­
GATE. AND DETER INSIDER TRADING 3, 6 1 -63 ( 1988) .  
8 Robert Chestman was sentenced to two years in ja i l ,  some of which had been served by 
the time his conviction for insider trading was reversed by the Second Circuit panel. United 
States v.  Chestman,  903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990 ) ,  vacated in part on reh 'g, 947 F .2d 551 (2d 
Cir .  1 99 1 )  (en bane ) ;  Martin Flumenbaum & B rad S. Karp, Second Circuit Review, 203 NY 
L.J. 3 ,  5 ( 1990) .  R.  Foster Winans was sentenced to an 18-month term in  prison. United 
States v.  Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1 024 (2d Cir. 1 986) ,  aff'd by an equally divided Court, 484 
U.S. 19 ,  24 ( 1987 ) ;  M artin Kimel ,  Note, The Inadequacy of Rule JOb-5 to Address Ou tsider 
Trading by Reporters, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1 549, 1 549 n . 1  ( 1 986). Even in the 1 970s, before the 
emphasis on prison sentences for insider trading, Vincent Chiarella, a financial printer, \Vas 
sentenced to serve one month in prison. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1 358, 1364 n.7 
( 2d Cir. 1978) ,  rev 'd, 445 U.S .  222  ( 1980) . 
9 See Kaswell ,  supra note 7, at 1 5 1  (describing Congressman Rinaldo's position in favor 
of enacting a definition) .  According to Kaswell, Congressman Rinaldo believed it was "un­
reasonable for the securities industry and the public to be subject to severe penalties for a 
crime that some say can be understood only after a detailed textual exegesis of cour t deci­
sions and administrative proceedings. " Id. 
10 The Chestman case demonstrates the difficulties associated with the "flexible" concept 
of insider tr::�ding espoused by the SEC. Chestman argued to the Second C ircuit that a 
criminal prosecution under the existing insider trading regulation violated his due process 
rights. See, e.g . . Reply Brief for Appellant at 24; United States v .  C hestman, 90:3 F.2d 75 (2d 
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The absence o f  a clear definition o f  the prohibited conduct may 
also hamper the efficient functioning of the capital markets. In an 
efficient market, all  available information about a corporation and 
its securities will be incorporated into the stock price.u If, how­
ever, analysts and traders must investigate fully the source of all 
trading information in order to protect themselves from prosecu­
tion, they will be unable to trade rapidly on rumors, hearsay, and 
other common sources of information. 1 2  Similarly, if all market 
participants are subject to a duty to disclose or abstain based sim­
ply on their possession of material nonpublic information, they will 
be discouraged from attempting to seek out superior information 
because of their inability to profit from it. 1 3  The Supreme C ourt 
Cir. 1 990) ( No. 89- 1 276) ("It is thus fundamentally unfair to punish as a felon a stockbroker 
who could not possibly have been expected to understand and conform to esoteric theories 
construing undefi ned laws under ambiguous circumstances." )  (on file with the Georgia Law 
Review). 
When Judge Jon 0. Newman inquired at the e n  bane reargument of the Ches t man deci­
sion why the SEC had not promulgated a definition of insider trading, Paul Gonson, arguing 
on behalf of the SEC, responded that the SEC had been unable to do so because de.fining 
insider trading was "too daunting a task ."  K arl  Groskaufmanis, The SEC's Enforcement 
Nose Dive, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 1 6, 1991 ,  at 2 1 .  The obvious response to this argument, as 
observed by the court, is that i f  the SEC cannot define insider trading, how can Chestman 
be expected to? 
At least one commentator has also argued that this form of jud icial legislation v iolates 
constitutional principles of separation of powers. Coffee ,  supra note 7,  at 35 .  
" See ,  e.g. , Basic ,  Inc.  v .  Levinson, 485 U.S.  224 , 246 ( 1988) ("Recent empirical studies 
have tended to confirm Congress' premise that the market price of shares traded on wel l ­
developed markets reflects all publicly available information . . . .  " ) .  The e fficient market 
theory, or efficient capital market hypothesis, has achieved wide acceptance by the legal 
culture. !d. at 253 n.4 (White, J., d issenting in part) (quoting Ronald J .  Gi lson & Reinier H. 
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Mark et  Efficiency, 70 VA. L REv. 549, 549-50 ( 1984 ) ) .  For a 
detailed d iscussion of efficient market theory and an analysis of whether the stock markets 
function efficiently, see Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient:  A n  Economic 
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regu lation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 6 1 3  ( 1988) .  
S e e  also D aniel R .  Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory i n  Securities Frau d  Cases In­
vo lving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAw. 1, 4 n .9 ( 1 982) (citing efficient market 
theory literature). 
1 2  Many traders, notably risk arbitrageurs, make their profit by trad ing on information 
that is not wholly public, at least in the sense that such information is not yet fully reflected 
in stock prices. See Coffee, supra note 7 ,  at 34.  
13 As Professor Brudney observes, " [e ] xploration for relevant corporate and economic in ­
formation is a service of  value in the  functioning of the  market." Victor Brudney, Insiders , 
Outsiders, and Informa tional Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws,  93 HARV. L.  
REv. 322, 341  ( 1 979) . This exploration is costly, however, and will not be undertaken unless 
the discoverer of the information has the opportunity to capitalize on his d iscovery. The 
most direct way for the discoverer to capitalize on the informational advantage is by buying 
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has expressly recognized that securities analysts perform an essen­
tial function in making the markets more efficient by disseminat­
ing market information and causing that information to be re­
flected in stock prices.14 This role cannot survive in a market in 
which trading is permitted only upon a parity of information. 15 
The litigation history of insider trading reveals fundamental dis­
agreement over the rationale behind the prohibition as well as its 
scope. The prohibition has been developed within the framework 
of federal securities fraud, and the resulting case law contains logi ­
cal as well as interpretive flaws. Moreover, litigation under the the­
ories of liability developed by the courts illustrates the practical 
drawbacks to a judge-made crime. The existing doctrines fai l  to 
give adequate notice of prohibited conduct and present issues of 
interpretation that are simply unacceptable in a criminal statute. 
Concern that prohibited conduct be properly delineated has in­
tensified with congressional authorization of increased penalties for 
insider trading, the devotion of greater resources to criminal in­
sider trading prosecutions, and the government's announced inten­
tion to seek prison sentences more frequently . 1 6  This enforcement 
activity poses a grave threat to due process concerns in the absence 
or selling securities.  !d. 
" Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983). 
" Thus, in Dirks, the Court noted, " Imposing a duty to d isclose or abstain solely because 
a person knowingly receives material , nonpublic information from an insider and trades on 
it could have an inhib iting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself 
recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy m arket." !d. at 658. 
16 See The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L .  No. 
100-704, 1 02 Stat. 4677 ( codified as amended at  15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991)) 
(" ITSFEA") ( increasing statutory penalties and remedies for insider trading); The Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C.A.  § 78 ( West 1981 & Supp. 1991)); Howard M.  Friedman, The Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act  of 1988, 68 N.C. L. REv. 465, 476-81 (1990) ( explaining 
how ITSFEA clarified and expanded penalties for insider trading). The House Committee 
that drafted the 1988 amendments to the Securi ties Exchange Act of 1 934, § l, 15 U S.C § 
78 (1988), expressed a desire to see a greater imposition of p rison sentences in insider trad­
ing prosecutions. 
The Committee's interest in  the rr.aximum jail term is  an  explicit congressional 
statement of the heightened seriousness with which insider trading and other 
securit ies fraud offenses should be viewed. Although the legislation does not 
include an explicit  mandatory minimum sentence the Committee believes in 
the strongest possible manner that courts should impose jail terms for the 
commission of these crimes, and expects that raisi ng the ceiling will increase 
the certainty of substantial prison sentences. 
HR HEr. i·-Jo. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043 , 6060. 
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of clear standards for traders as to  the legality of their conduct. 
Finally, because the United States was one of the first countries to 
develop extensive insider trading regulations and enforcement 
mechanisms , its experience has served as a model for much re­
cently enacted regulation by foreign sovereigns17 and is receiving 
increased attention from the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in connection with its harmonization of European securities 
regulations. 18 
This Article will demonstrate that the doctrine under which in­
sider trading is regulated is seriously flawed. Many of the flaws can 
be attributed to the fact that insider trading regulation has been 
developed on an ad hoc basis, with insufficient thought given to its 
rationale. The Article will review this development and examine, in 
particular , the judicial determination that insider trading is decep­
tive and thereby fraudulent because of the insider's breach of a 
fiduciary duty. After identifying the problems with this approach, 
the Article will turn to the question of whether insider trading 
should be illegal and, if so, why. Concluding that regulation can be 
justified by both political and market forces, the Article will pro­
pose a revised regulatory scheme that clarifies the application of 
the prohibition while removing the twisted logical basis upon 
which the existing regulation is founded. 
I. OvERVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING 
Many of the difficulties with existing insider trading law result 
from its uneasy legal source. The federal securities laws do not 
" See LANGEVOORT, supra note 2, at 483-521 (describing development and status ot in­
sider trading regulation in various foreign jurisdictions) .  insider trading (or insider dealing, 
as it is commonly referred to abroad) is also receiving increased attention overseas due to 
the prol iferation of recent insider trading scandals outside the United States. Notable 
among these were the Tateho C hemical I ndustries Co. scandai and the Recruit Cosmos Co. 
scandal  in Japan and the Pechiney affair in France. For a description of the Tateho Chemi­
cal scandal, see Tomoko Akashi,  Note, Regu lation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 CoLLr�o.t 
L. REv. 1296, 1302-03 (1989). For a description of the Recrui t  Cosmos scandal ,  see David 
Wil l iams, A Primer for Japan's Lates t  Political Scandal, LA TIMES, Apr. 16, 1989, pt. 5, at 
2. For details on the Pechiney affair,  see H .R. REP. No. 240, 101st Cong. , lst Sess. 6-7 (1989); 
LANCEVOORT, supra note 2, at 499-500. 
'" The European Economic Community has recently adopted an Insider Deal ing Direc­
tive, which sets forth min imum regulatory standards for member states. The final version of 
the Ins ider Dealing D irective is printed at 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30. A detailed analyo:.is of the 
Insider Dealing Directive can be found in Klaus J. Hopt, Th e Europea n Insider Dealing 
Dlrectice, '27 co�.!M. MKT. L. REV. 51 (1990). 
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contain an express prohibition of insider trading . 1 9  Instead, the 
conclusion that insider trading is i llegal has evolved from SEC and 
judicial interpretation of the general antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws , section 10 (b)  of the Securities Exchange 
Act20 (the Exchange Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5 thereunder.2 1 
19 The only sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 934 that directly address trading 
by insiders are section 1 6, 15  U.S .C.  § 78p ( 1988) (sometimes referred to as the "other in­
sider trading statute," see, e.g. , DoNALD C .  LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION ch.  1 0  
( 1 9 9 1 )  (describing section 16  a s  a "secondary tool" in  fight against insider trading))  and 
section 20A, 15  U.S.C.  § 78t- 1 ( 1 988) ( added by the 1 988 amendments to the Exchange Act) . 
Broadly speaking, section 16(b)  provides that profits earned by statutory insiders-defined 
as officers, d irectors, and 10% stockholders-through short-term trading in their company's 
stock belong to the corporation. Section 16 (a )  requires the reporting of all insider trades to 
the SEC on a monthly basis, and section 16(c)  prohibits certain insider trading outright, 
including short sales and sell ing against the box. Section 16(b) describes as its purpose the 
prevention of "the unfair use of i nformation which may have been obtained by [an insider] 
by reason of his relationship to the issuer." Liabi lity under section 1 6  does not require the 
misuse of inside information; the provision imposes strict l iabi l ity on the basis of short-term 
trading. 1 5  U.S.C.  § 78p ( 1988) . Nor does its coverage extend to trad ing on the basis of 
inside information, if that trading does not take place within the statutory six-month pe­
riod. !d. Because of these l imitations, commentators frequently have described section 16 as 
a "blunt tool" for the regulation of insider trading and have expressed d issatisfaction with 
it. See, e.g. , Steve The!, The Genius of Section 16: Regu lating the Management of Publicly 
Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391 ,  396 nn .9  & 1 0  ( 199 1) (citing descriptions of section 
16 as "crude" and "arbitrary") .  When the Exchange Act was passed, however, Congress felt 
that identifying and prosecuting insider trading d irectly was too d ifficult. Although it recog­
n ized that section 16 was not an a irtight provision against insider trading, Congress believed 
the Exchange Act would encourage voluntary abstention from insider trading. 
Because it  is difficult to draw a clear line as a matter of law between truly 
inside information and information generally known by the better-informed in­
vestors, the most potent weapon against the abuse of inside information is full 
and prompt publicity . . . .  The Committee is  aware that these requirements 
are not air-tight and that the u nscrupulous i nsider may sti l l ,  within the law, 
use inside information for his own advantage . . . .  
H.R REP. No. 1 383, 73d Cong. , 2d Sess. 1 3  ( 1934) .  But see The!, supra (argu ing that section 
16 is not aimed at regulation of insider trading but rather focuses on preventing manage­
ment manipulation of corporate events to create trading opportunities) .  
Section 20A, although addressing i nsider trading, does not contain any direct l imitation 
on trading; it simply provides a private cause of action for persons who trade contemporane­
ously in the market with inside traders. The section does not make insider trading il legal. 
I nstead, it bootstraps private civil l iabi l ity onto other statutory or regulatory provisions. See 
1 5  U. S .C.  § 78t- l ( 1988) . See generally Will iam K.S .  Wang, The "Cont empnraneous"' Tra d­
ers Who Can Sue a n  Inside Trader, 38 H ASTINGS L.J. 1 1 75 ( 1987) (discussing development 
of case law regard ing private actions by contemporaneous traders). 
'0 Section 10(b) provides: 
It shal l be unlawful for any person, directly or indi rectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any 
facil ity of any national securities exchange-
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Neither section 10 (b )  nor  Rule 10b-5  explicitly refers to  insider 
trading. Instead, the SEC and the courts have concluded22 that the 
language prohibiting deception and fraud bars insider trading. 
Based on the reasoning accepted by the Supreme Court, insider 
trading is a fraudulent omission and therefore securities fraud . 23 
Under the common-law tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, 
upon which much of the Court's interpretation of Rule 1 0b-5  is 
based , liability may be premised on omissions-the failure to 
speak-as well as affirmative misstatements.24 An omission is  de­
ceptive or fraudulent under Rule 1 0b-5 ,  however, only under c ir­
cumstances in which the defendant has a duty to speak . 2 5  Someone 
who trades on the basis of inside information has not deceived an-
(b )  to use or employ, in  connection with the purchase or  sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered , 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro­
priate in  the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C.  § 78j (b )  ( 1988) . 
"' SEC Rule l Ob-S provides: 
It  shall be unlawful for any person, d irectly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or i nstrumentality of i nterstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
( a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in l ight of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c )  To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R.  § 240. 10b-5 ( 1991 ) .  
22 One commentator describes this  process by stating that, in the Cady, Roberts opinion, 
"Chairman Cary discovered [Rule lOb-5] prohibited insider trad ing. " Stephen M.  Bain­
bridge,  The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal  and Economic Enigma, 38 U FLA. L. REv. 
35, 38 ( 1 986) (emphasis added) .  
23 Chiarella v .  United States, 445 U.S .  222 ,  226-30 ( 1980) .  
2 '  The original Senate b i l l  that  formed the basis of the  1 934 Exchange Act prohibited the 
use of false or misleading statements and defined "statement" to include "any omission to 
state a material fact." S. 3420, 73d Cong. ,  2d Sess. § 9 (a ) (4) ( 1 934) .  Congress omitted this 
provision from the final statute, deeming it superfluous. See H.R REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong. , 
2d Sess. 32 ( 1934) .  
20 See,  e .g . ,  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 ("One who fai ls to d isclose material  information 
prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to 
do so."); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S .  1 28, 154 ( 1972)  ("The obl igation 
to disclose and [ the] withholding of a material fact establish the requisite causation in 
fact. " ) .  
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yone unless he had a duty to disclose the information prior to trad­
ing. Under circumstances in which the trader has a duty to make 
such disclosure ,  trading in the absence of the disclosure constitutes 
securities fraud. 26 
The requirement of a duty has resulted in some confusing judi­
cial rhetoric. The courts have developed two lines of reasoning 
whereby a trader may be said to breach a duty by trading on non­
public information. These lines of reasoning, which form two dis­
tinct bases for liability, are commonly known as the classical, or 
traditional, theory and the misappropriation theory. 
A.  THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF INSIDER TRADING 
Classical insider trading theory has its roots in the regulation of 
trading by true corporate insiders . 27 Insiders are privy to confiden­
tial inside information about their corporation by virtue of their 
corporate responsibilities. In addition, corporate insiders perform 
these responsibilities subject to a fiduciary duty which has its ori­
gins in statute and common law.28 In 1 961 , the SEC decided that 
the acquisition of nonpublic information by insiders gave rise to an 
obligation either to refrain from trading on that information or to 
disclose it.29 In the landmark decision In re Cady, Roberts & Co. , 30 
26 It is generally assumed that an issuer itself cannot trade whi le in possession of material 
nonpublic i n formation. See, e.g. , Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp. , 704 F.2d 407, 412  
(8th Cir . ) ,  cert. denied, 464 U.S.  846 ( 1 983);  Western Hemisphere Group v.  Stan West 
Corp. ,  [ 1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L .  Rep. ( C C H )  �I 9 1 ,858, at 90,279 (S .D.N.Y. 
1984) ;  see a lso Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post­
Ch iarella Restatement,  70 CAL . L. REv .  1 ,  20-21 & n.77 ( 1 982) (comparing fiduciary obliga­
tions of issuer to those of corporate officers and employees) ;  infra note 29 ( discussing cases 
in which courts found insider's fiduciary duty to others justified l iabi l ity ) .  Under the Ameri ­
can Law I nstitute's proposed Federal Secur ities Code, the term " insider" for purposes of 
insider trading obligations is defined to include the issuer. FED. SEc. ConE § 1 603 (b )  ( 1 980) .  
27 The term " insider" has not been defined b y  statute or b y  the Supreme Court. See 3 
BROMBERG SECURITIES LAw § 7 .4 (6 ) (b )  at 1 80-81  & n . 169 .1  ( 1 969) .  Section 1 6 ( b )  classifies 
d irectors, officers, and 10% stockholders as insiders, 15 U.S .C. § 78p(a )  & ( b )  ( 1988 ) ,  but its 
language is not necessarily applicable to Rule 10b-5. See Moss v. Nlorgan Stanley Inc. ,  7 19  
F .2d  5, 1 0  n .8 (2d C i r .  1983) ("Ordinari ly,  ' insiders' include such corporate figures as  d i rec­
tors and vice presidents, persons who have access to confidential corporate information and 
therefore owe a duty to a corporation's shareholders not to trade on that information. "), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S .  1 025 ( 1984 ) .  
28 See, e.g. , WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A EISENBERG. CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoRPORA­
TIONS 471-548 (6th ed. 1 990 ) ( describing development of common- law and statutory fiduci­
ary duties of insiders) .  
'" in re C ady , Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.  907, 9 1 1  ( 196 1 ) .  Prior to 1961, there had been a 
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the Commission held that corporate insiders who receive inside in­
formation by virtue of their position have a duty to disclose the 
information to persons with whom they deal (or to the public at 
large) or to refrain from trading. 3 1  A failure to adhere to the "dis­
close or abstain" rule constituted fraud and hence violated Rule 
lOb-5.32 
The courts have accepted the classical theory of insider trad­
ing.33 In Chiare lla u .  United States, the Supreme Court adopted 
the Cady, Roberts rationale that insider trading can violate Rule 
lOb-5 as a fraudulent omission or fai lure to disclose but explained 
that liability must be premised on a duty to disclose. 3 4  The Court 
few court decisions that found ins ider trading i llegal as a violation of e ither Rule 1 0b-5 or  
state common- law doctrines .  One of the best  known is Speed v. Transamerica Corp. ,  99 F.  
Supp.  808 (D. Del .  1 951), in  which Chief  Justice Leahy permitted recovery under Rule 10b-5 
by minority stockholders of the Axton-Fisher Tobacco Company who were bought out by 
the majority stockholder, Transamerica, at  an unfairly low price. Transamerica had i n for­
mation, which i t  did not disclose to the other stockholders, that Axton-Fisher's tobacco in­
ventory was greatly undervalued. /d. at 8 1 2. Speed was not technically an insider trading 
case;  l iabil ity was premised on a fraudulent failure to d isclose, which was actionable because 
of Transamerica's fiduciary duties as majority stockholder. I d. at 828. 
Additionally, the transaction in  Speed was a face-to-face transaction so there was no n eed 
for the court to consider the general duties of an insider to the marketplace based on the 
possession of superior information. In general, judicial decisions during this period imposed 
insider trading l iability only in circumstances that involved face-to-face transactions be­
tween the insider and those to whom the insider owed fiduciary duties, typically stockhold­
ers. Bainbridge, supra note 22,  at  37-38. 
See also In re Ward La France Truck Corp . ,  13 S .E.C.  373, 381 (1943) ,  in \vhich ,  in  one of 
the first SEC opinions interpreting Rule 10b-5, the Commission reached the same conclu­
sion as the Transamerica court and held that insiders who purchased stock on behalf of the 
issuer without d isclosing material information to the stockholders with whom they traded 
violated the rule. Again ,  l iabil ity was based on the fiduciary obligations of the issuer and i ts 
officers to stockholders. "The failure to [ disclose] placed shareholders at an unfair  d isadvan­
tage in dealing with their own corporation and those in  control . "  !d. at 380-81 .  
' 0  40 S .E .C .  907, 9 1 1  ( 1961 ) .  
:n Jd. 
:\2 I d. at 91 :3. 
"" See, e.g. , SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. ,  401 F.2d 8:33, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1 968) (en bane) 
(" [A] nyone in possession of material inside information m ust either d isclose it . . .  or . . . 
must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities . . . . ") , cert. denied, 394 U.S .  
976 ( 1 969). 
3' 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Notably, according to the Supreme Court, Chiarella was the first 
case in which criminal l iabil ity was imposed upon a defendant for insider trading. !d. at 235 
n.20. Chiarella involved the prosecution of a financial printer who deciphered the identities 
of targets of upcoming takeover bids from documents he received for printing. W ithout dis­
closing the information he had obtained, C hiarella purchased the stock of the target compa­
nies before the takeover attempts were made public. United States v. Chiarella ,  588 F.2d 
1358, L162 (2d Cir. 1978), reu'd, 445 U.S .  222 (1980). 
1 99 1 ]  INSIDER TRADING 1 89 
stated that this duty may arise "from a relation�hip of trust and 
confidence between parties to a transaction."35 It concluded that 
this type of relationship exists between corporate insiders and 
stockholders,  based on the insiders' obligation to put the stock­
holders' welfare before their own.36 The Court consequently re­
versed Chiarella's conviction on the grounds that he neither was a 
corporate insider nor owed any duties to the stockholders of the 
corporation in whose stock he traded.37 
One obvious difficulty with the classical theory is that it fails to 
explain why the fiduciary relationship between insiders and the 
corporation gives rise to a duty in the financial marketplace to 
speak. In other words , why is trading by a corporate fiduciary de­
ceptive, and who is deceived? Some scholars have attempted to 
base the insider's duty to disclose on common-law principles of 
agency. 38 A corporate insider receives inside information in order 
to effectuate his role as agent for the corporation. 39 Agency law 
prohibits an agent from obtaining a personal benefit in the course 
of serving as agent.40 Under traditional agency rules, any profit an 
3 °  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
36 The Court stated that a corporate insider owes a duty to present stockholders because 
of his fiduciary obligations to such stockholders ;  thus, the insider who purchases stock from 
such stockholders on the basis of i nside information has breached this fiduciary duty. !d. at 
227-28. The Court concluded that it would be irrational to allow insiders to abuse their 
position by sell ing stock based on inside information, even though sales would not breach 
any duty to existing stockholders. !d. at 227 n.8.  
37  I d. at 231-35. The Court expressly rejected the argument that anyone who has i nside 
information owes a general Cady, Roberts duty to the marketplace. For a detailed analysis 
of the opinions in  Chiarella and the bases for regulation espoused by the various Justices, 
see Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agen ts, Evidentiary Privileges and the 
Produ ction of Information, 1981 SuP. CT.  REv. 309, 314-30. 
"" E.g. , Langevoort, s upra note 26, at 1 9-21. 
39 See James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the  Chi­
cago School ,  1986 DuKE L.J. 628, 659 (noting expectation of stockholders that insider will 
concentrate on developing corporation's interests rather than his own private investment 
agenda). 
'0 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 & cmt. C (1957); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1957). 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to the principal not  to 
use or to communicate information con fidentially given him by the principal or 
acquired by him during the course of or on account of his agency or in viola­
tion of his duties as agent, in  competition with or to the injury of the principal ,  
vn his own account or on behalf of anoth er,  although such information does 
not relate to the transaction in which he is then employed ,  un less the informa­
tion is a matter of general knowledge. 
!d. ( emphasis added). This common- law rule is designed to remove the agent's temptation 
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agent receives in  the course of his agen cy is received in trust for 
the principal . 4 1  
Applying agency principles to  insider trading is problematic, 
however, because agency law does not generate an obligation to the 
trading counterparty or to the market. Rather, agency law suggests 
that a corporate insider is unjustly enriched by making use of cor­
porate information for his personal benefit and that any trading 
profits are rightfully the property of the owner of the informa­
tion-the corporation.42 This unjust enrichment takes place, 
though, whether or not the insider discloses the infor.mation prior 
to trading. More importantly, unjust enrichment is  not the legal 
equivalent of deception. An agent who receives a personal benefit 
and thereby enriches himself unjustly does not necessarily deceive 
his principal.43 Thus, the agency analogy neither supports the 
Cady, Roberts duty to disclose or abstain nor explains how the 
breach of that duty violates section 10 (b ) .  
Another possible explanation for the Cady, Roberts duty i s  a 
level-playing-field notion of the securities markets. This approach 
assumes investors are entitled to equal access to securities infor­
mation.44 Any informational inequality based on unequal access, 
to act contrary to his principal's interests in  order to obtain a personal benefit .  See A llison 
G.  Anderson ,  Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Struct u re, 25 UCLA 
L. REv. 738,  758-60 ( 1978) ( discussing fiduciary duties as safeguards) ;  Gareth Jones,  Unjust 
Enrichment and the Fiduciary 's Duty of Loyalty, 84 LAW Q REv. 472 ,  486-87 ( 1 968) (dis­
cussing public policy issues regarding such a rule ) .  
" E.g. ,  Tarnowski v. Resop, 5 1  N .W.2d 801 ,  802  (Minn .  1952) .  The  extension of th i s  prin­
ciple to corporate law has resulted in the development of the corporate-opportunity doc­
trine, under which a corporate insider who receives a business opportunity in  the course of 
his employment may not appropriate the opportunity for his persona l  gain .  The most fa­
mous application of the corporate-opportunity doctrine  involved the case of Guth v.  Loft, 
Inc . ,  5 A .2d 503, 5 1 1  (Del .  1939) , in which C harles Guth,  the president of L oft, a m anufac­
turer and distributor of fountain beverages, attempted to acquire and explo it  the P epsi-Cola 
formula and trademark for his  persona l  benefit .  The Delaware Supreme Court held that the 
opportunity belonged to the company and could not be taken by Guth personally. !d. at 5 15. 
Even in  cases involving the misappropriation of a corporate opportun ity, however, the in ­
sider's conduct may be ratified by the  corporation. E.g. ,  Klin icki v. Lundgren,  695  P .2d 906, 
920 (Or.  1985) .  
' "  See supra note 40 ( discussing common law of agency a s  reflected in  Restatement (Sec­
ond) of Agency) .  
"' See RK'TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRU STS § 203 ( 1 959) (stating trustee is  accountable for 
any profit made by h im arising out of administration of trust, even if p rofit does not result 
from trustee's breach of trust) . 
·I I According to the Supreme Court, the SEC has argued for a parity-of-information stan­
dard. See, e.g , Dirks v .  SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 ( 1983) ( " [T]he SEC's theory of tippee l iabil-
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such as the receipt o f  inside information, compels a duty t o  dis­
close or abstain. The deception, under this approach, is of others 
trading in the security. The level-playing-field concept is based on 
the view that traders should not be able to take advantage of infor­
mation they know cannot lawfully be obtained by others.45  The 
duty to disclose or abstain is premised on principles of fairness: it 
is unfair for corporate insiders to trade on the basis of information 
to which they have access solely because of their position as 
insiders. 46 
The third potential source for the insider's duty lies in the cor­
poration's own duty of disclosure. Trading47 by the corporation it­
self, while in possession of material nonpublic information , would 
constitute securities fraud because of the issuer's duty, under the 
federal securities laws, to disclose all material information relevant 
to investors before trading.48 When corporate insiders obtain infor­
mation from the corporation, which itself may not lawfully trade, 
they arguably inherit the corporation's duty to disclose. 
The foregoing discussion focuses on the absence of an identifi­
able source for the Cady, Roberts duty. The second problem with 
the classical approach is its failure to articulate the beneficiary of 
that duty, i . e . ,  the person(s) to whom the duty is owed. Even if one 
ity [ in both Dirks and Chiarel la]  appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions 
require equal information among al l  traders ." ) .  Strictly speaking, this characterization is not 
true. No one would  suggest that all players in  the investment markets have equal informa­
tion. See Jonathan R.  Macey, From Fairness to  Contract: The New Direction of the Ru les 
Against Insider Trading, 13 HoFSTRA L. REv. 9, 1 6 - 1 7  ( 1 984) (discussing i nevitable advan­
tage of one party over the other in  a securities trade) .  The level -playing-field standard is 
based on equal access to information-a parity-of-access standard. See SEC v .  Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co. , 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1 968) (en bane) ("The Rule is based in policy on 
the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on imper­
sonal exchanges have relatively equa l access to materia! information.")  (emphasis added) ,  
cert denied, 394 U.S.  976 ( 1 969). 
' 6  This concept appears to be the basis of the Cady, Roberts decision. See Brudney, supra 
note 1 3 ,  at 353-54. 
46  More broadly stated, i t  may be viewed as unfair  for anyone to trade on the basis of 
information that is not publicly available. See infra notes 185- 194 and accompanying text. 
47 The disclosure obligations of a nontrading corporation are not clear. The courts have 
suggested that, under certain circumstances, even a nontrading corporation may be l iable 
for fai lure to disclose material developments that would have a significant impact on stock 
price. See, e.g. , Basic, Inc. v .  Levinson, 485 U.S .  224, 230-41 ( 1 988) (discussing when corpo­
ration must d isclose prel iminary corporate-merger d iscussions and suggesting that failure to 
disclose such discussions may constitute fraudulent omission ) .  
4 6  See supra note 26. 
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accepts the premise that a corporate insider has a common-law 
duty to abstain from using inside information for personal trading, 
it does not necessarily follow that the duty is to the market. The 
fiduciary duty viewed by the Chiare lla Court as the source of the 
insider's obligation to disclose or abstain is a duty to the corpora­
tion, not to the market at large.49  The breach of a fiduciary duty to 
the issuer, however, does not obviously constitute the deception re­
quired for a violation of section 10 (b ) .  Moreover ,  the case law 
under section 10(b)  makes clear that every violation of a common­
law duty does not give rise to a violation of the statute's antifraud 
provisions.5° Congress clearly did not intend, through the enact­
ment of section 10 (b ) ,  to federalize common-law doctrines of fidu­
ciary duty.5 1  
Accordingly, the breach of duty must, in some way, implicate the 
policies behind the federal securities laws. The violation of an 
agency-law based principle of fiduciary duty fails to do so. If the 
insider's trading is wrongful because of his fiduciary obligations to 
the corporation , it is not therefore deceptive or fraudulent. The 
corporation has not been deceived in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a security. The courts have attempted to deal with this 
problem by inferring a fiduciary duty to the corporation's stock­
holders. 52 A corporate insider has a direct fiduciary d uty to the 
corporation ; he also has a fiduciary duty to the corporation's stock­
holders. When an insider trades with stockholders without disclos­
ing his superior information, the insider has deceived them in vio-
49 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S .  222 ,  23 1 -32 & n. 14  ( 1980) (rej ecting court of 
appeals'  theory that Chiarella's position or access generated duty to d isclose information to 
others in market) . 
60 See, e.g. , Santa Fe Indus. v .  Green,  430 U .S .  462, 473-74 ( 1977) ( holding statute bars 
only "manipulative or deceptive" conduct). 
" See id. at 479 ( rejecting application of securities laws that would have federal courts 
applying a " ' federal fiduciary principle '  under Rule 10b-5") .  
" E.g . ,  Chiarella, 445 U .S .  at 227 .  This reasoning suggests that ins ider  trading in debt 
securities would not violate Rule 10b-5 ,  at least under classical insider trading theory. The 
applicabi l ity of the prohibition to trading in debt securities has not been definitively ad­
dressed by the courts. See SEC Staff Examining Junk Bonds for Insider Trading, Breeden 
Says, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. ( BNA) No. 1 5 ,  at 525 (April 1 2 ,  199 1 )  (quoting Chairman 
Breeden's statement to Senate Banking Committee Chairman Donald Riegle that applicable 
theories have not yet been tested in courts ) .  Some opinions appear to have assumed, with­
out analysis, that such trading is prohibited.  See, e.g. , United States v. Milken,  759 F.  Supp. 
109,  1 22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1 990) ( finding defendant did not receive material nonpublic informa­
t ion but assumir.g that l iabi l i ty  could be based upon defendant's trades i n  corporate bonds ) .  
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lation of this fiduciary duty.53 
It is not immediately obvious why the existence of a corporate­
law fiduciary duty makes the insider's trading with the corpora­
tion's stockholders deceptive. Apparently, the deception stems 
from a higher duty of disclosure or a duty of absolute fairness aris ­
ing from the fiduciary relationship. For example, if the fiduciary 
relationship generates a duty of objective candor, the stockholder, 
as beneficiary of this duty, may expect that when an insider trades 
with stockholders, the insider has disclosed all material informa­
tion. If the insider does not disclose all material facts , the stock­
holder is deceived. 
One legal source for a greater duty of disclosure in the fiduciary 
relationship is the special facts doctrine/4 an exception to the gen­
eral principle that there is no duty of absolute disclosure.'>5 If the 
parties to a transaction stand in some confidential or fiduciary re­
lationship, dealings between them require the "utmost good faith, 
and full and fair disclosure of all material facts."06 
An alternative source for a greater duty of disclosure is the law 
of trusts. Particularly in older cases, the position of a corporate 
insider has been analogized to that of a trustee. 57 The law of trusts 
governs transactions between fiduciary and beneficiary. In such 
transactions ,  it imposes upon the trustee a duty of the "utmost 
fairness" to the beneficiary, including disclosure of all information 
known to the trustee. 58 Again, the stockholder as beneficiary would 
" ' '  See Chiarella , 445 U.S. at 227 ( " [T ]he relationship between a corporate insider and the 
s tockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation.") .  
" See id.  at 228 n . 10 ;  Langevoort, supra note 26, at  4 -5 .  
' �  See W. PAGE KEETON E T  AL., P ROSSER A N D  KEETON O N  T H E  L A w  O F  ToRTS § 106 ,  at  737-
38 (5th ed .  1 984) (noting that  modern cases find no general duty to d isclose material facts) .  
0 6  Id. at 738-39. Traditionally, the special-facts doctrine did not apply to transactions 
that took place on organized stock exchanges. See, e.g. , HENRY G.  MANNE, I NSIDER TRADING 
AND THE STOCK MARKET 23-24 ( 1966) . 
67 See, e.g. , Oliver v. Oliver, 1 1 8  Ga. 362, 367, 45 S.E.  232,  234 ( 1 903) (holding that officer 
or director is "a quasi trustee as to the shareholder's i nterest in  the shares") ;  Stewart v. 
Harris, 77 P. 277, 279 ( Kan. 1 904) ("The managing officers of a corporation are not only 
trustees in relation to the corporate entity and the corporate property, but they are also to 
some extent and in many respects trustees of the corporate shareholders ." ) ;  People ex rel. 
Manice v. Powel l ,  94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y.  19 1 1 )  ("The relation of the directors to the stock­
holders is essentially that of trustee and cestui que trus t .") .  
'" See GEORGE T BoGERT, TRUSTS § 96 ,  at 348 (6th ed. 1987) :  
If a trustee enters into a transaction with a beneficiary relating to  the inter­
est of the beneficiary under the trust, the trustee owes the beneficiary a duty 
to display the utmost fairness, which ordinarily involves disclosure to the ben-
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expect the insider to  disclose all material facts unknown to  the 
stockholder. 
Finally, the insider's duty can be viewed not as a disclosure obli ­
gation but as a duty of overall or objective fairness. This duty may 
be linked to the corporate-law duty of loyalty, under which an in­
sider may not compete with the corporation or engage in transac­
tions in which he has a personal interest unless those transactions 
are objectively fair to the corporation and its stockholders. 59 
Transactions in which the insider has a personal stake present a 
special risk that the insider will abuse his fiduciary position. 60 
Under this standard of objective fairness, an insider who fails to 
disclose material information prior to trading with stockholders 
has misled those stockholders into entering an unfair transaction. 
The foregoing explanations provide a logical basis for finding 
that corporate stockholders have been deceived when an insider 
buys their stock (or sells them additional stock) without disclosing 
information obtained by virtue of the insider's p osition. Although 
the use of the fiduciary relationship to extend the insider's duties 
to a class of intended beneficiaries of the securities laws is widely 
accepted,61 it applies only to trades between an insider and stock­
holders of the insider's corporation. It is thus one-sided in opera­
tion. A corporate insider who purchases stock is trading with pre­
sent stockholders and arguably defrauds those to whom he owes a 
fiduciary obligation. On the other hand, a corporate insider who 
sells stock is dealing with someone who has no current relationship 
with the corporation. In this second case, the fiduciary obligations 
of the insider to the corporation generate no duty to disclose or 
abstain.62 
eficiary of al l  relevant facts which are unknown to the beneficiary . . . .  
The doctrine applies to a l l  fiduciaries and also to persons in a confidential 
relationship . . . .  
(emphasis added ) .  
•• See, e .g , Lewis v .  S.L. & E . ,  Inc. ,  6 2 9  F . 2 d  764, 768-70 (2d C i r .  1 980) ;  Scott v.  Mult i ­
Amp Corp . ,  386 F. Supp.  44 ,  68 (D .N.J.  1974 ) .  
60 See Anderson, supra note 40, at 760-61 ( noting situations in which l ikel ihood of cheat­
ing is particularly great ) .  
6 1  Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 ( 1980) .  
6 �  The Supreme Court's on ly effort at addressing this dilemma is contained in footnote 
eight of Chiarella ,  in which the CoUit c ites the reasoning of Judge Learned Hand that " i t  
would be a sorry distinction to allow [the  insider]  to use the advantage of  h i s  position to  
i nduce the  buyer in to  the  position of a beneficiary although he was forbidden to d o  so once 
the buyer had become one . "  !d. (quoting G ratz \·. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d C ir. ) ,  cert . 
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Moreover ,  Rule lOb-5 requires that the fraud occur in connec­
tion with the sale or purchase of securities.63 This requirement has 
two elements: the fraud must affect the financial marketplace,64 
and the plaintiff must be a defrauded purchaser or seller.65 It is the 
latter element that is of significance here ,  for as the Court found in 
Blue Chip Stamps v .  Manor Drug Stores , Rule lOb-5 is aimed only 
at "injury suffered 'in connection with the purchase or sale' of se­
curities. "66 Indeed, the Blue Chip Court specifically found that two 
classes of p laintiffs to whom corporate insiders owed fiduciary du­
ties lacked standing to recover under lOb-5 for the insiders' fraud 
because there was an insufficient connection between the fraud and 
a securities transaction.67 
Thus, in B lue Chip, the Court specifically rejected the notion 
that every fraud or breach of fiduciary duty practiced by a corpo­
rate insider upon shareholders constitutes securities fraud. The 
Court restricted the class of actionable claims under lOb-5 to those 
in which the fraud resulted in the purchase or sale of stock by the 
victim. 68 As the next section will demonstrate, this connection be-
denied, 341  U.S .  920 ( 1951 ) ) .  A lthough the distinction may wel l  be a "sorry" one ,  i t  is d iffi­
cult to  understand how this reasoning gives rise to  a duty by insiders not to  se l l  their stock 
on the basis of inside information. Importantly, the opinion of Judge Hand to which the 
Chiarella Court refers addressed the constitutionality of section 16 (b ) , not the obligations 
imposed by section 10 (b ) .  See Gra tz ,  187 F.2d at 49. 
63 17 C .F.R.  § 240. 1 0b-5 ( 199 1 ) .  
•• A s  Judge Friendly explained: 
The purpose of § 10 (b )  and Rule lOb-5 is to protect persons who are deceived 
in securities transactions-to make sure that buyers of securities get what 
they think they are getting and that sellers of securities are not tricked into 
parting with something for a price known to the buyer to be inadequate or for 
a consideration known to the buyer not to be what it purports to be. 
Chemical Bank v .  Arthur Andersen & Co. ,  726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir.)  (emphasis added) ,  
cert. denied,  469 U.S .  884 ( 1 984) ; see a lso Hemming v .  Alfin Fragrances, Inc . ,  690 F .  S).ipp. 
239, 244 (S .D.N.Y.  1 988) (distinguishing certain consumer-oriented statements as not invok­
ing antifraud provisions of federal securities laws because not directed to i nvestors) .  
65 See B lue Chip Stamps v.  Manor Drug Stores, 42 1  U .S. 723, 755 ( 1 975 )  (refusing stand­
ing to defrauded investors who did not trade on basis of misrepresentations) .  
• •  ! d .  at 733;  cf. United States v .  Naftal in,  441  U . S .  768, 772-76 ( 1979) (refusing t o  l imit 
application of section 17 (a) ( l )  of Securities Act of 1 933 to frauds injuring investors, on basis 
that i nvestor protection was not sole purpose of Securities Act ) .  
6 7  The Court's holding i n  Blue Chip denies standi ng t o  present stockholders o f  a corpora­
tion who are defrauded through management misrepresentations into not sell ing their stock 
and to stockholders (and creditors) who suffer a loss in the value of their stock as a result of 
the insiders' fraudulent practices. See Blue Chip , 421  U.S .  at 737-38. 
"8 !d.  at 723. On this basis the Southern District of New York dismissed insider trading 
charges i n  United States u. Newman, holding that the defendant could not be l iable for 
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tween the fraud and the securities transaction has been completely 
eviscerated in cases applying the misappropriation theory.69 Even 
under the classical doctrine of insider trading, however, the con­
nection between the insider's fraud and the victim's injury is not 
altogether clear. 
Although courts have found that trading by an insider or tippee 
furnishes the necessary purchase or sale to satisfy the " in connec­
tion with" requirement, they have not required any tie between 
the securities transaction and the breach of duty.70 The problem 
lies in distinguishing between an insider who sells confidential cor­
porate information to a competitor and one who sells such infor­
mation to a prospective trader. The misappropriation of informa­
tion from the company is  the same, as is the breach of the insider's 
fiduciary duty. Indeed, the damage to the company is likely to be 
greater in the former case. Yet, only the second situation violates 
insider trading law, and that violation results from the fortuity 
that the recipient of the information intends to use it in the securi ­
ties markets.  
In addition, unlike traditional securities fraud, there is no direct 
relationship between the corporate insider's breach of a duty-the 
decision to engage in insider trading-and the transaction that 
causes harm to other stockholders-the ' ignorant' trade.7 1  The cor-
insider trading unless he defrauded a purchaser or sel ler  of securit ies .  Uni ted States v .  New­
man,  664 F .2d 12 ,  19  ( 2d Cir .  1 98 1 ) ,  cert .  denied, 464 U.S.  863 ( 1983 ) .  The Second Circuit 
reversed the dismissal. !d. 
69 For a d iscussion of the misappropriation theory, see infra notes 80- 1 2 9  and accompany­
ing text. 
70 The insider's (or tippee's) trading is the securities transaction with which the fraud is 
connected. See, e.g . ,  SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197,  203 ( 2d Cir.  1 984) ,  cert.  denied, 471 U .S .  
1053  ( 1985) ;  Newman, 664 F . 2d at 18 .  
7 1  Cf. infra note 185 (discussing commentators' v iews of whether insider trading d irectly 
harms contemporaneous traders ) .  Some commentators have argued that insider trad ing 
causes market makers and specialists to adjust the spread for stocks i n  which insider trading 
is l ikely. E.g . ,  Wil liam J. Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U.  
L .  REV. 863,  888-9 1  ( 1987 ) .  
If insider trading induces any  trading, it  i s  l ikely to  induce copycat trades by  investors 
who, although not privy to the inside information directly, hope to take indirect advantage 
of such information by dupl icating the trades of insiders. This process has been described as 
"trade decoding. ' '  See Gilson & K raakman, supra note 1 1 ,  at 573  ( describing widespread 
trading practice by uninformed traders of duplicating trading by insiders based on assump­
tion that insiders are l ikely to possess valuable information) .  
The trading by statutory corporate insiders (officers, d irectors, and 10% stockholders) as 
reported to the government through the fil ing of Schedule 16A is made available to the 
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porate insiders who purchased stock on the basis of inside informa­
tion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. ,72  for example, did not in­
duce present stockholders to sell their stock but simply bought 
stock for themselves before any public announcement of the dis­
covery of extraordinarily rich mineral deposits.73 Those stockhold­
ers who decided contemporaneously to sell did so based on extra­
neous factors and in ignorance of the existence of insider trading. 
Their decision to sell the stock for a price that did not reflect the 
mineral deposit opportunity was the direct cause of their loss and 
was, presumably, a decision they would have made even if the in­
siders had stayed out of the market.74 Accordingly, while the insid­
ers may have breached a duty to the company by making a per­
sonal profit with corporate information, it is difficult to see any 
relationship between that breach and the harm suffered by the 
selling stockholders, who supposedly were the defrauded victims.75 
There is another problem with premising the fraudulent aspect 
of insider trading on the insiders' fiduciary duties to the corpora­
tion's stockholders: the premise is not implicated unless trading is 
effected by a traditional insider and the insider trades in the secur­
ities of his own corporation. For example, an insider, by virtue of 
his inside position in corporation A, receives material inside infor-
public on a monthly basis in  the Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings, 
printed by the U.S.  Government Printing Office in Washington, D.C.  A number of invest­
ment newsletters, books, and databases are marketed on the premise that merely copying 
the reported trading activities of corporate insiders is l ikely to produce superior returns. 
E.g. , VICKERS WEEKLY INSIDER REPORT; THE INSIDERS' CHRONICLE (a  weekly publication of 
American Banker-Bond Buyer edited by Will iam Mehlman); AARON B.  FEIGE:-J & DoN 
CHRISTENSEN. INVESTING WITH THE INSIDERS LEGALLY ( 1 988) ; cf. Dan Givoly & Dan Palmon, 
Insider Trading and the Exp loitation of Inside Informa t ion: Some Empirical Evidence, 58 
J. Bus. 69, 71 ( 1 985) (suggesting that, because of copycat effect generated when insiders 
trade, such trading may generate abnormal returns in absence of any m isuse of inside 
information ) .  
7 2  4 0 1  F.2d 833 ( 2 d  Cir.  1968) ( e n  bane) , cert. denied, 394 U . S .  976 ( 1969) . 
'3 !d. at 847, 852-57. 
' '  See Carney, supra note 71,  at 886-9 1  (finding no causal relationship between unde­
tected insider trading and harm to particular investors ) .  
" Indeed, i t  i s  n o t  Clear that  Texas Gulf  Sulphur could itself have traded stock during the 
time period in question, being in possession of material information that it had a duty to 
disclose to stockholders i f  it  traded. See supra notes 26-29. Thus, the d irect victim of the 
insiders' breach of duty cou ld not suffer an injury through engaging in securities transac­
tions. This d ivorce of the duty breached from the harm suffered is carried to an extreme by 
the contemporaneous traders provision of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud En­
forcement Act of 1 988, § 20A , 15 U .S .C .  § 78t - 1  ( 1988) . Section 20A permits investors who 
trade con tem poraneously with an insider to recover a private damage award. !d. 
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mation concerning corporation B ,  such as  the fact that corporation 
A is about to terminate its long-term supplier/purchaser relation­
ship with corporation B or that corporation A is planning a tender 
offer for the stock of corporation B. Knowing that disclosure of 
this information will have a substantial effect on the price of B's 
securities, the insider trades in  the securities of corporation B. 
Under the principles described above , the insider has not commit­
ted securities fraud. Whether the insider buys or sells, his transac­
tion is not with the stockholders of corporation A, to which he 
owes a fiduciary duty, but with the stockholders or future stock­
holders of corporation B, to which no such duty is owed.76 
Trading of this type is frequently described as " outsider trad­
ing," so denominated because the traders are outsiders with re­
spect to the issuer of the securities they trade.77 Outsider trading 
commonly occurs in connection with tender offers and other take­
over transactions. Insiders of the acquiring company, for example ,  
knowing of the impending tender offer,  may purchase stock in the 
target company prior to public announcement of the offer. Out­
sider trading also has been used to describe trading by persons 
who are not traditional insiders but perhaps could be described as 
market insiders based on their regular access to confidential infor­
mation likely to affect market prices. This group includes securi­
ties analysts , reporters , and financial printers. 
Prohibition of outsider trading requires a theory of liability that 
does not depend on a fiduciary relationship between the trader and 
the issuer of the securities traded. It therefore demonstrates the 
limitations of the classical theory. These limitations are illustrated 
by the Court's finding in Chiarel la that the Cady, Ro berts duty to 
disclose or abstain could not support Chiarella's conviction because 
he had no fiduciary duty to the companies in whose stock he 
traded.78 This decision generated dissatisfaction with the classical 
theory as the sole basis for imposing liability for insider trading. 
Although Chiarel la was a setba-ck ,  the SEC and the courts, most 
76 See Phillips & Zutz, supra note 5,  at 85 ( argui ng that fiduciary duty standard res u l ts in 
inabil ity to apply section l O ( b )  and Rule lOb-5 to persons trading stock of one company 
based on information learned while employed at another company) .  
" S e e  S E C  v .  C lark, 9 15 F . 2 d  439, 443 (9th Cir.  1 990) (defining " outsiders' '  a s  "persons 
who are ne ither insiders of the compan ies whose shares a;-e being traded, nor t i ppees of such 
insiders") .  
78 Chiarella v .  U n ited States, 445 U.S.  222,  232-33 ( 1980) 
r 
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notably the Second Circuit,79 found within Chiarella the seeds of 
an alternative approach to insider trading: the misappropriation 
theory. 
B. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 
The misappropriation theory bases liability on the breach of a 
duty other than the insider's fiduciary duty to his corporation.80 As 
the Second Circuit explained in SEC v. Materia, a person who mis­
appropriates or steals confidential information defrauds the source 
of the information.81 It concluded that the use of confidential cor­
porate information for personal gain by an outsider is misappropri­
ation. In Materia, the court held that a financial printer who had 
engaged in wrongdoing similar to that of Chiarella had defrauded 
his employer, not the target companies. This fraud on the source 
was found by the court to be a sufficient predicate for an insider 
7 9  SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 1 97 ,  201 (2d Cir .  1984 ) ,  cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1 053 ( 1985 ) .  
Thus far, the  only other circuits to  adopt the  misappropriation theory are  the  Third, Roth­
berg v.  Rosenbloom, 771  F.2d 818 ,  824 (3d Cir. 1985 ) ;  the Seventh, SEC v .  Cherif, 933 F.2d 
403, 410 (7th Cir .  1 99 1 ) ,  cert. denied, No. 91 -605, 1992 U.S.  LEXIS 658 ( U.S .  Jan. 27, 1992) ;  
and the Ninth ,  SEC v. Clark ,  915 F.2d 439,  453 (9th Cir .  1990). The theory has been em­
ployed in several other circuits at  the d istrict court level .  See,  e.g. , SEC v. H urton, 739 F. 
Supp. 704, 705 (D.  Mass. 1990 ) ;  SEC v. Peters, 735 F .  Supp. 1 505, 1520 (D. Kan. 1990) ; 
United States v. E lliott, 7 1 1  F. Supp. 425, 431  (N.D.  Ill .  1989) .  
80 The Ninth C ircuit has described the elements of the misappropriation theory as 
follows: 
Rule 10b-5 is  violated when a person ( 1 )  misappropriates material nonpublic 
information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and 
confidence and (3)  uses that information in a securities transaction, (4) regard­
less of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the traded stock. 
Clark , 915 F.2d at 443. 
81  Ma teria, 745 F.2d at 201 ;  see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-40 ( Burger, C.J., dissent­
ing) (applying duty to d isclose or  abstain whenever informational advantage is obtained "by 
some unlawful means" ) .  Ma t eria involved the same factual scenario as Chiarella; notwith­
standing efforts by clients to keep the identities of takeover targets confidential ,  Materia, a 
copyholder for a financial printer, was able to ascertain the identities of the targets. Materia 
purchased stock in the target companies and made substantial profits. Unl ike Chiarella, 
Materia was charged with trading on the basis of information that had been misappropri­
ated from his employer. lvfa t eria , 745 F.2d at 1 99-200. 
lvfa teria was not the first Second Circuit decision to adopt the misappropriation t heory. 
The concept that ins ider trading l iabi l i ty could be predicated on the defendant's defraud ing 
the source of the information was first adopted by that court in United States v. Newman, 
664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981 ) ,  cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 ( 1983 ) .  The Second Circuit has 
continued to apply t he misappropriation theory. See, e.g. , United States v .  Grossman. 843 
F.2d 78, 85-86 ( 2ci Cir. 1988) ,  cert. denied,  488 U.S .  1 040 ( 1989 ) .  
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Fraud under the misappropriation theory is not premised upon a 
duty to disclose or abstain. Indeed, the Materia court explicitly 
rejected the argument that insider trading liability must be based 
on a duty to disclose.83 Instead, the court found that the misappro­
priation of confidential information which defrauds the source84 
satisfies Rule 10b-5 's requirement that the fraud operate " on any 
person. ' '815 
The separate opinions in Chiarella contain the seeds of the mis­
appropriation theory. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion ,  which 
provided the crucial fifth vote in Chiarella , explained that the 
Court had not addressed whether Chiarella's breach of a duty of 
silence to his employer could serve as a basis of liability. 86 Simi­
larly, both Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion and Justice 
Brennan's opinion concurring in the judgment stressed that a 
trader could violate Rule lOb-5 by trading on the basis of informa­
tion that was improperly obtained.87 The Second C ircuit seized 
upon the language in these opinions and expanded it. Eschewing 
any requirement that the trader actually steal inside information, 
courts have permitted prosecution under the misappropriation the­
ory whenever the trader obtains or uses inside information in 
breach of a " fiduciary or similar duty of trust and confidence. "88 
The requirement of "a relationship of trust and confidence" re­
flects the Supreme Court's language in Chiarel la.89  
8 2  Materia, 745 F.2d at 203. 
83 I d. at 203. 
84 !d. at 201 -02; see also SEC v .  Clark , 9 1 5  F.2d 439, 447 (" [O ] utsider trading l iabi l ity is 
premised on the common law principle that when a fiduciary profits from confidential infor­
mation that he had received because of his fiduciary status, he breaches a l egal duty to the 
person or entity that entrusted him with the i nformation.") (quoting United States v. Reed, 
601 F. Supp. 685, 700 (S .D.N. Y. ) ,  rev 'd in part on other grounds, 773 F .2d 477 ( 2d Cir .  
1 985) ) .  
8' Ma teria , 7 4 5  F.2d at  201 .  
8 6  Chiarella , 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J . ,  concurring) . 
87 See id. at 239 (Brennan, J. ,  concurring) (stating that Rule I Ob-5 is violated whenever 
person improperly obtains or converts nonpublic information to his own use and then trades 
on it ) ;  id. at 243-45 ( Burger, C .J . ,  dissenting) ( information obtained through theft, conver­
sion, or other un lawful means cannot be used as basis for trading) . 
ss United States v. Wil l is ,  737 F. Supp. 269, 272 (S .D.N.Y.  1990). 
"" See Ch iarella , 445 U.S. at 230 ( predicating l iabi l ity under section lO (b )  for fraudulent 
omission "upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence be­
tween parties to a transact ion")  ( Powell ,  J. ,  delivering the opinion of the Court) .  
� • 
j 
1 l 'l 
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The misappropriation theory, as employed by the Second Cir­
cuit, imposes liability whenever a trader uses information in 
breach of this duty of trust and confidence. It thus applies in situa­
tions where the trader owes no fiduciary duty to the source of the 
information or to stockholders of the issuer of the security traded. 
The district court decision in United States u. Reed demon­
strates the degree to which this theory expands liability.90 The 
court held that the breach of a relationship of trust and confidence 
between family members was a sufficient basis for alleging fraud. 
The indictment in Reed charged the following facts: Gordon Reed, 
the father, was a director of a company that was the subject of 
merger negotiations. Gordon Reed told his son, Thomas , of the 
merger proposal before it was publicly announced. The son bought 
stock on the basis of the tip.9 1  The court found that, although the 
family relationship alone did not give rise to the necessary duty for 
10b-5 liability, because the father had a long-standing pattern of 
confiding in his son, there was sufficient evidence of a duty92 to 
permit prosecution.93 
Recently, the same court concluded that the relationship be­
tween psychiatrist and patient was also sufficient to give rise to 
10b-5 liability. In United States u. Willis , 94 the district court held 
that the United States could prosecute a psychiatrist who breached 
his doctor-patient duty of confidentiality by trading on informa­
tion he received in the course of treating a patient,95 on the basis 
90 601 F. Supp. 685 (S .D.N.Y. ) ,  reu 'd in  part on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir.  
1985).  
9 1  Reed, 601 F .  Supp. at 690-91 .  
9 2  The court did not explain whether the confidential relationship gave rise to a duty to 
disclose (presumably it did not) , a duty to abstain from trading, or some other kind of duty 
that made Reed's use of the information improper. 
93 Reed, 601 F .  Supp. at 7 17 - 18 .  Defendant Reed was ultimately tried before a jury and 
acquitted. John C.  Coffee, Jr. ,  The 'Chest man '  Case: Misappropriation, Rule 1 -fe-3, 202 
NY L.J. 5,  33 n . 1 7  ( 1 989) . 
9' 737 F. Supp. 269 (S .D.N.Y.  1 990). 
9 0  The psychiatrist learned through his treatment of Joan Weil l  that her husband was 
attempting to become chief executive officer (CEO)  of BankAmerica. The psychiatrist then 
purchased BankAmerica stock on the basis of this information. !d. at 27 1 .  It is not clear 
from the opinion that Sanford Weil l 's efforts to become CEO were generally confidential .  
See Janet Bush, Psychiatrist who Tra ded on Pa tien t 's A nx iet ies,  THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 
May 19, 1990, at I3  (d iscussing psychiatrist's claim that he was unsure information he 
traded on was confidential) .  According to the SEC complaint, however, Mrs.  Weill  also told 
Wil l is that her husband's plans for the company included making a significant capita! infu­
sion. See SEC v. Wil l is ,  Exchange Act Release No. 1 2 ,754,  1991  SEC LEXIS 152 ,  at * 2  (.Jan .  
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that this breach supplied the necessary element for insider 
trading.96 
The misappropriation theory raises more questions about the 
scope and source of the underlying duty than the classical theory. 
At the forefront is the relationship between the wrongful conduct 
and securities fraud.  As alluded to earlier, the questions about 
whether the fraud in an insider trading case is in connection with a 
securities transaction are exacerbated when the victim of the mis­
appropriation is not a market participant. This difficulty is appar­
ent in United States u. Carpenter.97 Foster Winans, a columnist 
for the Wall  Street Journa l, and his tippees were prosecuted for 
trading on information that Winans had gathered for use in a 
Journa l column, "Heard on the Street ," containing stock market 
recommendations. 98 The columns in which the information would 
appear had been prepared and publication dates set, but the issues 
containing the columns had not been published at the time the 
defendants traded. 99 The defendants were convicted of insider 
trading on the theory that Winans misappropriated property of the 
Journal by using information about the upcoming columns as a 
basis for trading. 1 0 0  
Although Winans had clearly violated a Journal rule prohibiting 
prepublication trading by employees, there was no indication that 
this violation injured investors . 1 0 1  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit 
14 ,  1991 ) .  
Subsequent t o  Wil l is 's purchase, BankAmerica publicly announced that Weill  h a d  sought 
to become CEO and that BankAmerica was not interested in  his offer. BankAmerica stock 
traded at prices somewhat higher than in the five weeks preced ing the announcement. Dr.  
Will is then sold his stock for a profit of approximately $27 ,476. Willis , 737 F.  Supp. at 2 7 1 ;  
S E C  v .  Will is ,  777 F. Supp. 1 1 65,  1 1 68-69 (S.D.N.Y. 199 1 ) .  
9 6  Willis , 737 F .  Supp. a t  274-75. D r .  Willis pleaded guilty t o  the cr iminal  charges against 
him and settled a civil injunction action by the SEC by agreeing to d isgorge h is trading 
profits and pay a civil penalty. Doctor Guilty in Insider Case, NY. TIMES, June 29,  1 990, at 
0 1 5: SEC v .  Willis, Exchange Act Release No. 1 2 ,754 ,  1991 SEC LEXIS 152 ,  at *2 (Jan. 14 ,  
1 99 1 ) ;  s e e  a lso United States v. Will is ,  778  F.  Supp. 205, 209 (S .D .N.Y. 199 1 )  ( refusing to  
dismiss indictment in l ight of en bane decision in Ches t man) .  
"7 791 F .2d 1024 ( 2d Cir .  1986 ) ,  aff'd by a n  equa lly divided Court ,  484 U.S.  1 9  ( 1 987) . 
98 !d. at 1026. 
"" !d. at 1 027. 
' "" !d. at 1025. The Wall Street Journal  hf.ld a formal policy prohi biting prepublication 
trading and making the contents of upcoming columns the exclusive property of the .Jour­
nal .  ld .  at 1026. 
'"' A direct injury to investors could be demonstrated i f  Winans pu blished information 
that was false,  intending to induce investors to trade, and thereby profiting from the market 
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affirmed Winans's conviction for insider trading1 02 and, in doing so, 
failed to adhere to the Blue Chip requirement that, in order for 
liability to attach under Rule 10b-5,  the defendant's fraud must 
result in a securities transaction by the victim. 103 Describing the 
lower courts ' findings , the Supreme Court explained, 
Although the victim of the fraud, the Journal, was not a 
buyer or seller of the stocks traded in or otherwise a mar­
ket participant, the fraud was nevertheless considered to 
be "in connection with" a purchase or sale of securities 
within the meaning of the statute and rule. The courts 
reasoned that the scheme's sole purpose was to buy and 
sell securities at a profit based on advance information of 
the column's contents. 1 04 
The Supreme Court affirmed Winans's insider trading convic­
tions by an equally divided vote. The Supreme Court's opinion is 
not explicit, but it i s  likely that the four Justices who voted to 
reverse in Carpenter were troubled by the issue of whether, under 
the misappropriation theory, there is a sufficient connection be­
tween the fraud and a purchase or sale of securities. 105 
effect of the false information. 
102 Carpenter, 79 1 F.2d at 1 033. Winans's conviction for securities fraud was atlirmed by 
an equally divided Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed his ccmvic­
tions for wire and mail  frauds. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S .  19  ( 1987 ) .  
1 03 The Second Ci rcuit had previously established its position that Blue Chip did not 
require l iabil ity to be based on the breach of a duty to a purchaser or seller of securities. 
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 1 2 ,  17 (2d Cir. 1 98 1 ) ,  cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 ( 1983) .  
The district court in Newman dismissed the  indictment because Newman had not  breached 
a d uty to, and thereby defrauded, any seller of securities. !d. at 14. The Second C ircuit 
reversed, finding that Rule 10b-5 does not require the defrauding of a buyer or seller of 
securities and holding that l iability could be premised on Newman's breach of his duty to 
his employer. /d. at 17 .  
' "' Carpenter,  484 U .S .  at 24 .  The  Second C ircuit had previously used similar reasoning 
to find a connection with the  purchase or sale of securities in its development of the misap­
propriation theory. For example, in  Newman, the court concluded that "since appellee's sole 
purpose in participating in the misappropriation of confidential takeover information was to 
purchase shares of the target companies, we find l i ttle  merit in  h is d isavowal of a connection 
between the fraud and the purchase." 664 F.2d at  18 .  
1 05 Inde<::d ,  under the  Blue  Chip doctrine,  see supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text, 
the Journal,  the victim of the fraud, would lack standing to bring a private civil  claim 
against Vvinans for securities fraud because i t  was not a purchaser or seller. Barbara B. 
Aldave, Th e Misappropria t ion Theory: Carpenter and its Aft ermath ,  49 OHIO ST. L..J. 873. 
376-77 ( 1988 ) ;  Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Note, Classical and Cross Insider Trc.ding Varia­
tions on t h e  Th eme of R u le I Ob-5 ,  28 AM. B us. L . . J 109, 136 ( 1 990 ) .  Nor i:. the Seccmd 
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Although it  may be wrong to violate a relationship of trust and 
confidence by breaching an employer confidentiality policy, as Wi­
nans did in  Carpenter,106 or  by using information obtained in the 
course of rendering psychiatric services, as in Wil lis , 1 07 these 
wrongs are not fraudulent or deceptive. It is difficult to understand 
how trading on information obtained through such a relationship 
defrauds108 the source of the information or anyone else. 1 09 If Dr.  
Willis trades on confidences obtained from his patients or discloses 
them at a cocktail party, he has done harm to the trust that his 
patients have reposed in him. The disclosure, however, while it vio­
lates the psychiatrist-patient privilege, does not constitute fraud. 
Unlike the Cady, Roberts duty to disclose or abstain, the acquirer's 
duty to the source under the misappropriation theory is one of 
simple nondisclosure . The source is harmed if its confidences are 
disclosed, regardless of whether the acquirer subsequently trades, 
and the harm is not exacerbated by his trading. 
It is important to recall ,  in this context, that section lO(b)  is 
triggered only by deception. We do not think of the doctrine of 
common-law fraud as applicable to a son who makes use of infor­
mation received from his father in a relationship of trust and confi­
dence, even if by using the information the son is breaching that 
trust. 1 1 0  Once again, we must reconcile the notion of what consti­
tutes a fraud under section lO(b)  with the Supreme C ourt's re­
minder that this section was aimed only at fraud, as well as the 
Circuit's statement regarding the purpose of the fraud satisfactory. According to the court's 
reasoning, any theft or fraud would constitute securities fraud as long as the defendant 
intended to use the proceeds of the crime to purchase stock. Carpenter, 7 9 1  F . 2d at 1 0 3 1 .  
1 06 Commentators have argued that the Journal suffered damage to its reputation. See, 
e.g. , Macey, supra note 44, at 43 ("If  readers thought that the Journal's financial  news was 
tainted by its reporters' quest for personal profit, the paper's influence, and therefore its 
readership and advertising revenues, would decl ine ." ) .  
107 U nited States v.  Wil l is ,  737 F.  Supp. 269, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1 990). 
1 08 In general, in order for the government to obtain a conviction on the basis of fraud, it 
must prove that the defendant contemplated some harm or injury to his vict im.  See, e.g . .  
United States v .  Starr, 8 1 6  F.2d 94, 9 8  (2d C i r. 1 987) ( reversing mail  fraud convic:tions be­
cause government fai led to prove that defendants intended to harm customers) .  
1 0 9  The court in Willis explained that " [b )y  not advising his patient of his i ntention to 
disclose her confidential  information and to profit personally from it, Dr.  Wil lis fraudulently 
induced his patient to confide in  him in  connection with his purchase and sale of  securities . "  
Wil lis, 7 3 7  F .  Supp. at 274. 
1 1 0 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (discussing United States v .  Reed, 601 
F. Supp. 685 (S .D .N.Y.)  reu 'd in part on other grou nds, 77:3 F.2d 477 ( 2d Cir.  1 985 ) ) .  
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caveat that even Rule lOb-5 does not provide a remedy for all 
fraud. 1 1 1  
I t  i s  hard t o  see how any breach o f  a private duty o f  nondisclo­
sure can implicate the objectives of the securities laws , which are 
concerned with duties to the market. Protection of the securities 
markets and innocent investors does not seem to bear any relation 
to whether an employee breached a duty of confidentiality to his 
employer, or a son to his father . 1 1 2  Is it any different to a third 
party trading contemporaneously in the market if Winans traded 
with permission of the Journa l, if Reed lacked any sort of relation­
ship of trust and confidence with his father, or if confidential infor­
mation was overheard by a third party who had no duty whatso­
ever to the source of the information? 1 1 3  
Finally, it  i s  not clear that expansion of  insider trading under 
the misappropriation theory is necessary. There are alternative 
ways to address much of the conduct to which the theory has been 
applied. One of the thorniest areas in the insider trading debate is 
the extent to which the prohibition should cover trading by outsid­
ers. In particular, classic outsiders, such as Winans , do not obtain 
their information as corporate insiders or tippees. Thus, prosecu­
tion of such outsiders requires doctrine to be stretched very thin. 
It might be preferable to remove these cases from the insider trad­
ing area altogether. After all, Winans was not trading on classic 
" inside" information; the information that formed the basis of his 
' "  See supra text accompanying note 68 (discussing Blue Chip decision ) .  
1 1 2  In United States v. Newman, the Second Circuit  expressly cautioned that the indict­
ment was based on a breach by the defendants of a duty to their employer and the em­
p loyer's cl ients, not on a duty to the marketplace or to the shareholders of the target com­
panies. 664 F.2d 1 2 ,  15 n . 1  (2d Cir .  198 1 ) ,  cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 ( 1983 ) .  The Second 
C ircuit subsequently explained, in Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., that the breach of a duty to 
the source under the misappropriation theory cannot be "stretched to encompass an em­
p loyee's 'duty of d isclosure' to the general public ." 7 19 F.2d 5 ,  1 3  (2d Cir .  1 983) ,  cert .  de­
nied, 465 U.S. 1 025 ( 1 984 ) .  But see Norman S .  Poser, Misuse of Confidential  Information 
Concerning a Tender Offer as Securities Fraud,  49 B ROOK L. REv. 1 265, 1 270 ( 1983) ("Re­
gardless of how the defendant received the information . . .  public investors are equally in  
need of protection .") .  
1 1 3  An example of this last scenario is provided by SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 
( W . D .  Okla. 1984) ,  i n  which the SEC attempted to prosecute a football coach who traded 
based on d iscussions he overheard while in the stands at a game. The court rejected the 
SEC's argument s ince Switzer was not in  a fiduciary position and did not know the informa­
tion on which he traded was the result of an insider breach. !d. 
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columns was all in the public domain . 1 14 
Winans conceivably might have been prosecuted for "scalping," 
a legal theory that does not depend on an insider trading analy­
sis . 1 1 5  Scalping is trading by an investment advisor for his own ac­
count based on the market effect of his recommendations to inves­
tors . 1 16 Although scalping is prohibited by the Investment Advisors 
Act of 1940,1 17 these prohibitions probably do not apply to newspa­
per reporters. 1 18 Alternatively, prepublication trading may be 
viewed as traditional securities fraud. 1 1 9  One might treat a colum­
nist's recommendations as a representation to the public, upon 
which the column's readers rely in purchasing and selling securi­
ties. Clearly, when a financial columnist publishes a column of 
stock recommendations, he intends to convey information to the 
financial marketplace and expects readers to make trading deci ­
sions in reliance on those recommendations.  The columnist who 
makes prepublication trades in order to benefit from the publica­
tion effect of his column has a conflict of interest. 120 The purchases 
' ' '  See Brudney,  supra note 13 ,  at  368-71  (d iscussing l iabil ity for trad ing on in formation 
within public domain) .  
" '  See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. , 375 U.S .  180 ,  181 ( 1963) (holding 
scalping to be fraud or deceit upon cl ient or prospective cl ient) .  
" "  !d. at 1 96.  Although an investment advisor may readily anticipate the market effect of 
a good faith recommendation, the danger in  scalping is that an advisor wi l l  recommend a 
given security not because of i ts potential for a long-term price increase but because of its 
potential for a short-term price reaction to the advisor's recommendation. 
1 1 7  15 U.S.C. §§ 80b- 1  to 80b -2 1  ( 1 988).  
" "  The definition of investment advisor under the 1940 Act explicitly excludes "the pub­
l isher of any bona fide newspaper, n ews m agazine or business or financial p ublication of 
general and regular circulation." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2 ( a) ( l l )  ( 1 988) . The statute does not ad­
dress the status of reporters or employees of a publisher. See Cox, supra note 5,  at  385 
(p lacing Winans and the Journal beyond reach of Investment Advisors Act) . 
1 1 9  See, e.g. , Zweig v. Hearst Corp. ,  594 F.2d 1261 ,  1 2 7 1  (9th Cir.  1 979) .  In  Zweig, the 
court found that a newspaper columnist who made a practice of engaging in  prepublication 
trading could be civil ly l iable under Rule 10b-5 for fail ing to d isclose the conflict o f  interest 
i nherent in his  trading. See a lso SEC v. C ampbell ,  [ 1 972- 1 973  Transfer B inder]  Fed.  Sec. L .  
Rep.  (CCH) 11 93,580, at 92,703 (C.D.  Cal .  1972)  ( reporting prosecution of investment colum­
n ist under Rule 10b-5 for prepublication trading) . 
1 2 0  As the Ninth C ircuit stated in Zweig, " [R]easonable investors who read the column 
would have considered the  motivations of a financial columnist such as Campbell  i mportant 
in  deciding whether to invest in  the companies touted." Zweig, 594 F.2d at  1 266; see Cha­
sins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1 167,  1 172 (2d Cir .  1 970) (requiring broker/dealer to 
d isclose fact that i t  was a market maker in  recommended stock) ;  see a iso  B rudney, supra 
note 13 ,  at 369 (arguing that columnist makes implied warranty of disinterestedn ess, which 
is  breached by scalping) ;  Cox, supra note 5, at 385 (arguing that client is a ided in  assessing 
strength of analyst's recommendation by knowledge that analyst "is  serving two masters, 
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will increase in value, based on the columnists favorable recom­
mendation, whether or not the stock is actually worth more than 
the current market price. Thus, it seems that Winans could be 
prosecuted for failure to disclose his own trading to the paper's 
readers/2 1  who are then defrauded in connection with their subse­
quent sale or purchase in relia:qce on the column. 1 22 
Similarly, misappropriation theory covers a range of wrongful 
conduct that can be addressed with standard criminal laws/23 such 
as theft and mail fraud. 124 The burglar who breaks into an office in 
order to obtain confidential corporate information for trading is 
stealing as well as engaging in insider trading. 1 2 5  Moreover, the 
theft of corporate information through less dramatic means may 
qualify as conversion or embezzlement. 1 26  
Many of the proposed definitions of insider trading would only 
exacerbate this problem. With their emphasis on the wrongful ac­
quisition of inside information, the proposals would increase the 
one of  which is his own self- interest") .  
11 1  One commentator suggests that the alternative is to have the newspaper publish a 
statement disclosing that employees are permitted to engage in prepublication trading. Mar­
tin Kimel,  Note, The Inadequa cy of R u le l Ob-5 to Address Ou tsider Trading by Reporters, 
38 STAN. L. REv. 1549,  1571  ( 1986 ) .  
1 22 The theories whereby scholars claim Winans's scheme damaged the reputation of the 
Journ a l  are based on  the belief that the Journal's readers will perceive the content of  the 
columns as tainted by Winans's personal p rofit motive and accord them less reliabil ity. See 
supra note 1 06. 
1 2 3  M isappropriation theory has also been criticized on the basis that it duplicates state 
agency law. Georgakopoulos, s upra note 105, at 137 n.93.  
1 24 In Chiarella , Chief Justice B urger q uoted with approval a passage from a 1 936 law 
review article that stated , " [a ]ny time information is acquired by an i l legal act it would 
seem that there should be a duty to disclose that information. "  Chiarella v. United States, 
445 U.S. 222, 240 ( 1 980) (Burger, C.J. ,  dissenting) (quoting W.  Page Keeton, 
Fra u d � Concealment and Non-Disclosure ,  15 TEx. L.  REv. 1, 25-26 ( 1936 ) ) .  The mere fact 
that the acquisition has taken place through an i l legal act suggests, however, that an alter­
native mechanism exists for redressing the wrong. See U nited States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 
1024, 1036-37 (2d Cir. 1986) ( Miner,  J., d issenting in  part) ( arguing that broadening federal 
securities laws to cover Winans's conduct is unnecessary because conduct could be c:de­
quately addressed by mail  and wire fraud statutes) ,  aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 ( 1987 ) .  
' 2 5  See, e.g. , SEC v .  Cherif, 933 F .2d 403, 417  (7th  Cir .  1 991 )  (convicting under misappro­
priation theory terminated bank employee who gained access to bank after d ischarge) , cert. 
denied, No. 9 1 -605, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 658 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1 992) .  See genera lly Gary Lawson, 
The Ethics of Insider Trading, 1 1  H ARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 727, 767 ( 1 988) (stating that it is 
unclear why state criminal law is n ot adequate for insider trad ing that is equivalent of 
theft ) .  
' 2 "  See, e.g. , Macey, supra note 44 ,  at 28-29 (arguing that Chiarella's u s e  of tender offer 
information for his personal trad ing was breach of contract and theft ) .  
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duplication between insider trading and current criminal statutes.  
For example, the SEC's proposed insider trading bil l  would pro­
hibit the use of, among other things, information that has been 
obtained by or as a result of "theft, bribery, misappropriation or 
espionage. " 127 The proposed Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 
1 987128 would prohibit the use of information obtained by " theft ,  
conversion, [or] misappropriation. " 1 29 
II.  APPLICATIONS OF CURRENT INSIDER TRADING LAW 
Notwithstanding the logical flaws , many commentators accept 
the judicially developed theories of insider trading, based on a fun­
damental perception that insider trading is unfair and wrong. 1 30 
Given this perception, one might conclude that those who engage 
in such trading should be held liable in spite of the diffi culties in 
articulating the rationale for such liability. Even with this ap­
proach, however, the problems associated with insider trading reg­
ulation are evident. The viability of a theory of liability does not 
depend only on whether l iability is reasonable but also on whether 
it can be imposed in a logical manner. 
A. LIABILITY FOR TIPPING 
One fundamental difficulty is determining how to impose liabil­
ity for tipping. Who, if anyone ,  should be prosecuted when an in­
sider, rather than trading himself, tips the information to others 
who trade in reliance on that information? Under both the classi ­
cal and the misappropriation theories of  insider trading liability, 
the original acquirer of the information and anyone who receives 
the information from that acquirer may be held liable for insider 
trading. Indeed, in Cady, Ro berts ,  the defendant who traded on 
the basis of inside information was not a corporate insider but the 
1 2 7  Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed I nsider Trading Bi l l  ( Nov. 1 8 ,  1 987) 
[ hereinafter SEC Modified Proposal ] , reprinted in SEC Compro m is e  Proposal  o n  Insider 
Tra ding Legis lation; Accompanying Let ter, and A n a lysis by A d  Hoc Legis l a t ion Com m i t ­
t e e ,  1 9  Sec. Reg. & L.  Rep .  (BNA) No.  47 ,  at 1 8 1 7  ( Nov. 27 ,  1 987) .  The bi l l  is also reprinted 
in Symposium, Defining "Insider Trading ", 39 ALA. L. REv 531 app. ( 1 988 ) .  
1 2 8  S .  1 380, lOOth Cong., l s t  Sess. ( 1987 ) ,  reprinted i n  Symposium, supra n ot e 1 2 7 ,  at 53.5 
app. 
1 2" !d. § 3 :  s e c  K imel ,  supra note 1 2 1 ,  at 1 564 ("Federal securities laws are not  needed to 
protect employers from theft. " ) .  
"'0 E.g , Brudney, supra note 1:3 ,  at 3.54 -55 ;  Bainbridge, supra n o t e  2 2 ,  at  .J.J - (3 2 .  
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partner of a director. The Commission failed to explain how the 
tippee inherited his partner's fiduciary duty; it simply based liabil­
ity on the fact that the broker knew the information was nonpublic 
and had been received from an insider. 1 3 1  
The courts appear to  predicate the liability of  a tippee on the 
tipper's breach of some duty. As the Court in Chiarel la explained, 
" [t] he tippee's obligation [not to profit from the inside informa­
tion] has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after 
the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty. " 1 32 Thus, it is 
necessary for the tipper to act wrongfully in order for his tippee to 
incur liability. The extent of this requirement was clarified in 
Dirks u. SEC, 1 33 in which the Supreme Court found that Secrist, 
the corporate insider and source of the information/ 34 had com ­
mitted no breach of fiduciary duty in disclosing the information to 
a securities analyst, Dirks. 1 35 Accordingly, Dirks could not have 
been a participant after the fact in a breach of fiduciary duty and 
hence could have no derivative liability as a tippee . 1 36 
The SEC has taken the position that a tippee stands in the shoes 
of the tipper, inheriting the tipper's fiduciary duty. If the tipper 
would be barred from trading by virtue of his insider position, the 
tippee is similarly barred. 137 The Court in Dirks , however, rejected 
this position . 1 38 The Court held that, before a court imposes liabil­
ity upon a tippee, the government must satisfy a two-part test. In 
addition to proving a primary breach of fiduciary duty by the tip-
1 3 1 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S .E.C.  907, 9 1 2 - 1 3  n . 17 ( 1961 ) .  
1 32 Chiarella v .  United States, 445 U.S .  222, 230 n . 1 2  ( 1 980) . 
1 33 463 U.S. 646 ( 1983). 
"' Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America (EF A), disclosed to Dirks, a 
securities analyst, that a major fraud was being perpetrated at EFA. Secrist "urged D irks to 
verify the fraud and d isclose it publicly." !d. at 649. 
1 36 ld. at 666. The Court's method of determining whether Secrist breached a fiduciary 
duty in revealing the fraud to D irks may have been overly simpl istic. The Court concluded 
that the test for whether an i nsider acted improperly in revealing inside information was 
"whether the i nsider personally wi l l  benefit, directly or i ndirectly, from his disclosure."  ld. 
at 662. Thus, an i nsider breaches h is duty in revealing inside information only if  he receives 
a personal benefit from the d isclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a benefit to his reputa­
tion that will  translate into future earnings. !d. S ince Secrist received no money or personal 
benefit, the Court held he had breached no duty to EFA. !d. at 662. 
1 36 !d. at 667 .  The Court concluded that t ippees do not inherit the insider's duty to dis­
close or abstain merely because they receive inside in formation; tipees only inherit the in­
sider's duty if  the information " has been made avai lable to them imp.-operly . "  !d. at 660. 
1 37 !d. at 655. 
13"  !d. at 655-59. 
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per, the government must show that the tippee knew or  had reason 
to know that the information was nonpublic and had been wrong­
fully obtained. 1 39 
Neither requirement fills the void in the Cady, Roberts opinion. 
The Court in Dirks still did not explain how a tippee who does not 
obtain (or pass on) inside information-in breach of a fiduciary 
duty to the stockholders, the source of the information,  or someone 
else-can commit securities fraud by trading on the basis of that 
information. How can such trading be a fraudulent omission if the 
tippee has no duty to speak? 140  Agency principles do not supply an 
answer. Even if the original insider had a fiduciary duty to his 
shareholders,  the tippee does not inherit that same duty upon re­
ceiving a tip.  Moreover, if the insider tips in breach of a duty of 
nondisclosure, it is illogical to find that this duty of nondisc losure 
is converted ,  in the hands of the tippee, into a duty to disclose .  
The problem is further complicated by the willingness of Con­
gress 14 1  and the courts to impose insider trading liability upon an 
insider who tips but does not trade. 1 4 2  Such liability is really sec­
ondary in nature ;  the insider is aiding and abetting the violation 
committed by the tippee's trading. But if the insider abstains from 
trading, he is not violating the Cady, Ro berts duty. Moreover, un­
less disclosure of the inside information harms the company (or 
1 "" ! d .  at 661 -64. 
1 1 0 It has been suggested that a tippee " inherits" the duty from the tipper as long as the 
tippee knew or should have known that the information was improperly obtained.  SEC v. 
Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 439 (S .D.N.Y.  1984) ;  see Phil l ips & Zutz, supra note 5,  at 89 
( terming this the " ' inheritance' theory ." ) ;  cf. D irks , 463 U.S .  at 655-56 ( rejecting notion 
that tippee inherits Cady, Roberts duty absent breach of that duty by t ipper) .  
1 4 1 The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1 984, § 2 ,  1 5  U .S .C .  § 78u (d ) ( 2 )  ( 1988) , provides 
for the imposition of civil penalties on nontrading tippers based on the belief that " [a ]bsent 
the tipper's misconduct. the tippee's trading would not occur." H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th 
Cong. ,  1 st Sess. 9,  reprin ted in 1 983 U.S .C .C.A.N. 2274, 2282. 
1 '"  See, e.g. , Shapiro v .  Merrill Lynch, P ierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 241 (2d 
Cir .  1974) (holding stockbroker l iable for t ipping institutional clients based on in formation 
M errill Lynch received as result of p erforming underwriting work) ;  see a lso SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co. ,  401 F .2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1 968) (describing duty of insider who possesses 
material nonpublic information to "abstain from trading in  or recommending the securities 
concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed")  ( emphasis added) ,  cert. de­
n ied, 394 U.S. 976 ( 1969) .  Indeed, Dirks did not himself trade in  the stock of Equity Fund­
i ng. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665. These cases can be addressed,  as the District of  Columbia Cir­
cuit did in Dirks, by finding that securities professionals, by virtue of their position, have a 
fiduciary duty to the marketplace not to engage in selective disclosure. Dirks v. SEC, 681 
F.2d 824, 840 (D .C .  Cir . 1982) ,  reu'd,  463 U.S.  646 ( 1983 ) ;  see infra note 265. 
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results i n  personal gain t o  the insider) , it is difficult to find a 
breach of fiduciary duty, even when the disclosure is selective . 143 
Thus, the courts impose liability for a tipper's breach of a duty of 
nondisclosure alone. But this breach is no more deceptive if a tip­
pee purchases securities based on the information disclosed than if 
the tippee sells the information to a competitor or otherwise uses 
the information to his business advantage. This contradiction is 
the result of focusing on the tipper's fiduciary obligations to assess 
whether the insider trading prohibitions have been violated. 
Whether the tippee trades is irrelevant. Nevertheless, the SEC 
does not appear to have taken the position that disclosure by cor­
porate insiders of inside information is ,  by itself, insider trading or 
securities fraud, as long as no subsequent recipient of the informa­
tion trades securities in reliance on the information. 
B.  CHOOSING BETWEEN CLASSICAL THEORY AND MISAPPROPRIATION 
A major difficulty in applying the existing insider trading theo­
ries is choosing which theory to use. Courts have not always distin­
guished clearly between the two theories144 in reviewing insider 
trading convictions. 1 411 Nor is it always intuitively obvious which 
theory is appropriate . For example, professionals such as invest­
ment bankers and lawyers are frequent targets in insider trading 
prosecutions based on their misuse of information conveyed to 
them for professional purposes. Such traders can be prosecuted 
"3 An example is a recently settled action by the SEC against Phillip Stevens, the former 
CEO of U ltrasystems Corp . ,  SEC v. Stevens, 91 Civ. 1 869 (CSH) (S .D.N.Y.  Mar. 19 ,  1991 ) .  
See Ex- CEO Sett les Charges H e  Disclosed A dverse Inside Information to  Analysts, 23 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 439 (Mar. 22, 1 99 1 )  [hereinafter Ex-CEO].  Stevens alleg­
edly conveyed nonpublic information to securities analysts that Ultrasystems would have 
lower earnings than expected. The SEC claimed that Stevens tipped in order to improve 
"his status as a corporate manager ."  Id. Apparently Stevens believed tipping would enhance 
his cred ibi l ity among analysts and enable h im to function as a more effective CEO. Thus, 
Stevens's tips can be viewed as attempts to help the issuer rather than as a breach of his 
fiduciary duties .  
1 44 Some commentators believe that derivative or tippee l iabi l ity should be treated as a 
distinct category of insider trading regulation. E.g. , LANGEVOORT, supra note 2, at 1 0 1 -39. 
This belief is based, in  part, on the fact that derivative l iabil ity brings additional analytical 
problems to the insider trad ing debate. See id. at 363-94 ( noting gray areas of insider trad­
ing l iabil ity ) .  
'"  When used t o  refer t o  insider trading l itigation, t h e  term "couviction" should b e  read 
broadly to include cases in which the government has been successful in a civil enforcement 
action or administrative proceeding as well as a criminal prosecution. 
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under the classical theory based on the view that they became tem­
porary insiders when they received information for a corporate 
purpose. 145 Alternatively, under the misappropriation theory, the 
traders may be prosecuted as outsiders who have misappropriated 
the information through the process of converting it to their per­
sonal use. Professionals also may be viewed as tippees,  although, 
after Dirks,  such a predicate for liability appears dubious because 
corporate officers do not breach a fiduciary duty in communicating 
information to professionals for business purposes. 
The problem is illustrated by the recent prosecution of Robert 
Chestman. 1 47 Chestman, a broker, was prosecuted under the mis­
appropriation theory for trading on information about a forthcom­
ing tender offer for the stock of Waldbaum, Inc. C hestman ob­
tained the information from Keith Loeb, a nephew by marriage of 
a Waldbaum insider. 148 Loeb had no inside position in the com­
pany, and he disclosed the information to Chestman voluntarily; 
between Loeb and Chestman there was no theft or breach of confi-
1 1 6 The Court stated in Dirks: 
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is  revealed 
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer or consultant working for 
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. 
The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons 
acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered 
into a special confidential relationship i n  the conduct of the business of  the 
enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes. 
Dirks  v .  SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n . 14 ( 1983 ) .  
When such a person breaches h is fiduciary relationship ,  he may be treated more  properly 
as a tipper than as a tippee. Thus, for example ,  in SEC v. Musella, 578 F .  Supp.  425,  441 
( S . D.N.Y.  1 984), in  which the office manager of a law firm disclosed i nform ation about the 
merger and acquisition plans of the firm's clients, l iabil ity might more appropriately have 
been based on the treatment of the defendant as a constructive insider. Instead,  the court 
determined that the defendant had, in  tipping, misappropriated the information.  I d .  at  438-
39. 
1 1 7 United States v .  Chestman, 903 F.2d 75, 82, 84 ( 2d Cir .  1 990) ,  vacated in part on 
reh 'g, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991 )  (en bane) . The court's decision en bane reversed 
Chestman's conviction for insider trading under Rule lOb-5 but upheld his conviction under 
Rule 1 4e- :3 ,  see infra note 1 50. 
1 1 8 The government's theory of the case was that Chestman had received inside informa­
tion about Waldbaum stock from Loeb. !d. at 75.  Chestman maintained that his trading was 
motivated by his independent analysis of Waldbaum stock. Chestman claimed that he did 
not d iscuss Waldbaum stock with Loeb pr ior  to making the purchases for  which he was 
p:·l•secuted. !d. at 555. Chestman's testimony at trial was cmroborated by that of his admin­
istrati·,·e assistant, who testi.fied that as of late morning or early afternoon of the day 
C hestman purchased Waldbaum stock, Chestman had not spoken to Loeb.  F lumenbaum & 
l'�arp ,  suprn note 8, at 3. 
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dence. Thus, Chestman could b e  prosecuted only a s  a tippee and, 
at that, only as a remote tippee. 149 
The panel of the Second Circuit that heard Chestman came to 
three separate conclusions with respect to Chestman's conviction 
under Rule 14e-3150 but unanimously reversed Chestman's convic­
tion under Rule lOb-5 . 1 5 1  Upon rehearing en bane, a sharply di­
vided Second Circuit agreed with the panel and reversed the con­
viction under Rule lOb-5 . 1 52 The court held that prosecution under 
the misappropriation theory, under which Chestman was 
charged ,u' :3 required proof that Chestman knew Loeb was breach­
ing a relationship of trust and confidence, that is, misappropriating 
information. 1 54 The evidence with respect to Loeb's misappropria­
tion was shaky at best-the information had been passed down a 
chain of family members, in each case upon a pledge of secrecy 
that was broken. 1 55 Loeb received the information from his wife,  
who was not a Waldbaum insider, who had no fiduciary duties to 
the co�pany, and who was expressly authorized to disclose the in-
' '" Ch estman,  947  F .2d  at 570- 7 1 ;  s e e  Coffee, supra note 93 ,  at 5 ( ' 'Put simply Chestman 
was a fourth-level tippee ." ) .  
"" SEC Rule 14e-3 ,  1 7  C .F .R. § 240. 1 4e-3 ( 199 1 ) ,  regulates trading whenever a bidder has 
either taken substantial steps to commence or has commenced a tender offer. Absent public 
disclosure, the rule prohibits trading by anyone who is i n  possession of material nonpublic 
information concerning the offer and who knows or has reason to know that the information 
came from the bidder or the target company, d i rectly or indi rectly. The bidder is exempted 
from this prohibition. 
The Second Circuit panel reversed Chestman's conviction under Rule 14e-3 by a two-to­
one vote. Judge M ahoney felt that Rule 14e-3 was an inval id exercise of the SEC's rulemak­
ing power. Chestman,  903 F.2d at  84 (Mahoney, J. ,  concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) . •  Judge Carman determined that Rule 14e-3 required proof of fraudulent acts and de­
termined that, because the trial court did not instruct the jury on the elements of fraud, 
Chestman's conviction must be reversed. !d. at 86 (Carman, J . ,  concurring in  part) . The en 
bane court, however, d isagreed with the panel and concluded both that Rule  14e-3 was an 
appropriate exercise of the SEC's rulemaking power and that Chestrnan's  convict ion under 
the rule was proper. Chestman,  947 F.2d at 556-64. The validity of Rule 14e-3 obviously 
implicates a number of the issues discussed herein,  but a comprehensive treatment of the 
rule is beyond the scope of this Article. 
151  Chestman,  903 F.2d at 80,  84 ,  86. 
'" 947 F.2d 551 (2d C ir .  199 1 )  (en bane ) .  Five judges dissented from the reversal of 
Chestman's convictions under 10b-5.  !d. at 57 1 .  
' ·' "  C hestman was convicted o f  both aiding a n d  abetting insider trading b y  assisting 
Loeb's purchase of stock and of trading as a t ippee with respect to purchases on behalf of 
h imself and others. Chest m a n ,  947 F.2d at 564. 
"' ' /d . 
," See Chest m a n ,  903 F.2d at 77;  Chestman,  947 F.2d at 579 ( \Vinter, , J . , dissenting in 
part l .  
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formation to her husband. 1 56 Moreover, there was no evidence that 
Loeb ever agreed to keep the information confidential. 111 7 Under 
those circumstances, the court found it impossible to conclude that 
Loeb had breached a duty in disclosing the information to 
Chestman . 1 58 If there was no breach of duty, then Chestman, not­
withstanding the fact that his conduct suggested consciousness of 
guilt, 1 59 could not have knowledge of such a breach. 
At oral argument before the en bane court, the prosecution tried 
to base a duty on the family relationships involved, in  particular 
on the marital relationship between Keith and Susan Loeb . The 
prosecution argued that the marital relationship was persuasive, if 
not conclusive , evidence of a relationship of trust and confi­
dence. 1 60 From this relationship , the government tried to infer a 
duty to hold interspousal communications confidential . 1 6 1  The dif­
ficulties with this approach are apparent. It would be difficult 
enough for the family member involved, much less his tippee, to 
evaluate every conversation with a relative and to distinguish relia­
bly confidential conversations from ordinary family gossip . 1 62 
Of course ,  the government was not required to prosecute 
Chestman under the misappropriation theory. Intuitively, the 
classical theory of insider trading seems better suited to the facts 
of the Chestman case. Ira Waldbaum, the original source of the 
confidential information, was a traditional insider. 1 63 The informa­
tion was passed from Waldbaum to Chestman through a series of 
Waldbaum family members . 1 64 Why is this not a classic case of re­
mote tippee liability? One answer is that the case illustrates the 
above-described logical difficulties with derivative liability for tip-
1 06 Chestman, 947 F.2d at 579  ( Winter,  J . ,  dissenting in  part ) .  
1 07 !d. at 57 1 .  
" s  I d. 
1 06 !d. This conduct included his denial  that he had ever d iscussed the W aldbaum stock 
with Loeb. See id. at 555-56.  
1 6 0  In his opinion,  dissenting on the reversal of Chestman's convictions under Rule lOb-5,  
J udge Winter attempted to articulate a test for recognizing a fiduciary duty b ased on a 
famil ial  relationship.  !d. at 579-80 (Winter, J . ,  dissenting in part ) .  
1 6 1  !d. The Chestman indictment charged that Loeb had breached a d uty of trust and 
confidence to his wife and her family when he tipped Chestman. Chestman al legedly aided 
and abetted this breach by trading. Coffee, supra note 93,  at 5. 
1 6 2  See Chestman,  947 F.2d at 582 -83 ( Miner,  J . ,  concurring) ( criticizing "famil ial  rela­
t ionship" rule as difficult to apply and inh ibiting family discourse ) .  
1 6 "  I d. at 555. 
1 6·1 Jd.  
j 
l ··l 
! 
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pees. 1615 Ira Waldbaum disclosed the information to  Shirley Witkin , 
his sister, for valid business purposes-Witkin had to assemble her 
stock certificates in order to effect the upcoming sale of the busi­
ness. 166 Since Waldbaum 's disclosure of the sale was for valid busi­
ness purposes and not for improper personal gain, it was not a 
breach of any fiduciary duty. Under the reasoning of Dirks, if 
Waldbaum breached no duty in disclosing the information, Witkin 
could not be liable as a tippee for subsequent disclosure or 
trading. 167 
Accordingly, any culpable conduct in this case is l imited to the 
disclosure of the transaction by Loeb to Chestman and the subse­
quent trading by Loeb and Chestman. But this conclusion brings 
us back to the question asked by the Chestman court: why was the 
information confidential in the hands of Loeb? Is the sanctity of 
the marital relationship really the basis for the jury's determina­
tion that Chestman's conduct constituted insider trading? Should 
insider trading prosecutions be a tool to enforce the maintenance 
of spousal confidences? If the concern of the securities laws is the 
protection of investors through complete disclosure of investment 
information, why should Chestman's liability for insider trading be 
dependent upon whether the Loebs'  marriage constituted a rela­
tionship of trust and confidence? 168 
1"'  Professor Langevoort notes that tippee-derivative l iabi l ity, especially based on tips to 
friends or relatives, constitutes one of the "gray areas" in insider trading regulation. 
LANGEVOORT, supra note 2 ,  at 389-94. 
16 6  Chestman,  947 F.2d at 555. 
1 67 I t  can be argued that Witkin,  too, was a n  insider, s ince s h e  owned Waldbaum's stock 
and was a party to the sale that Ira Waldbaum had negotiated. Assuming that Witkin was 
an insider, one m ust analyze her disclosure to determine i f  i t  was an i mproper tip. Witkin 
was Susan Loeb's mother, and when Susan Loeb became anxious that her mother's activities 
reflected a problem with her health, Witkin disclosed the upcoming sale to ease her daugh­
ter's anxiety. Chestman,  903 F.2d at 77.  Witkin did not d isclose the sale for personal gain or 
to make her daughter a g ift, so, under Dirks, Witkin's d isclosure was not a breach of any 
insider's duty. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 579 ( Winter, J . ,  dissenting in part) .  Moreover, Witkin 
told Susan Loeb she could tel l  her husband about the sale ,  so when S usan d isclosed the 
transaction to Keith she breached neither a duty as a tippee nor a relationship of trust and 
con fidence. !d. at 555. 
1 68 The Third C ircuit's opinion in  Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 8 1 8  (3d Cir .  1985) ,  
provides an equally compell ing i l lustration of the problem of identifying the appropriate 
theory upon which to predicate i nsider tradi ng l iabi l ity. Defendant Rosenbloom was an in­
sider of Nytronics, a corporation engaged in an attempt to take over Culton Industries. 
Rosenbloom tipped Rothberg as to both Nytronics's intention to take over C ulton and his 
expectancy that the attempt would be successful ,  based on Nytronics's favorable contacts on 
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The Chestman case is not the only difficult factual s ituation 
under current lines of insider trading analysis. Consider the situa­
tion of a business acting as a major supplier to a corporation. The 
supplier is advised by the corporation's executives that the corpo­
ration has significant expansion plans, as yet unannounced, and ac­
cordingly will be substantially increasing its orders with the sup­
plier. If the supplier trades on that information, has i t  engaged in 
insider trading? 1 69 The supplier is ,  in a sense, a tippee,  but the 
information was communicated to the insider for business pur­
poses rather than securities trading. Arguably the supplier may be 
viewed as a temporary insider when it receives the tip , but it is 
unlikely that a supplier that only receives payment from the corpo­
ration for material provided can be viewed as owing a fiduciary 
duty to the corporation and its shareholders . 1 70 Nor can the sup­
plier be considered to have misappropriated the information, even 
if the executives describe the corporation's plans as confidentiaU71  
t h e  Gulton board. !d. at 821 -22 .  
The Third C ircuit concluded that Rosenbloom's t ip violated insider trading law under the 
misappropriation theory because Rosenbloom "owed [ Nytronics] a duty not to d isclose se­
cret information which would cause others to buy Gulton stock, thereby making i t  more 
difficult for Nytronics to consummate a merger on favorable terms ."  !d. at 822. In his con­
curring opinion, Judge Higginbotham agreed with the majority's conclusion but found i ts 
reliance on the misappropriation theory to be misplaced. According to Judge H igginbotham, 
the significance of the t ip was based on the disclosure of the Gulton board 's l ikely receptive­
ness to the offer, information that came not from Nytronics, the acquirer,  but as a leak from 
Gulton, the target. !d. at 825 ( Higginbotham, J., concurring) . Even under a fraud-on-the­
source theory, Rosen bloom did not owe a fiduciary duty to Gulton as source of  the i n forma­
tion. Judge H igginbotham concluded that Rosenbloom should instead b e  found to have vio­
lated i nsider trading law under the classical doctrine based on the fact that Dr. Gulton, the 
Gulton insider who had contact with Rosenbloom, breached a fiduciary d uty under the 
Dirks analysis i n  leaking the information. Id. (Higginbotham, J . ,  concurring) . 
1 69 Professor Brudney would argue that the supplier has access to an informational ad­
vantage that is not available to the general public and hence should be barred from trading. 
See B rudney, supra note 1 3 ,  at  359 (arguing that supplier/customer s ituation invokes dis­
close-or-refrain rule) .  
1 7 0  I d. at 359 ( " [N]o  legal doctrine seals a supplier 's knowledge of a significant increase in 
orders by a customer. " ) .  
1 7 1  One commentator refers to situations i n  which insidErs, by virtue of their position, 
receive knowledge about other corporations, to which they owe no fiduciary d uty, as "cross 
trading. " Georgakopou!os, supra note 105,  pass im.  The author suggests that, although cross­
trading is not classical insider trading, it can be reached under the misappropriation theory. 
Further, according to the author, i t  should be reached because the policy considerations for 
banning cross- trading are even stronger than those underlying the general regulation of in-
l 
l 
j 
j 
' 1 
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The corporation cannot unilaterally impose restrictions on  infor­
mation the supplier has legitimately obtained. 1 7 2  
Those who argue that trading by the supplier in this case does 
not present the same dangers of manipulation of corporate events 
and harm to the corporation as trading by insiders may consider 
the converse factual scenario, in which the supplier decides to cut 
off the supply of material to the corporation and,  in anticipation of 
that decision, sells the corporation's stock short . 1 73  Should insider 
trading regulation be expanded to cover someone who acts in 
breach of a contractual duty to the corporation , such as that im­
posed by a supply contract, and trades " in connection with" that 
breach? 1 74 
Finally, consider a corporation that deems itself a possible take­
over target. Management, fearing a hostile takeover attempt, ap­
proaches other companies as prospective white knights, seeking to 
enter into :1 merger on friendly terms .m; Although the disclosure of 
sider trading. Id. at 1 33 .  
1 72 The corporation could, w i th  the  consent of  the  supplier, restrict the  supplier's right to 
use the information by contract. This possibi l ity raises the question of whether the sup­
plier's breach of that contract could be bootstrapped into an insider trading violation like 
that in the Carpenter case. 
173 Professors Carlton and Fischel describe the situation of a short seller as providing the 
same moral hazard as that of an insider. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R .  F ischel,  The Regu ­
lation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857,  874 ( 1983) .  
174  Professors Carlton and Fischel suggest that there i s  n o  real possibi l ity o f  i nsider trad­
ing prosecution in  this situation. !d. The supplier, however ,  might logically be indicted 
under the m isappropriation theory, based on the claim that he had a contractual duty not to 
use information derived from his business relationship for his personal gain,  or under the 
classical theory, based on the argument that he has become a temporary insider of the sup­
plied firm. See infra note 175 (discussing situations involving temporary insiders ) .  
1 7 6  This factual scenario is s imilar to those in  a number of  reported cases. For example, in 
SEC v. Ingram, [ 1 987-88 Transfer B inder] Fed. Sec. L .  Rep. (CCH) 11 93,788, at  98,720 (C.D. 
Cal. 1 988) , Ingram, a securities analyst, wa�' asked by the corporation to look for a merger 
partner. Ingram, who was not compensated for his services. located a partner and sat in on 
the merger negotiations. During the course of the negot iations, he tipped several of his bro­
kerage clients about the deal. The court held that Ingram, by virtue of his participation in 
the deal ,  had become a temporary insider who inherited a Cady, Roberts duty. !d.  Earlier, 
in SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1 397,  1399-400 (C .D.  Cal. 1 983 ) ,  a corporate insider asked 
Lund if  he was interested in participating in a lucrative joint venture with the corporation. 
Lund declined to join in the deal but purchased stock in the corporation, realizing a $1 2,500 
profit. The d istrict court found that Lund was guilty of insider trading, holding that the 
insider's approach to Lund made him a temporary insider of the corporation and imposed 
upon him the obligation to keep the information confidential .  !d. at 1403.  But  see Walton v. 
Morgan Stanley & Co. , 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980) ( holding that fi nancial advisor of 
acquiring entity has no duty to target entity even when target disclosed confidential infor-
2 1 8  GEOR GIA LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 26: 179 
confidential corporate information about the issuer i s ,  in these sit­
uations , generally subject to an appropriate confidentiality agree­
ment that prevents the white knight from trading on the basis of 
the information obtained, there is nothing to prevent a prospective 
white knight from rej ecting the suitor's advances and purchasing 
target stock based on the knowledge that the target is seeking an 
acquirer or "shopping the company. "176 These initial contacts may 
precede public disclosure by the corporation that it is a target . 1 77 
III. THE BASIS FOR THE INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITION 
The foregoing analysis of the Chestman decision demonstrates 
the gap that has developed between the regulation of insider trad­
ing and the traditional goals of the securities laws. It  also calls into 
question what should be done to regulate insider trading regula­
tion. Development of the existing case law has been logically incon­
sistent and possibly unfair, a result that is hardly surprising in the 
absence of any clear statutory or common-law prohibition. Com­
mentators have observed that the law is sorely in  need of clarifica­
tion; many have called for a clear definition of the prohibited con­
duct. 178 This outcry requires some reflection on the basic rationale 
for prohibiting insider trading. 179 If there is no clearly defined pro­
hibition, why have the courts and the SEC decided that insider 
trading is i llegal? Are they correct? In other words ,  having deter­
mined that section 10(b)  does not provide an appropriate basis for 
prosecuting misuse of inside information, we are left to question 
mation to advisor for express purpose of exploring acquisition deal with d i fferent acquiring 
entity).  
1 7 6 Whether the firm's trading violated SEC Rule 14e-3 would be a separate issue. See 
supra note 1 50 (discussing Rule 14e-3) .  
1 7 7  In the initial stages a corporation is typically shopped through an  i nvestment banker 
without d isclosure of its identity to avoid this kind of trading. Many in  the industry believe 
that i f  those approached can ascertain the identity of the company being shopped, they are 
free to trade. 
1 78 See supra note 5. 
m In considering the purposes of regulating insider trading, this A rticle will not consider 
the general objectives behind the antifraud provisions. Those objectives have been described · 
as including the protection of public investors against overreaching by issuers, the enhanced 
market efficiency that results from increased disclosure of relevant corporate information, 
and the regulatory function ascribed by Justice Brandeis to disclosure as a d i rect deterrent 
to fraud. See Lours BRANDErs.  OTHER PEOPLE's MoNEY AND How THE BANKERS UsE IT 62-63 
( 1933) . For a general d iscussion of the functions of the antifraud provision and c itation to 
the relevant legislative history, see Brudney, supra note 13,  at 334-36.  
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whether such a prohibition is desirable and, i f  so, what form it 
should take. 
A. ECONOMICS, FAIRNESS,  AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: POPULAR RATIONALES 
FOR REGULATION 
Scholars have debated at great length whether insider trading 
should be regulated. Although an extensive analysis of this debate 
is beyond the scope of this Article, the battle lines are commonly 
drawn between those commentators who believe that insider trad­
ing increases the efficient operation of the markets and those who 
view insider trading as harmful to the markets, the firms whose 
securities are traded, or both. Professor Henry Manne has been 
generally credited180 with focusing the insider trading debate by 
rejecting criticisms of insider trading in terms of fairness and in­
stead basing the analysis  on the perceived costs181  and benefits 182 
1 80 HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET vi i -v i i i  ( 1966) ; Ray A.  
Schotland, Unsafe a t  A ny Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 
53 VA. L. REv . 1425 ( 1 967) ;  Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 
VAND. L. REv. 547 ( 1970) ; see,  e.g. , Carlton & Fischel, supra note 173 ,  at  857 n . l  (citing 
Manne's book as "starting point" for subject) : Carney, supra note 7 1 ,  at  863 n.2 (citing 
Manne's book as "seminal") ;  Langevoort, supra note 26, at  1 n . 1  ( cit ing Manne 's book as 
initial source for artic le) .  
1 " 1  It has been suggested that insider trading causes a decl ine in investor confidence and 
ultimately a decrease in the flow of money to the capital markets. As the Supreme Court has 
observed, " [w ]ho would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game? " Basic, Inc. v .  
Levinson, 485 U.S.  224, 247 ( 1 988) (citation omitted) . Moreover, one of the congressional 
purposes in adopting the federal secur it ies laws was to restore investor confidence in the 
securities markets. See, e.g. , In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S .E.C.  249, 254 ( 1973) ("One of [the 
Exchange Act's] primary objectives was to restore and maintain investor confidence in the 
capital markets of the United States. " ) ;  see also Securities Exchange Act of 1 934, § 2,  1 5  
U.S.C. § 78b ( 1 988) (explaining " [n ] ecessi ty for regulation " ) ;  cf. Spencer Cerek, Note, In ­
sider Trading, SEC Decision-lvfaking, and the Calculus of Inuestor Confidence, 16 HoFSTRA 
L. REv. 665, 675 ( 1988) (arguing that SEC's emphasis on high-profile i nsider trading prose­
cutions may do more harm than good with respect to investor confidence ) .  
In addition, the  abil ity to  engage i n  insider trad ing may  create perverse incentives for 
corporate management, encouraging management to manipulate corporate decisions in order 
to create trading opportunities and to delay reporting of operations to accommodate trading 
by insiders. The former problem is commonly described as " moral hazard." See, e.g. , Saul 
Levmore, Securit ies and Secrets: insider Tra ding and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv. 
1 1 7,  149 ( 1982) ( arguing that insiders can structure corporate transactions in order to profit 
from a decrease in corporate stock prices ) ;  Schotland,  supra note 1 80,  at 1451  (discussing 
belief that insider's trad ing in  shares may i mpede insider's commitment to corporation 's 
business ) ;  ,Joel Sel igman , The Re,form u la t ion of Federal Securit ies Law Concerning Non­
pu b lic Information,  73 GEO LJ. 1 083, 1095 ( 198.5) (d iscussing inside trader's ability to ma­
nipulate release of news, adopt riskier practices to detriment of shareholders,  and profit by 
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of such trading. This analysis ,  while interesting on a theoretical 
level, has not generated any clear consensus, probably because of 
the absence of empirical data. 183  Unless the effect of the legaliza­
tion of insider trading on investor confidence or management be­
havior can be quantified, it is impossible to determine whether 
such effects justify retaining the existing prohibition. 184 
Alternatively, the debate can be returned to the issue of fairness. 
A common view of insider trading is that it is unfair to other trad­
ers. Insiders possess an informational advantage by virtue of their 
position or through fortuity and should not reap a windfall by us­
ing that information for personal gain . 1 85 Whether other traders 
bad as well as good events ) ;  Anabtawi, Note, supra note 5 ,  at 386 (arguing that where moni­
toring by shareholders is  costly and shareholder and management i nterests are not the 
same, managers may fail to maximize shareholder wealth ) .  Section 1 6 (c)  of the Exchange 
Act, which prohibits short sales by corporate insiders, has been cited as a congressional 
attempt to deal with the moral hazard problem. E.g . ,  The!, supra note 19 ,  at 476. 
For a discussion of the possibility that insiders may delay d isclosure to enhance their 
personal trading, see Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 50- 5 1 ;  Cox, supra note 39, at 636-37; 
Robert J .  Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading R ules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large 
Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1 05 1 ,  1 053-60 ( 1982 ) ;  Kenneth E .  Scott,  Insider Trading: 
Rule J Ob-5, Disclosure and Corpora t e  Pri!J·acy, 9 J.  LEGAL STUD. 801 ,  810- 1 8  ( 1980). 
'"" Free-market advocates claim that insider trading i ncreases the use of information i n  
the markets and thus causes stock prices t o  become more accurate. Several commentators 
have made the argument that insider trading is a form of executive compensation and, be­
cause of the type of trading opportunities created, may lead to desirable management be­
havior. E.g . ,  Carlton & Fischel, supra note 173,  870; Ronald A.  Dye, Insider Trading a nd 
Incen tives, 57 J. Bus. 295, 298-308 ( 1984) ( providing formal econometric analysis) . 
' 8 3  See, e .g. , Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 63-65. 
' "' See Easterbrook, Stlpra note 37, at  338 ( arguing that questions of whether insider 
trading restrictions are justified are ultimately empirical) .  
' " 6  M a n y  also believe that insider trading d irectly hurts contemporaneous traders in the 
market by causing them to trade at an improper time or price. See, e.g. , William K.S. Wang, 
Trading on Impersonal Stock Ma rkets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under 
SEC Rule l Ob-5, .54 S. CAL. L.  REv. 1 2 1 7  ( 1981 ) .  Professor Wang has argued that insider 
trading may have the effect of inducing others to trade or preempting the trades of other 
investors. Id. at 1 235-36.  He explai ns that all trading in  securities is subject to the " law of 
conservation of secur i ties," under which the profits gained by an insider m ust be directly 
offset by lo8ses sustained by other investors. I d. at 1 235. Professor Wang concludes that, i f  
insiders profi t ,  other investors m u s t  b e  harmed, although i t  may b e  difficult to determine 
who those investors are. !d. at 1 236-38. But see Bainbridge, supra note 22, at  42-45 (arguing 
that insider tnJd ing causes securities to be priced more accurately in  s ituations in which 
corporation is permitted to withhold material information) ;  Easterbrook, su pra nute 37, at  
324-27 (arguing that insider trading is unlikely to result in unfair  transactions for other 
traders) ;  G i lson & Kraakman, supra note 1 1 ,  at 6:30-34 (arguing that insider trad i ng is un­
l ikely to  have any effect on market pr ice  u nless p rivate information is e ffectively transmit­
ted to market ) .  
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are harmed directly, such as by  inducement to trade at an incor­
rect price , or indirectly, through the presence in the market of 
other traders who possess an overwhelming informational advan­
tage, inequality of information is at the heart of the fairness ra­
tionale. Yet, few suggest that insider trading be regulated by a par­
ity-of-information standard.186 Instead, the unfairness associated 
with insider trading has been attributed to inequality of access to 
information. 187 As Professor Brudney explains, the unfairness asso­
ciated with the insider's use of corporate information is based on 
the fact that the insider has a "lawful monopoly on access to the 
information involved . . .  which cannot be competed away. "1 88 
Apart from insiders who gain access to information by theft or 
its equivalent, when does the insider's access to information make 
his trading activity unfair? 189 Obviously, participants in the market 
1 86 At least one commentator has suggested that Congress enact a parity-of- information 
approach by statute. Seligman, supra note 1 8 1 ,  at  1 1 37 -40. 
1 87 The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the theory that all traders are entitled to 
equal information. See D irks v.  SEC, 463 U.S.  646, 657 ( 1 983) ("Judge Wright correctly read 
our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal infor­
mation before trading: ' [T ] he "information" theory is rejected . ' " )  (quoting Dirks v.  SEC, 
681 F.2d 824, 837 (D.C. Cir .  1 982 ) ,  reu'd, 463 U.S .  646 ( 1983 ) ) .  
Although many argue that the level-playing-field theory i s  addressed not t o  equal i nfor­
mation but to equal access, the Court in Chiarella also rejected unequal access to informa­
tion as a basis for imposing l iabil ity. Chiarella v .  United States, 445 U .S .  222, 235 n .20 
( 1980 ) .  Even the Second Circuit, with its expansive view of insider trading, does not take 
the position that the regulation of insider trading is designed to equalize access to i nforma­
tion. "We do not say that merely using information not available or a ccessible to others 
gives rise to a violation of Rule 1 0b-5 . . . .  There are d isparities in knowledge a nd the 
auailability thereof at many levels of market functioning that the law does not presume to 
address." United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1 024,  1031  (2d Cir .  1 986) ( emphasis added ) .  
1 8 8  Brudney, s upra note 1 3 ,  at 346. 
189 It is unclear why disparate access to information and the exploitation of that ;c, ccess 
present a unique problem in the securities industry. Business transactions are routinely 
predicated on the fact that one party to the transaction has superior information of which it  
intends to take advantage. An obvious example is the series of real estate purchases that 
gave rise to the i nsider trading opportunity in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case. SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co. ,  401  F.2d 833, 844 (2d Cir. 1 968) (en bane) , cert . denied, 394 U.S .  976 
( 1969) .  Texas Gulf Sulphur was buying land because of its superior knowledge that there 
were extraord inary mineral deposits in that land, without revealing its d iscovery to the sell­
ers. I d .  Although the purchases may have been unfair to the sellers, they surely wen; not 
fraudulent. Indeed, the Ontario High Court of Justice, in  a case arising out of the sc:me 
factual situation as that l itigated before the Second Circuit, found that Texas Gulf Sulphur 
had done what any prudent mining company would do in pursuing the purchases without 
disclosing the d iscovery. Leitch Gold M ines, Ltd. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co . ,  1 O . H .  469.  
492-93 ( 1969) .  For a further discussion, see Anthony Kronman, Mistake,  Disclosure.  Infor­
ma tion, and the Law of Contracts ,  7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20- 2 1  ( 1 978) .  
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do not possess equivalent information. For example, the average 
analyst or other market professional has a great deal more infor­
mation about the stocks he trades than the average small investor. 
Although this inequality may be unfair/90 it is not seriously sug­
gested that analysts be precluded from taking advantage of this 
informational asymmetry. 191  Market professionals expend a great 
deal of effort trying to obtain information that does not duplicate 
what everyone else has, 192 through discussions with corporate in-
1 90 Even advocates of the equal  access theory of regulation accep t  that  there is " system­
atic inequality of lawful access to information by reason of disparit ies among individual 
investors with respect to power, wealth, d iligence, or intelligence." B rudney,  supra note 1 3 ,  
a t  360. I t  has been suggested that the unfairness o f  a llowing investment analysts t o  trade on 
and sell superior in formation is  addressed by the fact that, while every investor cannot be­
come a corporate insider or the confidante of such an insider, everyone can obtain the ser­
vices of an investment analyst. Donald C .  Langevoort, Investment A n a lysts and the Law of 
Insider Trading, 76 VA. L .  REv. 1 023,  1032 ( 1 990) .  Therefore, all investors do have access to 
analyst in formation. 
This argument overlooks two factors. First, even among the customers of an investment 
analyst, there i s  asymmetrical access to information. Many analysts selectively allocate the 
information they obtain ,  auctioning valuable information off to the  h ighest bidder, or dis­
closing the most significant information only in oral conversations with favored clients. The 
information received by the typical investor, such as i n  the form of the firm's newsletter ,  i s  
often markedly inferior. !d.  at 1 039. Indeed,  in  the Dirks case, i t  was D irks's allocation of  
h i s  information to  his large institutional clients at  the  expense of  smaller investors that  the  
D istrict of Columbia Circuit found to  be unfair. Dirks v.  SEC,  681  F .2d 824 ,  84 1 (D.C.  Cir .  
1 982) ,  rev 'd, 463 U.S .  646 ( 1 983) .  
Second, the customers of an investment analyst pay for the i n formation they obtain. 
While an analyst is not an absolute free rider, i t  is unclear why h e  should be compensated 
for the information acquired. That is, why has the analyst acquired some sort of property 
r ight in the information by virtue of the t ip? Even if the analyst system achieves market 
efficiency, why is i t  socially preferable to allowing corporate insiders to sell  information di­
rectly to the public? 
1 9 1  Anaiysts may garner personal advantage from trading for their  p roprietary accounts, 
from bonuses and other compensation schemes that reward superior i nformation, and from 
benefit to their reputations. Moreover, because superior information generates greater busi­
ness and the market for financial services is highly competitive, an a nalyst who has access to 
inside information furthers his career substantially. See Langevoort, sttpra note 1 90 ,  at 
1 042-43. 
1 "2  The average small investor is automatical ly at  a d isadvantage due to his inabil ity to 
follow the market and its developments on a full-t ime basis. C harles C .  Cox & Kevin S. 
Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 360 n.23 ( 1988 ) .  Some scholars, 
such as Professor Brudney, would not be concerned with this d isparity ,  arguing that the 
relevant distinction is not equality of in formation but equality of access and that as long as 
any investor may, through expending sufficient resources, obtain the equivalent information, 
the investment professional's informational advantage is not unfair .  Brudney, supra note 1 3 ,  
a t  322 .  This argument begs t h e  question: Should t h e  inquiry focus o n  actual access o r  theo­
retical access? See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 330 (pointing out that access to informa­
tion is function of cost of obtaining information and that inequality of access is thus natural 
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siders , following the progress of important litigation , or monitoring 
news reports and the Dow Jones tape constantly. 1 93 Should the 
arbitrageur who keeps close watch on an important lawsuit be pre­
cluded from trading as soon as the court announces its ruling be­
cause he has an informational advantage over the rest of the in­
vesting public? 1 94 
If not, how can legal informational advantages be distinguished 
from those that form an impermissible basis for trading? 195 The 
method employed by existing legal theory is to brand as impermis­
sible those informational advantages acquired through the breach 
of a fiduciary duty. Yet, for the investor-victim, it is irrelevant 
whether the trader has acquired inside information through the 
breach of a duty or not; anyone who trades based on superior in­
formation not available to the investing public has obtained a trad­
ing advantage that is arguably unfair . 196 Moreover, as previously 
result of unequal d istribution of i ntell igence, wealth, and investment of human capital). 
193 Indeed, arbitrageurs go much further, attempting to ferret out information directly 
from corporate insiders. An arbitrageur's assessment of an investment opportunity may be 
based en factors that include not merely what an insider says, but also his " tone of voice, 
. . .  the way a question was answered or avoided, or . . .  the fact that a telephone call was 
not returned ."  Sarah Bartlett, Business and Law: Cases Illustrate Wa li St . 's Edge,  NY 
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1 989, at D2.  
1 9 '  As Professor Brudney observes, the search for relevant corporate and economic infor­
mation is a service of value to the functioning of the capital markets. The search entails 
research costs that will not be allocated for that purpose unless the investor is able to re­
ceive the rewards of the informational benefits so obtained. Brudney, supra note 13 ,  at 341 . 
On the other hand, it is possible that the selective favorable treatment of the fi nancial com­
munity leads to excessive research and competition for superior information. 
1 96 This question assumes that all informational asymmetry is not unfair .  Although the 
Supreme Court has rejected the level - playing-field underpinning for insider trading regula­
tion and has refused to uphold l iabi l ity in the absence of a breach of duty, see supra note 
187, Congress could choose to impose such a standard. 
1 96 An example of trading that appears improper but i nvolves no breach of a fiduciary 
duty is pre-offer trading by a prospective tender offerm. When an individual who is about to 
make a tender offer for the stock of a target company purchases stock p rior to announcing 
the tender offer,  he is, in some sense, trading on inside information about the forthcoming 
announcement, but since the bidder owns the information , the trading is legal .  See Chiarella 
v. Un ited States, 445 U.S. 222, 2 ::l 1 -32 n . 14 ( 1 980) ("The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit previously held, in a manner consistent with our analysis here, that a tender offeror 
does not violate § lO (b)  when it makes preannouncement purchases precisely because there 
is no relationship between the offeror and the seller . . . .  ") (citing General Time Corp. v. 
Talley Indus.,  403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir .  1968 ) ,  cert. denied.  393 U.S. 1 026 ( 1969 ) ) .  Yet, if 
the bidder tells a friend about the offer, which, as owner of the information, he should be 
entitled to do, and the friend proceeds to trade in the target company's stock, the friend's 
trad ing violates Rule 1 4e-3 .  See supra note 1 50 (discussing Rule l4e -::l ) .  
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discussed, neither the insider 's fiduciary duty to the firm nor the 
misappropriator 's duty to the source forms a logical and consistent 
justification for prohibiting trading. Most importantly, in this re­
gard, applying the Court's rules regarding fiduciary duty requires 
reference to the parties'  private agreement. For example, if the 
Wall Street  Journal had not had a rule maintaining the confiden­
tiality of its columns, \Vinans would not have breached a fiduciary 
duty by trading on the information contained in those columns. 
Similarly, if a corporation, through charter amendment, stock­
holder vote , or the equivalent, authorized its management to trade 
on the basis of inside information, there would be no breach of 
management's duty to stockholders upon which to predicate classi­
cal insider trading liability. 197 
This analysis has led some commentators to view insider trading 
in terms of property rights . 1 98 If corporate information is consid­
ered the property of the firm, then the conversion of the property 
for the insider's personal use is a theft. 199 Under this theory, an 
insider or misappropriator is a thief, and his tippee is receiving 
stolen property. 200 The property rights theory provides a justifica­
tion for prosecuting Winans for stealing information about upcom­
ing columns from his employer ,  even though the Wall  Street Jour­
nal would have been free to trade on the information in 
question. 2 0 1  
1 9 7  Although i t  is rarely argued that  corporations should be able to  authorize insider trad­
ing d i rectly by treating corporate information as property and contractually bargaining with 
management about the allocation of rights in that property, some commentators assert that 
corporations would be able to authorize such trading indirectly by relieving management of 
a fiduciary obligation not to trade. E.g. , Nicholas Wolfson, Trade Secrets and Secret Trad­
ing, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 95,  1 13 ( 1 988) .  
' 98 See.  e.g . ,  Carlton & Fischel ,  supra note 1 73, at  861 ;  Easterbrook,  s upra note 37 ,  at  3:3 1 ;  
Edmund W. Kitch, The Law a n d  Economics o f  Righ ts i n  Va luable Informa tion,  9 J .  LEGAL 
STUD. 683, 7 18 - 1 9  ( 1980 ) ;  Lawson, supra note 1 25 ,  at 759;  Macey, supra note 44, at 9;  Rich­
ard J .  Morgan, Insider Tra ding and the Infringement of Property R ights,  48 OHIO ST. L.J. 
79 ( 1987) .  
1 9 9  Additionally, use of the information by the insider may impair the corporation's abi l ­
i ty  to  exploit it  further. The corporate owner may require that confidential ity be maintained 
in order to profit fully. See, e.g. , SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. ,  401 F.2d 833 ( 2d Cir. 1 968) 
( find ing that corporation maintained confidentiality of dri l l ing results in  order to confirm 
results and acquire land) ,  cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 ( 1969 ) .  
'0" Lawson, supra note 1 25, a t  767 ("Mr.  Levine was thus a garden-variety thief, and Mr.  
Boesky, who traded on the information and spl i t  the profits with Mr. Levine ,  was a fence ." ) .  
' " 1  According to  the  defendants in Carpenter, this anomaly meant the ir  trading couid not 
violate the law. The court responded by explaining that, while the .Journal might lawfully 
l 
l 
j 
·i 
1 
l 
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The property rights approach also offers a method for dealing 
with two of the examples posed earlier: that of the corporate sup­
plier and that of the prospective white knight. 202 While neither has 
unilaterally created the inside information in the sense that would 
give rise to an unequivocal ownership i:1terest, both are trading on 
the basis of information voluntarily imparted by a third party for 
the purpose of business dealings. The third party has the opportu­
nity to preclude trading on the basis of those dealings by contract, 
thereby restricting property rights in the information. Absent such 
a contractual provision, there is no misuse or theft in trading on 
the information. 
A more troubling aspect of treating inside information as prop­
erty is that such treatment does not justify government interven­
tion to allocate the property rights to information. If inside infor­
mation is the property of the firm producing it, why is it different 
from any other firm property, which the firm may allocate, as it 
chooses, by contract?203 This view would enable a firm to authorize 
its officers or employees to trade on the basis of inside information. 
The firm would, in effect, be opting out of the government enforce­
ment of its property rights . 204 In other words, viewing inside infor­
mation as property justifies treating the misappropriation of that 
undermine i ts reputation by trading on the basis of its knowledge of forthcoming publica­
tions, " its employees should be and are barred from destroying their employer's informa­
tional property." United States v.  Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1 024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1 986) .  
' ""  See supra text accompanying notes 169- 177 .  
203 This  argument is detailed in the  seminal article by Professors Carlton and Fischel. 
They argue that insider trading would be regulated more efficiently i f  firms were free to 
authorize insiders to trade. Carlton & F ischel, s upra note 173, passim. Professor Fischel and 
Judge Easterbrook have observed that pr ivate contract theory may not achieve optimal allo­
cation of the property rights in information due to a variety of factors, including the diffi­
culty in enforcing contracts that restrict insider trading because of the practical problems of 
detecting improper trades. Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as a n  Agency Problem, 
in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS THE STRUCTURE OF BusiNESS 8 1 ,  90-97 (John W. Pratt & Richard 
J. Zeckhauser eds . ,  1985) [ hereinafter Easterbrook, Agency Proble m ] ;  Easterbrook, s upra 
note 37, at 332-35; Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, Trading on Inside Informa­
tion, 36 LAw ScH. REc. 10,  14 ( 1 990) .  
Although these observations m a y  explain why firms have n o t  chosen t o  regulate insider 
trading by private contract, they do not justify a government ban on such contracts. "Public 
enforcement of antitheft laws does not imply that consensual transfers of property ought to 
be forbidden; just so with inside trading rules." !d. at 14 .  
20 1 Additionally, the  firm would be able to sell the information to  others. S e e  Jonathan R .  
Macey, From Ju dicial Solutions to Political Solutions: The New, New Directions o f  the 
Ru les Aga inst Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REv. 355,  376 ( 1 988). 
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property as theft but correspondingly requires the government to 
defer to firm decisions contractually allocating the entitlement to 
that property.205  
If the wrong associated with insider trading is a harm to the is­
suer or to the source, as suggested by the classical and misappro­
priation theories, respectively, the harm m ight be  addressed 
through a regulation that protects property rights in  information 
but allows firms to bargain away those rights voluntarily, restrict­
ing the government's involvement to enforcement of the privately 
negotiated bargain.206 B ut perhaps existing theories o f  insider trad­
ing misapprehend the significance of insider trading. Is  the ration­
ale for the public perception that insider trading is  wrong actually 
based on a perception that corporate insiders damage the issuer 
when they trade? This perspective seems unlikely. It  is more plau­
sible that the public views insider trading as damaging to traders 
and to the trading markets. The insider , by virtue of his position, 
has obtained an unfair informational advantage over o ther traders.  
Thus, the traditional views of insider trading distort the doctrine 
by ignoring the concepts of market duty and market harm. 
B.  JUSTIFYING REGULATION ON THE BASIS OF AN INSIDER'S DUTY TO 
THE MARKET 
It might be argued that the Court in Chiarella rejected a general 
duty of disclosure to the market and that such a duty, therefore, 
' " 5  According to Coase's theorem,  in  the absence of substantial transaction costs , property 
rights will be transferred to those who can exploit them most p rofitably. See genera lly 
David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U 
L REv. 1 449 ( 1987 ) (concluding, based on Coasian analysis, that ordinary s hareholders 
would be better off if  firms were allowed to opt out of proscriptions of current insider trad­
ing law ) .  The SEC has not taken the position that informational rights can be transferred as 
property. For example, SEC Rule 14e-3 is inconsistent with the p roperty rights approach 
because it prohibits a b idder from consensually transferring i ts property rights in  informa­
tion about a prospective tender offer to third parties. See, e.g. , 17 C .F .R .  § 240. 1 4e-3 ( 199 1 ) ;  
Morgan , supra note 198, a t  1 1 3 (arguing that, under a property r ights approach , bidder 
should be free to do whatever he  wants with such information, including giving it to others ) .  
20" This approach would address the concern that private enforcement is too di fficult and 
costly to be effective in  banning insider trading, even where such trad ing is ineflicient. See 
Easterbrook, Agency Pro ble m ,  supra note 203, at 94-95 ( arguing that,  if fi rm cannot meet 
costs of establ ishing program to prohibit insider trad ing and of  detecting improper trades, it 
is unl ikely to adopt private prohi bition, even where prohibition is socially beneficia l ) .  See 
genera l ly supra note 203. 
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cannot be the basis for imposing insider trading liability. 207 There 
are two responses to this argument. First, the Court in Chiare lla 
rejected the concept that everyone, corporate insider or not, has a 
general duty to the market.208 The Court, however ,  did not con­
sider the specific question of whether a corporate insider such as 
an officer or director, by virtue of his position, has a duty to the 
trading market not to misuse nonpublic information. 
Second, the Chiarella decision represents an interpretation of fi­
duciary duties under the existing statutory language of section 
10(b) .209 As demonstrated earlier ,  section l O (b)  is a poor statutory 
choice for regulating insider trading. 2 1 0  I f  regulation is to be ef­
fected by a new statute, however, the limitations of Chiare lla need 
not apply. l'vloreover, if we are engaged in a search for an appropri ­
ate statutory definition, i t  seems appropriate to tie that definition 
to the rationale for regulation. Finally, imposing a market duty 
upon insiders is consistent with the overall structure and objectives 
of the federal securities laws, which are aimed primarily at the pro­
tection of investors and the capital markets , not at the protection 
of such fiduciary relationships as the physician-patient 
relationship. 2 1 1  
Accordingly, a revised statutory approach to insider trading reg­
ulation can be predicated on the theory that a corporate insider 
has a duty to the marketplace not to misuse nonpublic informa­
tion . Why is the insider's use of non public information unfair? The 
answer can be explained, in part, by the importance of the capital 
markets to the large publicly held corporation. Absent a system in 
which corporations have ready access to capital markets, access 
which is facilitated by the availability of safe, liquid , regulated 
markets for secondary trading, the public corporation would be un­
likely to attain the same size and dominance. This growth, in turn, 
provides management with unparalleled opportunities for wealth 
and status .  Thus, in a sense, the corporate insider's superior ac­
cess, due to his position , may be partially attributed to government 
and public participation in the markets. It is the fact that an in-
""' See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,  2 3 1 ,  233 ( 1 980) ( reject ing duty of 
Chiarel la "to the market as a whole " ) .  
too J d. 
"0" See id. at 2 3 2 - 35 (premising holding on language of section 1 0( b ) ) .  
2 1 0  See supra Part II. 
" 1 1  See United States v. Wil l i s ,  737 F .  Supp.  269, 272 (S .D .N .Y 1 990) .  
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sider has obtained his informational advantage because of his posi­
tion, and the fact that this position is attributable to the presence 
of other less-privileged transactors in the market, that makes the 
insider's use of nonpublic information unfair. This conclusion does 
not necessarily imply that other market transactors are hurt by in­
sider trading.2 1 2 
C .  A POLITICAL EXPLANATION FOR REGULATION O F  INSIDER TRADING 
Before considering the new proposal , it is necessary to consider 
one additional factor: why the status quo prohibits insider trading. 
The preceding analysis suggests that the proffered justifications for 
regulating insider trading, particularly under the existing statutory 
scheme, are unconvincing. Yet in spite of the logical inconsisten­
cies, insider trading enforcement continues as a high priority, and 
the SEC continues to expand its enforcement efforts with more ag­
gressive prosecutions and calls for stiffer sentences. The expansion 
of liability under section l O (b)  is particularly surprising in view of 
the fact that the objectives of existing insider trading theory could 
be achieved more precisely by strengthening state law doctrines of 
fiduciary duty,213  coupled with the existing federal prohibition on 
short swing trading and short sales by corporate insiders.2 1 .1 Before 
attempting to address the deficiencies in the existing regulatory 
scheme, it is important to understand the reasons for its evolution. 
This question can be answered,  in part, by looking to who benefits 
from insider trading regulation. 
This Article contends that at least three major interest groups 
are beneficiaries of the existing regulatory scheme. One of these 
� 1 2  B u t  cf. supra note 1 8 5  (c it ing participants i n  debate over whether inside trad ing 
harms other market transactor s ) .  
2 1 3 Many commentators, of course, v i e w  state law as a n  unsatisfactory m e t h o d  of d i s c i ­
p l i n i ng corporate insiders because of general i nstitutional fai lures s u c h  a s  the ineffectiveness 
o f  the derivative s u i t  and other tools for e nforcement of state-law fiduciary duties.  See, e.g. , 
.J i l l  E. Fisch, Fra nkenstein 's Monster Hits the Campaign Tra il. An Approach to Regu la tion 
of Corpora te  Political Expenditures, 32 W:vt & MARY L. REv.  587,  638 n n . 26 1 -63 ( 1 99 1 )  
(c it ing articles which assert that voting and derivative suits d o  not provide sufficient s hare­
holder control or managerial accountabi i ity) . In addition,  the wil l ing n ess of state legislatures 
and courts to decrease protection of shareholders in the i n terest of attracting corporate 
franchises, the so- called race to the bottom, suggests that states w i l l  be slow to expand 
fi duci ary principles to l i m i t  insider  trad i n g  activity. See id.  at 635 n n . 246-47 (arguing that 
state legislatures are influenced by revenues of corporate fra nchise tax ) .  
·n • S e e  su pra note 1 9 .  
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groups is the securities analysts. Securities analysts earn their live­
lihood by analyzing publicly available information215  and attempt­
ing to determine when a particular security represents a good in­
vestment. Because they have the time and expertise to acquire 
superior information, analysts are at an informational advantage 
over many members of the investing public . 2 1 6  Moreover,  under ex­
isting insider trading law, securities analysts enjoy a position of 
distinct legal advantage over the general public . 2 1 7  After Dirks, dis­
closure by corporate insiders to analysts for reasons other than 
personal gain2 1 8  will be treated as lawful .2 19  This means that ana­
lysts enjoy a unique position in the market-regular access to ma­
terial nonpublic information220 without restrictions on its use . 2 2 1  
2 1 0 Publicly avai lable information i s  used in its broadest sense in describing the work of 
secur ities analysts. Frequently, analysts have access to sources of information that are not 
available to the general public. See supra notes 1 90 - 194 (discussing disparity of information 
among market participants ) ;  see a lso B rudney, supra note 1 3 ,  at 365 ( questioning whether 
analyst who makes overt i nquiries to firm's executives about future of company has received 
nonpublic information) .  
" 6  Indeed,  some commentators have described such market professionals as "quasi - insid­
ers ' '  due to thei r  persistent advantage over al l  other traders. E.g. , Macey, s upra note 204, at 
377.  
2 1 7  See Langevoort, supra note 190,  at 1 024 (concluding that investment analysts receive 
special treatment because of their perceived role in  increasing market efficiency ) ;  Macey, 
supra note 204, at  377 (stating that market professionals who are permitted, even en­
couraged, to trade on basis of their lawful ly acquired informational advantage benefit from 
general proscription on insider trading) .  
2 1 "  Langevoort, supra note 1 90, at 1023-24.  As Professor Langevoort observes, there are 
many reasons why an issuer might find it  desirable to d isclose i nformation through an ana­
lyst rather than a press release or  SEC filing. See id. at 1028-31 (citing four reasons for 
preferring d isclosure through analysts: abi lity to release substance without specifics, avoid­
ing l iabi l ity ,  overcoming moral hazard, providing incentive to analysts ) .  
" ' "  Cf. SEC v. Stevens, 9 1  C iv .  1 869 (CSH)  (S .D .N .Y .  Mar .  19 ,  1 99 1 ) ;  Ex - CEO, supra note 
143, at 439. In Steuens, an ex-CEO settled insider trading charges based on selective tipping 
to securities analysts. The SEC charged that the CEO tipped in order to enhance his  profes­
sional reputation and his future earnings power as CEO. !d. 
""" Many scholars have attempted to justify d isclosure of nonpublic information to ana­
lysts as in the best interests of the corporations. Among the arguments proffered are the 
claims that such disclosure is faster,  more credible ,  l ess expensive, and more accurate than 
disclosure to the general public would be. E.g. , Daniel R. Fischel , Insider Trading and In­
L>es l m e n t  Analysts: A n  Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
1 3  H oFSTRA L. Rzv. 1 27 ,  1 40-42 ( 1 984 ) ;  Helen Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate  
Int eres t ,  1987 Wis.  L. REv. 573,  625. This Article does not take the position that selective 
d isclosure is justified. See, e.g . ,  Langevoort, s upra note 1 90 ,  at 1023 (arguing "special treat­
ment" given to investment analysts under existing insider trading l aw is  excessive and un­
viarranted ) .  Moreover, the SEC has indicated that it does not accept the notion that the 
!Ji,-b· dec i s i .Jn gives corporate insiders carte blanche to make selective d isclosure to ana-
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In an ideal world, the information provided by investment ana­
lysts would be useless. Perfectly efficient markets would cause in­
formational changes to be reflected immediately in stock prices, 
with the result that an analyst could not, on the basis of public 
information, provide advice that would produce a better-than-av­
erage return.222 The continued use of investment analysts can be 
justified only by the conclusion that, under the current regulatory 
scheme, analysts are able to provide superior information.223  Ana­
lysts' ability to provide this information might be explained as 
proof that the markets are not perfectly efficient.224 In the alterna-
lysts. SEC Commissioner Edward H .  Fleischman, P resentation to University of California 
1 3th Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 24, 1 9 9 1 )  [ hereinafter Fleischman, Presen­
tation ] .  Regulation requiring corporations to handle d isclosure through a neutral method 
such as press releases would address this unfairness. 
22 1 The special treatment of the analyst has been justified by the important role that 
analysts play in market efficiency. Congress explicitly stated that the Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1 988, Pub. L. No. 1 00-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in 
scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (Supp. 1 988 ) ) ,  was not intended to cut back on the 
deference to analyst tipping recognized by Dirks: 
[The Dirks test was meant] to ensure that the insider trading laws do not in­
hibit honest communication between corporate officials and securities analysts. 
The Committee recognizes that market analysts play a crucial role in  facil itat­
ing the d issemination of information to the marketplace, and thereby promot­
ing smoothly functioning markets. This legislation is not intended to i nterfere 
with these critical functions. 
H o usE CoMM. oN ENERGY AND CoMMERCE, I NsiDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD ENFORCE­
'.IENT ACT OF 1 988, H .R . REP. No. 910 ,  1 00th Cong. , 2d Sess. 19 ( 1988) ,  ,-eprinted in 1 988 
U.S .C .C .A.N. 6043, 6056. As Professor Brudney observes, the search for relevant corporate 
and economic i nformation improves the functioning of the capital markets. Such a search 
entails research costs that wil l  not be allocated for that purpose unless the investor is able 
to receive the rewards of the informational benefits so obtained. Brudney, supra note 1 3 ,  at 
34 1 .  On the other hand, i t  is possible that the selective favorable treatment of the financial 
community leads to excessive research and competition for superior information. 
m Modern portfolio theory suggests that it  is impossible to outperform the stock market 
systematically without the use of nonpublic information. See, e.g. , Macey, supra note 44, at 
21 n .55 .  
m Professor Coffee explains that the disclosure provisions of the Securities Exchange Act 
cf 1934 actually subsidize the investigatory activities of investment analysts by providing 
them with extensive detailed information at low cost-information that is more useful to 
the professional analyst than the individual trader. John C. Coffee, Jr. ,  Market Failure and 
rhe  Economic Case for a Manda tory Disclosure System,  70 VA. L. REv. 7 1 7 ,  728-29 ( 1984 ) .  
""" See, e.g. , Stanford J .  Grossman, On t h e  Efficiency o f  Cumpetitiue Stock Markets 
Where Trc.des Ha ve Diverse Information,  31 J. FIN. 573, 574 ( 1976 ) ;  Stanford J .  Grossman 
& Joseph E. Stiglitz,  Information and Competitive Price Sys tems, 66 AM.  EcoN. REv. 246, 
248 ( 19/6 ) .  Grossman argues that it  would be paradoxical to conclude that markets are per­
fectly effic ient given the superior information and returns attributed to analysts. He  there­
fore concludes that analysts are able to d iscover information that is not ful ly  retlected in 
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tive, analysts may have access t o  information that is not available 
to the general public.225 The policy of permitting corporations to 
make disclosures by tipping analysts is one plausible explanation 
of how analysts gain such access.226 
Deregulation of insider trading would have two effects on ana­
lysts , effects that this Article will describe as the "better source 
effect" and the "embarrassment effect. " The better source effect 
reflects the fact that an analyst's information is seldom as good as 
a true insider tip. In a world in which insider trading and tipping 
are legal , investors would have access to a marketplace of better 
information than that provided by analysts, rendering the analyst's 
information second-rate. 227 The embarrassment effect results from 
the fact that a free flow of inside information would result in the 
entry into the marketplace of superior information to that pro­
vided by the analyst-information resulting from tipping and in­
formation generated by the occurrence of insider trades. This in­
formation would be likely to make the analyst's information 
appear dated and of poor quality. The derogation of the analyst's 
information would generate the implicit message that the analyst 
is not really a high-level specialist and does not provide a valuable 
service to investors.228 
A second group threatened by insider trading is the professional 
stock prices. 
225 Indeed, through the ir  practice of  selective d isclosure, analysts may further informa­
tional d isparities in the market. As P rofessor Langevoort observes, the analyst may favor 
the high -paying inst itutional investor over the retail  c l ient .  Langevoort, supra note 1 90, at  
1 04�3; see a lso Fleischman, Presentation,  s upra note  220. 
2 2 6  See supra notes 193, 215-218 .  This policy does not, however, answer concerns raised 
by advocates of the leve l-playing-fie ld approach to the securities markets that analysts' pos­
session of this  informational advantage is unfair .  For example,  the analysts i n  Steuens did 
not d isclose  their superior information to the world; they simply told a few of  their favored 
clients, who were able to sel l  their  holdi ngs in the computer and d efense equipment manu­
facturer and avoid losses.  See Ex - CEO, supra note 143,  at 4:39.  
227 In countries in  which insider trading prohibitions are absent or loosely e n forced, the 
value of inside information is  so s ignificant as to cause investors to advertise for such infor­
mation openly. See How Asia Regards Insider Trading: A wareness Up But Some Countries 
Ca ll  It  Part of Business.  LA TIMES, Mar. 28,  1 989, § 4 ,  at 9 ( describing practice in  New 
Zealand of traders running newspaper ads openly asking for inside information at height of 
pre-October 1 987 bull  market) .  
'"" The embarrassment effect partially explains why analysts feel the need to tread c lose 
to the legal line by attempting to ferret out information that is  not widely available to the  
publ ic .  See D irks v. SEC,  463 U.S .  646 ,  658-59 ( 198 :)) .  
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investors.229 This diverse group might be viewed broadly as includ­
ing risk arbitrageurs,230 broker-dealers trading for their own ac­
counts,231 and institutional investors, such as mutual funds, pen­
sion funds, and insurance companies. Investment professionals 
spend a great deal of money to acquire superior m arket and firm 
information. Although they do not have the access of an insider, 
their resources enable them to be "next in line" in terms of quality 
of information.232 To the extent that insiders are able to trade, 
they preempt or reduce the professional investors' informational 
advantage.233 
Stockholders of publicly held companies are also direct benefi­
ciaries of the regulation of insider trading. The existing regulation 
allows stockholders to be passive. Stockholders need not weigh the 
costs and benefits of allowing insiders to trade the corporation's 
stock or monitor the agency problems that may result from such 
trading.234 If insider trading problems were relegated to state- law 
derivative suits , based on allegations of breaches of the insider's 
fiduciary duty or duty of loyalty, the burden of enforcement would 
be on stockholders. Instead, the SEC has assumed the enforcement 
229 As Professor Langevoort explains, professional investors benefit from insider trading 
regulation because they are " 'next in l ine'  [ after corporate insiders] w ith respect to the 
opportunity to trade immediately upon disclosure. " Langevoort, supra note 5 ,  at 400 n.6 .  
2 3 0  Arbitrageurs generate profits through in-depth monitoring of  corporations coupled 
with large investments when those corporations present "trading opportunities." The arbi­
trageur is rewarded when this monitoring results in  timely information of  which he can take 
advantage by taking a large position before that information is fully reflected in the market­
place. In a sense, the arbitrageur profits from the fact that the securities markets are not 
perfectly efficient. The public announcement of material effects is not immediately reflected 
in stock prices; the market requires an adjustment period. Arbitrageurs are threatened by 
insider trading because such trading is able to beat them at their own game. Not only can 
insiders profit from information before it is available to arbitrageurs, but the leakage effect 
of their trading also may reduce the trading opportunity available to the arbitrageur. 
23 1 To the extent that an analyst makes proprietary investment decisions as opposed to 
rendering investment advice to others, this category overlaps with the previous one. 
'32 Langevoort, supra note 5 ,  at 400 n.6 .  Professional investors also serve as major cus­
tomers of securities analysts. 
2 3 3  This is not to say that the informational advantage of the professional investor is a 
bad thing. To the extent that professionals expend resources to gather securities informa­
tion, they improve market efficiency. See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 329-30 ( arguing 
that information is quickly reflected by stock prices and that it "would be a colossal waste i f  
the information . . .  had t o  b e  presented t o  everyone") .  
"'' See, e.g. , Roberta Romano, Metapo litics and Corpora te Law Reform , 36 STAN. L .  REv. 
923, 1004-0.S ( 1 984 )  (explaining that government intervention to regulate insider trading ad­
dresses stockholder free -rider problem and lowers agency costs) .  
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role. Absent this enforcement, stockholders would have to exercise 
more vigilance in monitoring the extent and cost of insider trading 
in their corporations. Moreover, returning insider trading regula­
tion to the purview of such common-law doctrines would rekindle 
the ongoing debate over the efficacy of using the stockholder deriv­
ative suit to enforce insiders' fiduciary duties to the corporation.235 
Most importantly, the general public, unexposed to many of the 
legal analyses discussed above, appears to believe that insider trad­
ing is harmful to the markets . The concepts of insider trading as 
. unfair, as misappropriation of corporate property, and as destruc­
tive of investor confidence, while controversial and vigorously de­
bated among scholars,236 reflect the perception of the average 
stockholder. Stockholders, rightly or wrongly, are likely to view in­
sider trading regulation as an effective way of disciplining their 
corporate managers with little cost or effort. 
This feeds into the popular mentality237 that "greed is  bad. "238 
In the view of typical members of the public, someone who trades 
on inside information obtains a benefit from information for which 
he has not paid, information in which the trader has no ownership 
interest or other legitimate expectation of gain. The successful in­
side trader has won the lottery without buying a ticket. While they 
may be jealous of the trader's good fortune, typical members of the 
public see no reason to approve of activity in which they cannot 
also participate and which leads to what they perceive as unde­
served gains. 239 
Thus, it is possible to identify at least three politically signifi­
cant groups that benefit from the current regulation of insider 
trading. Securities analysts and professional investors support in-
2 3 0  For a sampling of the l iterature addre5sing whether the derivative suit effectively de­
ters management misconduct, see Daniel  R.  Fischel & Michael  Bradley, The Role of Liabil­
ity Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretica l and Empirical Analy­
sis, 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 261 ,  262 n.2 ( 1 986) .  
236 See supra note 1 8 1 .  
237 See Langevoort, supra note 5 ,  a t  400-01  ( describing restriction o f  insider trading as 
"emotional in its genesis" and as political attempt to satisfy "those who feel unfairly disad­
vantaged by the absence of power, size,  or status") .  
236 H ence the vi l la in in the movie WALL STREET, Gordon Gekko, can be identified by his  
philosophy: "Greed . . .  is good." WALL STREET ( 20th Century Fox Fi lm Corp.  1987 ) .  
2 3 9  Judge Posner terms regulation fueled by a public feeling or  concern rather than an 
economic or uti l itarian analysis "public sentiment statutes ." Richard A. Posner, Economics, 
Politics and the Reading of Statu tes and the Cons titution,  49 U. CHI. L REv. 263, 287 
( 1982) .  Insider trading legislation may be a prime example of a public sentiment statute. 
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sider trading regulation and strict enforcement efforts by the 
SEC240 because, after insiders, they are the next best able to obtain 
and use market-sensitive information .2 4 1  Stockholders support in­
sider trading regulation because of their perception that insider 
trading is harmful and because it is easier to have that judgment 
made by Congress than to analyze the question firsthand. 
In contrast, those who oppose such regulation are not in a posi ­
tion to mount a public campaign for deregulation .  Corporate insid­
ers would betray their beneficiaries by endorsing a regulatory sys­
tem that allows insiders to  exploit their positions for private gains. 
Individual tippees generally receive inside information on an un­
predictable and fortuitous basis. Absent systematic access to such 
information , they are not likely to agitate for change. Temporary 
insiders, such as lawyers and investment bankers, r isk the same 
type of disapprobation as that faced by traditional insiders if  they 
support deregulation . In addition, promoting the freedom of pro­
fessionals to trade on information provided by their clients would 
be l ikely to result in contractual modification that, at a minimum, 
would require the outsiders to disgorge such trading profits to their 
corporate clients . 
This combination of public disapproval and industry support 
virtually guarantees the continued regulation of insider trading. In­
dustry professionals constitute active and knowledgeable partici ­
pants in SEC and congressional decisionmaking on regulation and 
enforcement of the securities markets. They often serve as advisors 
to Congress and are ,  directly and indirectly, the source of congres­
sional perceptions as to the effect of insider trading regulation on 
the securities markets and the economy.242 Congress is particularly 
"" Some scholars, such as Professor Macey, argue that market professionals try to per­
suade the public that insider trading is  wrong because the successful influence of  public 
opinion wi l l  result in  increased regulation and enforcement of the prohibition against insid­
ers,  and those who are next best able to use the i n formation wil l  p rofit thereby. Jonathan R.  
Macey, Ethics, Econom ics, and Insider Trading. Ayn Rand Meets the Theory of the Firm, 
11 HARV. J.L & Pus. PoL'Y 785, 803 ( 1988). 
"" See David D .  Haddock & ,Jona than R. Macey, Regula tion on Dema nd: A Priva te In ­
t erest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regu lation, 30 JL. & EcoN. 3 1 1 ,  329-
:30 ( 1 987) (arguing that i nsider trad ing regulation results in greater d istribution of trading 
profi ts to industry professionals than to general publ ic  and that this d istr ibution results i n  
pol itical efforts b y  such professionals in support of greater regulation and e n fo rcement ) .  
"" See id. a t  3 1 9-24 (descr ibing insider trading regulation as responsive to the p o l i tical 
consti tuency that bene fits from such regulation, primari ly market profess ion a l s ) .  
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unlikely to disregard the recommendations of these professionals 
in l ight of the public aversion to insider trading. A member of Con­
gress would be loathe to risk disapprobation by taking on the de­
regulation of insider trading, a reform that enjoys no substantial 
public support. 
IV. THE RESULT OF THE ANALYSIS: A NEW PROPOSAL FOR 
REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that continued regulation 
of insider trading is likely because of political realities, regardless 
of whether economists can demonstrate an empirical effect of in­
sider trading on the market or advocates of market fairness can tie 
insider trading to the availability of capital. This Article also has 
demonstrated that the existing system of regulation is unsound 
and that the best justification for prohibiting insider trading is 
that insiders owe a fiduciary duty to the market not to abuse their 
position by taking personal advantage of nonpublic corporate 
information. 
Today, it appears that resistance to a statutory definition of in­
sider trading may be weakening; Congress, commentators, and 
even the SEC have been attempting to draft a definition . 243  These 
principles may serve to inform decisions about the appropriate 
statutory scheme. In developing a statutory scheme, we should be 
aware that calling it a statutory definition of insider trading 
prejudges the issue. In the absence of a strict parity-of-information 
standard , the statute will be deciding, in effect, who should be free 
to use material nonpublic information. 
143 A number of legislative proposals defining insider trading have been d eveloped in the 
past several years. These include a proposal drafted by a group of private securities lawyers 
(the "Ad Hoc Committee") at the request of Senators R iegle and D'Amato, which was intro­
duced as S. 1 380, lOOth Cong. ,  1 st Sess.  ( 1 987) , reprin ted in Symposium, supra note 1 27 ,  at 
531 -34 app. ;  a proposal developed by the New York Stock Exchange Legal Advisory Com­
mittee, Report of the New York Stock Exchange Legal Advisory Committee, Proposed Stat­
utory Definition of Insider Trad ing ( 1987) ,  reprinted in Symposium, supra note 1 27 ,  ot 543-
44 app . ;  and a proposal prepared by the SEC, reprinted in Symposium, supra note 127 .  at 
.)35-42 app. ,  which was subsequently modified to conform to the approach of the Ad Hoc 
Committee's proposal. See SEC Modified Proposal, supra note 1 27 .  Congress requested that 
members of the Ad Hoc Committee meet with the SEC and prepare Reconcil i ation Draft of 
S. 1 380, reprinted in Symposium, supra note 1 27 ,  at .552-58 app. The draft never game;-ed 
the full support of e ither the Committee or the SEC. For a detailed analysis of these propos­
als, see Phil l ips '� Lavoie, supra note 5 ,  at 457-62.  
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The proposal suggested by this Article departs most radically 
from existing proposals and literature by rejecting the focus on the 
method by which a trader acquires nonpublic information. By pre­
mising liability on an insider's duty to the marketplace, this propo­
sal is able to avoid the quagmire of analyzing the method of acqui­
sition, as well as the private contractual and other relationships 
between the trader, the issuer, and the source of the information. 
The current proposals for a statutory definition of insider trading 
analyze whether the information has been acquired wrongfully.244 
Through the requirement of wrongfulness, they attempt to incor­
porate current law on breach of duty, breach of relationship of 
trust and confidence, and so forth. 245 This approach is misguided. 
Additionally, regulation of insider trading would be improved by 
reclassifying such trading as a regulatory violation rather than a 
crime. A complete examination of the effect of decriminalizing in­
sider trading is beyond the scope of this Article,  but it should be 
noted that Congress would be justified in prohibiting a broader 
range of trading, based on concerns about market fairness, if  such 
trading were not penalized by criminal sanctions. 
Given the lack of consensus on whether insider trading should be 
regulated and, if so, the justification for such regulation, it is sur­
prising that insider trading has generated so much recent media 
and enforcement attention. Although public and j udicial opinion 
appear to condemn insider trading as the moral equivalent of 
theft,246 it is not clear that this perception is accurate. Treating 
"" See, e.g , S.  1 380, lOOth Cong. , 1 st Sess. § 2 ( b) ( l )  ( 1 987)  (prohibiting use of nonpublic 
i n formation if  trader " knows or is  reckless i n  not knowing that such i nfor mation h as been 
obtained wrongfully, or i f  the p urchase or sale of such security would constit ute a wrongful 
use of such information " ) ,  reprinted in Symposium , s upra note 1 27 ,  at 532 app. ;  SEC Mod i ­
fied Proposal, supra note 1 27 ,  § 2 ( b) ( l )  ( prohibiting use of nonpublic i n form 3.tion if  trader 
" knows or recklessly d isregards that such information has been obtained wrongfully, or that 
such purchase or sale would constitute a wrongful use of such information ") .  
1 4 0  See, e.g. , S. 1 380, lOOth Cong. , 1st Sess. § 2 (b) ( l )  ( 1 987) ( reconci l iation draft) ,  re-
printed in Symposium, supra note 1 27 ,  at 554 app. 
For the purposes of this subsection, such trading while in possession of  mate­
rial ,  nonpublic information is wrongful only if  such information has been ob­
tained by, or its use would constitute, d i rectly or indirectly, (A)  theft ,  bri bery, 
m isrepresentat ion, espionage (through electronic  or other means) or ( B )  con­
\'ersion , m isappropriation , a breach of any t!duci ary duty, any personal or 
other relationship of trust and confidence, or any contractual or employment 
relationship. 
"" For examp l e ,  the Second Circuit described i nsider trading in Uni t e d  S t G t e.' L ' .  Carp r> n -
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insider trading as stealing is consistent with a property-rights ap­
proach, but if  the regulation is refocused on the harm to the mar­
ketplace and the insider's duty to disclose to that marketplace , the 
insider trading violation might more accurately be likened to lying. 
A moral evaluation of lying, however, is more difficult. Societal 
views of lying are equivocal: society treats some lies as worse than 
others.247 lVIoreover, in view of the fact that insider trading results 
only in omissions and not in affirmative misrepresentations, it is 
not necessarily the moral equivalent of lying. There is a distinction 
in moral terms between affirmative misrepresentations and omis­
sions. To a certain extent, it is anomalous that the jurisprudence of 
common -law fraud has accepted the concept that liability may be 
predicated upon material omissions,248 a concept that has worked 
its way into statutory theory as well. Traditional philosophical the­
ory supports the view that it is far worse , from a moral perspective, 
to mislead than simply to omit relevant facts of which no inquiry 
has been made.249 Indeed, this principle is reflected in current ju­
risprudence. 250 These philosophical roots support the argument 
that insider trading is not the moral equivalent of lying.251 
If insider trading cannot readily be equated with either stealing 
or lying, it is difficult to condemn such trading as immoral or in­
herently wrong. Therefore, from a moral perspective, classifying 
such trading as criminaP52 and penalizing it with stiff prison 
ter as "conduct constituting secreting, stealing, [or] purloining."  791 F . 2d 1 024 ,  10:3 1  (2d 
Cir. 1 986).  
247  See, e.g. , SISSELA BoK. LYING: MoRAL C HOICE IN P UBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE ( 1978) (ex­
amining reprehensibi l ity of lying in  variety of settings) .  
" " '  Such l iabil ity requires, of course, the  presence of a d uty. See supra Part  LA ( d iscuss­
ing requirement of d uty to d isclose in classical theory of insider trading) .  
"" See,  e.g . ,  MARCUS CICERO. DE OFFICIIS BK.  III  321 (W.  Miller trans.  1 968) ( " ' It  is one 
thing to conceal, '  . . .  , ' not to reveal i s  q uite a d ifferent thing. ' " ) .  For a detai led analysis of 
the relative ethical  or moral  culpabili ty of nondisclosure and m isrepresentation as viewed by 
a number of classic- philosophical scholars, see Lawson,  supra note 1 2 5 ,  at n7-4:3. 
""'' See supra note 189 ( discussing nondisclosure in Texas Gulf Sulphur case).  
2" If  insider trading constitu tes lying, decisions by insiders based o n  n onpublic informa­
tion to refrain from trading should also be actionable as fraudulent omissions. Insider non­
trading, al though perhaps d ifficult to prosecute, presents the same moral issue as insider 
trad ing.  See Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 336-37 ( arguing that insider nontrad ing may 
atfect stock pri ces just as insider trading does).  Nonetheless, a decision by an insider or 
tippee to refrai n  from sell ing stock, for example, based on superior i n formation about an 
upcoming corporate development, is apparently legal. 
2 52 See,  e.g. , WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W.  ScoTT, JR. HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL L..>.w 
§ 1 . 2 ,  at 1 1  (2d ed. 1 986) (explaining that major purpose of criminal laws i s  enforcement of 
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Although the presence of a fiduciary duty may be a factor in 
determining insider status , it should not determine when informa­
tion can be used as a basis for trading.254 Rather, a legislative solu­
tion should focus on defining the insider class. 255 Once the class is 
defined, thereby identifying the c lass of persons for whom the per­
sonal use of nonpublic information breaches their duty to the mar­
ketplace, insider class status alone should be the basis of restrict­
ing trading.256 Status as an insider should be determined by 
society's idea of morality); cf. Ronald J .  Rychlak, Society 's Mora l Right t o  Punish: A Fur­
ther Explora tion of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment,  65 TuL. L. REv. 299, 329 
( 1 990) ( " [N ]ot a l l  crimes are immoral, and not al l  immoral acts are criminal . " ) .  
203 Although the EEC Insider Dealing Directive prohibits insider trading,  it does not re­
quire member states to make such trading criminal .  See genera lly Raffael lo  Fornasier, The 
Direc tive on Insider Dea ling, 13 FoRDHAM lNT'L L.J 1 49 ( 1 990) (discussing legal basis and 
effects of EEC Insider Dealing Directive ) ;  Hopt,  s upra note 18, at 56-57 (arguing that by 
leaving sanctions to member states, d irective is  a compromise) .  
n •  The difficulty o f  applying the duty approach is  aptly i l lustrated by both Reed and 
Chestman. I n  Reed, the court searched through principles of trust law, fiduciary law, and 
even the law of restitution in an attempt to locate some clear standard as to when an action­
able breach of duty results from betrayal of a fam ily confidence. See United States v.  Reed, 
601  F. Supp. 685, 703 - 1 8  (S .D.N.Y. ) ,  rev 'd in part o n  other grou nds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 
1985). Notably, although the court did not go so far, sources relied on by the court suggest 
that a close family relationship is, by itself, sufficient to confer a relationship of trust and 
confidence. See 4 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAw OF RESTITUTION § 19 .3 ,  at 1 1 3  ( 1978) (ex­
plaining that "there is a strong inclination to find a confidential relationship from the fact 
of a close family connection") (quoted in Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 7 10) .  
Additionally, predicating insider trading l iabi l ity on the breach of a fiduciary duty would, 
presumably, al low a corporation to authorize i nsiders to trade i n  its securities by submitting 
the issue to the board or the shareholders for approval. Wolfson, supra note 197, at 1 1 3.  
2 0 5  As the Supreme Court explained in Dirks, the point of insider trading regulation is " to 
focus on policing insiders and what they do . . .  rather than on policing information per se 
and its possession . "  Dirks v.  SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 ( 1 983) (quoting In re I nvestors Mgmt. 
Co. ,  44 S.E.C. 63:3, 648 ( 19 7 1 )  (Smith, C.,  concurring in result) ) .  
2 0 6  The idea of a status-based restriction has its seeds in  the insider trading regulations of 
Great Britain,  which, inter alia, restrict trading by persons "connected with" a company. 
" Connected with" means holdi ng a position such as d irector, officer , or employee,  or having 
a professional relationship, such as a lawyer-client relationship, that affords access to non­
public information. See Company Securities ( Insider Dealing) Act, 1 985, ch. 8 ( Eng. ) .  The 
provisions of the B ri tish statute are described i n  Mark A. Spitz ,  Note, Recent Developments 
in Insider Trading Laws and Problems of Enforcement in Great Britain,  1 2  B.C .  INT'L & 
Cmw L REv. 265, 275-83 ( 1 989 ) .  The EEC I nsider Dealing Directive also focuses on status 
as a hasis for l iabil ity, although it defines " insider" broadly, including within that category 
v i rtually ail persons who have a relationship  with the 1ssuer and obtain information by vir-
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considering the objectives of market regulation rather than princi­
ples of agency law. Viewing insider trading regulation in terms of 
market regulation does not place the emphasis on harm to the cor­
poration or its stockholders, issues more appropriately left to state 
fiduciary law.257 Moreover it makes no sense to focus on the wrong­
ful nature of acquisition; there is no tie between injury to the in­
formational source and the objectives ·of securities regulation . 
Rather, the definition should be designed to address the harm that 
insider trading causes to the marketplace.258 
One important element of the regulation is its relationship to the 
statutory disclosure system. To the extent that an insider controls 
disclosure of corporate information, that insider has not only supe­
rior access to information but also the opportunity to manipulate 
the timing and quality of disclosure. Limiting the incentives for 
such manipulation serves the objectives of prompt and complete 
disclosure as well as the insider trading regulation objectives of 
market fairness. 
Accordingly, the class of insiders should include those who are in 
a position to control corporate disclosure. In addition , much of the 
perceived unfairness of insider trading is based on the idea that 
management is able to beat the market; even in circumstances in 
which information is disclosed promptly, management is able to 
trade immediately prior to or concurrently with the disclosure, ob­
taining as a windfall the value of the market reaction to that dis­
closure .259 Thus, corporate insiders have an unerodable advantage 
in terms of access. The quality of this advantage depends, in part, 
on the level of the employee. High-level employees have a system­
atic advantage in terms of access because they are in a position to 
tue of  that relationship ,  as well as tippees. See Hopt, supra note 1 8, at 62 -65 (describing 
groups included by directive in  category of  insider ) ;  see also Langevoort, supra note 5,  at 
4 1 1  (suggesting system of insider trading regulation that focuses on whether trader has "po­
sit ion of access" ) .  
" " '  See Barbara A.  Ash ,  State Regulation of  Insider Trading-A Timely Resurgence?, 49  
OHIO  ST. L.J. 393, 398 ( 1988) .  
'""  See supra note 181 (discussing possible harms of i nsider trading to marketplace ) ;  see 
a lso H .R  REP. No. 1 383, 73d Cong. ,  2d Sess.  1 1  ( 1 934) (discussing importance of disclosure 
in functioning of markets and correlating market price with value ) .  " [T]he hiding and se­
creting of  important i n formation obstructs the operation of the markets as i ndices of real 
value ."  !d. 
'"" See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853-54 nn. l ? - 1 9  (2d Cir .  1968) (en 
bane ) (d iscussing t iming of orders p laced by insiders ) ,  cert.  den ied, 394 U.S .  976 ( 1969) .  
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learn about all significant corporate events as well as plans for dis­
closure of those events. 
It is important not to draw the class of insiders too broadly. The 
superior access of corporate employees must be balanced against 
the difficulty an employee may have in determining, before the 
fact, whether he is in possession of material  nonpublic informa­
tion. Virtually any employee is likely to have an advantage over 
the general public in evaluating his own company, but this superi­
ority alone should not preclude the employee from trading. Assum­
ing employee stock owr.ership is  desirable,260 deeming this advan­
tage unfair is overbroad. Moreover,  for lower-level employees, 
unlike officers and directors, the trading opportunities created by 
exposure to significant corporate events are likely to be random 
and occasional in  nature and are less l ikely to interfere with corpo­
rate decisionmaking. Occasional access to nonpublic information 
can be addressed through the category of secondary insiders de­
scribed below. 
For purposes of section 1 6  of the Exchange Act, insiders are de­
fined as officers, directors, and ten percent stockholders. 2 6 1  This 
proposal takes that definition as the starting point for purposes of 
insider trading and includes those persons as "primary insiders"262 
zao The practice of permitting corporate insiders to trade the stock of their  company is 
generally defended on the grounds that this practice al igns management i nterests more 
closely with those of the stockholders and minimizes the agency costs associated with the 
separation of ownership from control in the large publ icly held corporation. See generally 
Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL. EcoN. 288 ( 1980) ;  
Oliver Hart, An Economis t 's Perspective on t h e  Theory o f  the Firm, 89 CoLUM. L.  REv. 1 757 
( 1 989) ;  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial  Beh av­
ior ,  Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 ( 1976) .  Absent such a view, 
corporate insiders could s imply be precluded from trading i n  their company's stock, a prac­
tice that would substantially reduce opportunities for insider trading. See Levmore, supra 
note 1 8 1 ,  at 1 29-32, 1 57-58 (acknowledging systematic advantage that corporate insiders 
have when trading in  their company's stock and suggesting investment through bl ind trust 
as alternative remedy) . 
'" '  See 1 5  U.S. C . § 78p ( 1 988) . 
262 The terms "primary i nsiders" and "secondary insiders" were used by the European 
Economic Commission during its preparation of the Insider Dealing Directive, although they 
do not appear in the d irective i tself. Hopt, supra note 18 ,  at 62. Usage of the terms herein 
dif!"ers in that the EEC used the term " primary insiders" to refer to all classes of persons 
who have a relationship  with the issuer ,  including employees, lawyers, auditors, suppliers, 
etc . ,  and used the term "secondary insiders" to refer to tippees. !d. at 62-65. Because this 
proposal does not impose l iabil ity on the trading activities of tippees, it  i s  possible to be 
more precise in the classification of ins iders. 
.l 
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because they generally have (1 )  the ability to affect the content 
and timing of corporate disclosure; (2 )  regular access to informa­
tion on significant corporate events; and (3) the ability to affect the 
decisionmaking process about such events. This proposal then 
adds to the category of primary insiders other persons employed 
by the corporation who by virtue of their employment have regular 
access to decisions on corporate pol icy and disclosure. The purpose 
of this addition is to make the section 16 class of insiders more 
flexible by treating insider status as a function of responsibil ity 
and access as well as position. 263 
To this class of primary insiders, the proposal adds a second cat­
egory denominated "secondary insiders ." Secondary insiders are 
those who by virtue of an employment or other contractual rela­
tionship receive nonpublic information relating to the issuer or its 
securities for the purpose of advising or rendering services to the 
corporation or its management.264 Secondary insiders include both 
outsiders, such as lawyers and investment bankers , who are hired 
to advise or represent the corporation,265 and employees who have 
26 3 The modification is akin to that introduced by the SEC in its recent amendments to 
the regulations under section 16 ,  in which the SEC determined that the category of officer 
should be defined in terms of " policy-making function" rather than title. See 17 C .F .R.  § 
240. 16a-1 ( f) ( 1991 ) .  
264 The receipt o f  nonpublic information b y  a secondary insider need not b e  a regular 
occurrence; insider status under this provision may be based on an isolated exchange of 
information, such as that which occurs when a lawyer is hired to represent a corporation 
with respect to a single transaction. 
260 The proposal would not classify as insiders those traders sometimes described as 
"market insiders" ( i . e . ,  those who by virtue of their position or the types of services they 
perform have regular industry access to nonpublic information ) .  See Maria T. Galena, Note, 
Drawing the Line on Insiders and Outsiders for Rule l Ob-5: Chiarella v. U ni ted States, 4 
HARV. J .L. & Pus. PoL'Y 203, 233-41 ( 1981 )  (arguing that those with regular access to non­
public information should be treated as insiders based on claim that those traders breach 
their duty because they have obtained information " by virtue of a structura: position within 
the market").  
The use by market insiders of nonpublic information can take two forms: insiders may 
trade on the information directly or al locate the information, effecting wealth d istribution 
through d isclosure to clients. The former problem can be addressed by prohibiting analysts 
or their firms from trading on nonpublic information. Such a prohibition would not affect 
the market d issemination function addressed by Congress and the Supreme Court. See 
supra notes 220-22 1 .  
The latter problem was the basis for the District o f  Columbia Ci rcuit's concern i n  Dirks. 
See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 840-41  (D.C.  Cir. 1982) ,  rev 'd, 463 U.S. 646 ( 1 983);  see a lso 
supra note 225 ( discussing analysts' selective disclosure as aggravating existing informa­
tional disparities ) .  It is clearly possible to conclude, as the court did in Dirks, 681 F . 2d at 
840-42, that securities professionals, by virtue of their position, owe fiduciary duties to the 
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access to  nonpublic corporate information on  an irregular or  infre­
quent basis. 266 
Trading by the above-described classes of insiders would be re­
stricted as follows: it would be a violation of federal law for pri­
mary insiders who possess material nonpublic information relative 
to any security,267 obtained by virtue of their status as an insider, 
to take advantage of that information by trading or tipping.268 It 
would be a violation of federal law for secondary insiders who pos­
sess material nonpublic information relative to any security, ob­
tained by virtue of their relationship with the corporation, to take 
advantage of that information by trading or tipping. Trading by 
either class of insiders would be defined to include effecting trades, 
for the insider's personal account or the account of others, on the 
basis of nonpublic information. The provision would contain a 
statutory presumption that an insider who possesses material non­
public information has based his trading on that information; this 
presumption could be rebutted through a showing, by the insider, 
of a distinct legitimate basis for the trading in question. 
B. THE MEANING OF INSIDE INFORMATION 
Removing the emphasis on fiduciary duty demonstrates that a 
major issue in defining insider trading is the question of what con­
stitutes inside information. Although many issues are presented in 
constructing a statutory definition of inside information ,  including 
specifying when information is material and when it is nonpublic, 
market at large not to engage in selective d isclosure of nonpublic information. B ecause se­
curities professionals, i ncluding investment advisors, and registered broker-dealers l ike 
Dirks ,  are heavily regulated by the federal securities laws, such duties also can be imposed 
directly by statute. As the court in Dirks observed, however, the obligations of  securities 
professionals in  this regard are distinct from the generally applicable antifraud provis ions. 
I d. Accordingly, they should be addressed separately. 
266 The European Insider Dealing Directive classifies certain government officials as insid­
ers based on their access to market-sensitive information. See Hopt, supra note 18,  at  62-65. 
The British regulations also prohibit trading by public servants. Spitz,  supra note 256,  at 
278; see a lso Galena, supra note 265, at 204 n.5 (d iscussing insider status of government 
employees ) .  Consideration of the appropriate treatment of government officials is  beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
267 Because the proposal does not premise l iabi lity on the breach of a fiduciary duty, in ­
siders violate the  provision by trading in any security of  the  issuer, whether i t  i s  debt  or 
equity. See supra note 52 (debating whether trad ing in debt securities violates current in ­
sider trad ing law) . 
268 For an explanation of what constitutes impermissible tipping, see infra Part IV .C .  
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one that seems most difficult is deciding when information is "in­
side" with respect to a class of insiders. Is an insider barred from 
trading on the basis of nonpublic information that relates only to 
the corporation to with the insider is connected269 or from using 
any information he receives by virtue of insider status, even if that 
information relates to the stock of another issuer? 
Both the British statute and the EEC directive seek to prohibit 
the use of any information acquired by virtue of the insider's sta­
tus or position,270 but it is not clear that this broad scope is appro­
priate. Again ,  it is necessary to look at the rationale behind the 
prohibition and the availability of alternative methods of 
regulation. 
The economic rationales for prohibiting insider trading are 
weakest when the trader is an outsider with respect to the issuer of 
the securities traded. A corporate employee who learns, in the 
course of his employment, of information relevant to another is­
suer is not in a position to control disclosure of that information, 
to manipulate corporate events of the issuer, or to abuse a fiduci-
26 9  There are two separate issues in this analysis. F irst, does an outsider violate insider 
trading rules by using information obtained by virtue of business relations with the source? 
And second ,  even if such trading would be permissible when effected by an outsider as prin­
cipal ( i .e . ,  a corporation or an ind ividual) ,  is it  i l legal i f  the outsider is an employee (or 
otherwise an agent) of a corporation and acquires the information by virtue of his employee 
status? 
27 0 Under the British statute, this issue was resolved by defining inside information, to 
include information relating to any actual or contemplated transaction between the insider's 
company and another company. Insiders are prohibited from trading in the securities of the 
other company while in  possession of such information. Thus, inside information for pur­
poses of the Br itish law includes i nformation both about the issuer and about the issuer's 
transactions with other companies.  Company Securities ( Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8 
(Eng. ) ;  see Spitz, supra note 256, at 277. 
The coverage of the EEC I nsider Dealing Directive is s imi lar. I t  defines inside information 
as simply 
information which has not been made public of a precise nature relating to one 
or several issuers of transferabl e  securities or to one or several transferable 
securities, which, i f  i t  were made public, would be l ikely to have a significant 
effect on the price of the transferable security or securities in  question. 
Council D irective 89/592 Coordinating Regulations on I nsider Deaiing, art. 1 ,  1 989 O.J. (L 
334) 30, 3 1 ,  quoted in Hopt, supra note 18, at  57. Thus, inside information can relate to the 
securities or the issuer. Under the directive's provisions, inside information cannot be uti­
l ized by insiders, who, for the purposes of the Directive, include, inter alia, anyone who 
obtains inside information by virtue of his profession, duties, or business relationship with 
the issuer. Thus, insiders might include suppliers, cl ients, or participants in a planned 
merger. Council Directive 89/592 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, art. 2 ,  1 989 
O . •  J. ( L  334) 30, :3 1 ;  Hopt, supra note 18 ,  at 64.  
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ary pos1t10n with respect to the issuer's stockholders. Nor is the 
employee appropriating property that belongs to the issuer as long 
as the information was legally obtained by the employee or the 
corporate employer. Moreover, information relating to third par­
ties often falls within a grey area with respect to confidentiality. 
Although both the bidder and the target would hope to maintain 
confidentiality of information relative to a prospective tender offer, 
information relating to the business plans, orders for supplies, etc . ,  
may not be explicitly proprietary or secret.2 7 1  
The British and EEC positions272 take the broadest approach, 
defining as inside information all material nonpublic information 
with respect to either the employer or the second corporation.273 
The fact that information is nonpublic, however, does not make it 
either confidential or proprietary. As a practical matter, some in­
vestor is always going to be the first to discover new information 
about a company, and it seems unreasonable to disqualify the in­
vestor from using the information simply because he acquired it by 
virtue of employment. 
An alternative approach would include as inside information all 
material nonpublic information that either the target or the em­
ployer wants to keep confidentiaU74 The difficulty with this ap­
proach is that the ability of the investor to use the information 
may depend on decisions of a corporation that does n ot employ 
him, to which he may owe no duties,  and that, arguably, s hould not 
be  able to bind him. Moreover ,  the target clearly could not restrain 
third-party individuals or entities directly, absent a contractual 
agreement; it should not be able to restrain traders simply by vir­
tue of their status as corporate employees. 
" 1 1  Both Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 7 7 1  F .2d 818 ,  820 ( 3d Cir .  1985 ) ,  see supra note 1 75 ,  
and SEC v.  Lund,  570 F.  Supp.  1397 ,  1401  (C.D.  Cal .  1983 ) ,  see supra note 1 68, involved 
such nonproprietary information. The ambiguity in both cases is i llustrated by the courts' 
assumptions that, although the individual defendants '  trading was illegal, trading by the 
defendants' business employer would have been lega l .  
"'"  See supra note 270 (discussing Brit ish and EEC provisions) .  
m Thus,  under these definitions, both the tender offeror and the supplier in  the examples 
in Pare II.C. of this Article would be precluded from trading. The British statute provides 
that a prospective bidder may buy the stock of the target company in order to effect the 
takeover, but not otherwise. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1 985, ch.  8, § 1 (5 )  
( Eng. ) .  The provision is ambiguous as to  whether preannouncement trading by the  bidder is 
legal .  
"�·• This provision could be strengthened by requiring that the corporation take affirma­
t ive steps to maintain the confidential ity of the information. 
"i 
I 
1 
l 
l 
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i 
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The third option is to preclude the employee from trading on 
information that is confidential and proprietary in the hands of his 
employer. Thus , the test of whether information is " inside" under 
this approach is not whether it relates to the securities of the com­
pany with which the insider is connected,  but rather whether the 
corporation has some sort of interest, proprietary or property, in 
the information. This test may be analogized to the corporate op­
portunity doctrine, in which a corporate employee may not appro­
priate a business opportunity that is of value to the corporation for 
his personal benefit.275 Whenever a corporate employee uses infor­
mation that has a value to his employer for personal use,  there is a 
diversion of value from the corporation to the employee.276 
This approach to inside information views a corporation's infor­
mation as a form of intangible property. The corporation may, 
through confidentiality regulations, employment contracts, or oth­
erwise,277 restrict its employees' abilities to use that information.278 
m See, e.g. , Guth v. Loft, Inc. , 5 A.2d 503,  5 1 1  (Del .  1939)  (discussing corporate opportu­
nity doctrine) .  
, 7 6  One might observe that firms are taking a broader v iew of proprietary information in 
areas other than securities trading. For example, contractual arrangements that restrict an 
employee's abil ity to compete with the firm after termination of employment are premised 
on the notion that  the firm has a proprietary interest in  the employee's human capital, the 
knowledge and skil l  acquired by the employee during his tenure at the firm. See K itch, 
supra note 198, a t  684-86 (describing firm's interest in  "human capital" ) .  
277 M any employer-employee cases present difficult problems o f  proof under this ap­
proach because of the absence of any explicit effort by the employer to maintain the infor­
mation as confidential .  I t  has been suggested that, even in the absence of a written agree­
ment, there may be an implicit contractual agreement by the employee to maintain 
corporate information as confidential .  See Wolfson, supra note 197, at 1 07 -08. This is par­
ticularly true with respect to certain market-sensitive information such as the existence of 
merger negoti ations or a pending change in dividend policy, which is l ikely to be viewed by 
the corporation as confidential and treated as such even in the absence of contractual 
restrictions. 
278 This approach conversely would permit corporations to opt out of insider trading regu­
lation, at least in  part, by refusing to treat corporate information as proprietary or confiden­
tial. The treatment of information as intangible property would make the employee's use of 
the information a breach of his duty to the corporation based on the combination of the 
contractual provisions and the obligations of confidentiality thereunder. This definition is a 
way of clarifying the breach of duty articulated by the court in Roth berg u. Rosenbloom. As 
the court stated, " [a ] n  insider on either side of a proposed transaction violates the insider 
trading rule when he uses insider information in violation of the fiduciary duty owed to the 
corporation to which he owes a duty of confidentiality." Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 7 7 1  F.2d 
8 1 8, 822 ( 3d Cir. 1985). The shortcoming in the Rothberg court's analysis is i ts fai lure to 
analyze the source of the defendant's duty of confidentiality. Instead, the court seems to 
premise a general duty of con fidentiality on the general duties i n herent i n  the employment 
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As a property rights theory, this approach i s  logical. Moreover, this 
notion of insider trading bears the greatest relation to the agency 
principles from which insider trading liability has evolved.  
Finally, the least restrictive view of inside information is to cate­
gorize information as " inside" only if it relates to the issuer or the 
securities of the issuer to which the insider is connected.279 The 
justifications for this approach include the fact that only in this 
s ituation are concerns about manipulation,  moral hazard, and de­
lay of disclosure justified. Moreover, this view of inside informa­
tion speaks to the rationale behind the level-playing-field theory of 
regulation. Arguably, the situation in which insider trading is  most 
unfair to the marketplace is the case in which a corporate insider, 
by virtue of his position, obtains material information that enables 
the insider to value the corporation's stock more accurately than 
outside investors .  280 
C. REGULATION OF TIPPING 
The proposed provision would deal more harshly than current 
law with insiders who tip confidential information to others. Tip­
ping by insiders would be defined as selective disclosure of infor­
mation by an insider under circumstances in which trading by the 
insider would be illegal. The proposal presumes that such tipping 
benefits the insider, directly or indirectly.28 1  Accordingly, the pro­
vision would impose liability on tippers regardless of whether a pe-
relationship. 
One difficulty with this approa;:;h is that i t  does not limit the corporation's abi l i ty to re­
strict the use of corporate information. While certain  corporate information, such as trade 
secrets or developments created by corporate action, may well be p roprietary in nature ,  i t  is 
not obvious that all corporate information is proprietary simply because i t  comes into the 
possession of the corporation or because a corporation has property rights in all the infor­
mation it possesses. For a detai led d iscussion of the Lockean theory of information as prop­
erty and the corporation's rights to such property, see Lawson, supra note 1 25, at  763-69.  
2'" This definition of inside information would make cross -trading legal .  See supra note 
1 7 1  (discussing cross- trading) . The same approach is taken by the 1988 Japanese statute. 
Shoken torikikihb (SEL) ,  Law No. 25 of 1 948, amended by Law to Amend a Part of the 
SEL, Law No. 7 5  of 1 988; see Akashi ,  Note, supra note 17, at 1 :306- 10.  
"'"0 See Akaski ,  Note, supra note 17,  at  1 3 1 2  (describing unfairness of allowing persons 
who have special relationship with issuer whereby they are able to generate, or at. least ob­
tain ,  ready access to information about issuer to use information in trad ing with public 
investors ) .  
" 8 1  The case of an insider who tips by mistake could l:Je addressed by applying Rule l0b-
5's requirement of scienter to ins ider  trading. See Ernst & Ernst v .  Hochfelder ,  42.5 U.S .  
1 8.5,  1 99 ( 1 976 ) .  Thus, to  be l iable,  the  tipp ei must have acted with at least recklessness. 
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cuniary motive could be established for tipping.282 Insiders would 
be liable for profits earned by tippee trading based on a two-part 
test. Insiders who disclose confidential corporate information to 
third parties who subsequently trade on that information would be 
liable for the profits earned through such trading, if the insiders 
acted negligently or wrongfully in disclosing the information283 and 
if the tippee's trading was reasonably foreseeable. 
The purpose of broadening liability for tippers is to deter the 
creation by corporate insiders of informational inequalities through 
selective disclosure. If insider trading is harmful to the markets 
because those on the inside enjoy unfairly superior access to infor­
mation compared to average investors , the types of insider-analyst 
relationships that create superior access should also be minimized. 
This formulation responds to two concerns: the SEC's concern that 
corporations improperly use investment analysts to make selective 
disclosure,284 and commentators' concern that investment analysts 
contribute to a market in which insiders in a broad sense, such as 
professional investors , have an unerodable and unfair informa­
tional advantage.285 
While dealing more harshly with tippers , the proposed regula­
tion would abolish the regulation of insider trading by tippees. The 
only trading on the basis of nonpublic information that would be 
restricted is that engaged in by statutory insiders. 286 Rather, tippee 
282 Thus, the provision would abolish the standard set by Dirks that an insider breaches 
his fiduciary duty by t ipping only if he receives a pecuniary benefit thereby. Di rks v.  SEC, 
463 U.S. 646, 662-63 ( 1 983) .  L iability would not require proof of financial gain or proof that 
the tipper intended to make a gift to the tippee. 
283 In other words, an i nsider who d iscloses to a third party for transactional reasons ( i .e . ,  
for a val id ,  non-disclosure-related corporate purpose) wi l l  not be liable i f  the recipient of the 
information uses the information to trade. The tippee may, however, incur l iabi l ity as a 
secondary insider. For example, a corporate officer, who discloses a prospective tender offer 
to the firm's attorneys so they can assist with preparation of the tender offer documents, 
will not be l iable i f  the attorneys trade on the inform ation. The attorneys in this case would 
be treated as secondary insiders under the statute. 
28' Fleischman, Presentation, supra note 220. 
28" See supra notes 220-22 1 ,  226 ( highlighting debate over whether analysts' informa­
tional advantage is  unfair ) .  
28" Thus, this proposal takes the opposite position from that o f  the EEC d irective, which 
imposes l iability on t ippees "who with full knowledge of the facts possess [ ]  inside informa­
tion, the direct or indirect source of  which could not be other than a [pr imary insider ] . "  
Hopt, supra note 18 ,  at 7 1  (quoting Insider Dealing Directive, a r t .  4 (EEC ) ) .  Under the 
directive, t ippees are prohibited from trading regardless of whether the primary insider has 
disclosed the information lawfully. ld .  Thus, the directive also rejects the "wrongfulness" 
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trading would be regulated indirectly by requiring tippers to be 
responsible for the economic consequences of tippee trading.287 
The rationale behind this provision is that the concept of deriva­
tive liability, or derivative duty, is too difficult to apply, both for 
the courts and for traders. It is impractical,288 and perhaps ineffi­
cient, 289 to require a tippee to analyze the source of his information 
to determine if, somewhere up the chain of information , there has 
been a misappropriation or a breach of fiduciary duty. Indeed, the 
SEC appears to be making a practice of investigating and prose­
cuting tippees on circumstantial evidence that trading was based 
on inside information. 290 Some in the industry have described the 
focus of the draft congressional definitions. See supra notes 243-245 and accompanying text. 
287 Although circumstances in which the tipper is  judgment-proof and the tippee has gar­
nered large trading profits appear to present an enforcement problem, m ost such cases 
would never arise under this proposal. The common ( and most troubling) obj ective for the 
tipper is pecuniary gain, and the disgorgement remedy addresses that gain. A dditionally, as 
a practical matter, most of those within the class of statutory insiders, by virtue of their 
position, will  have attained substantial personal wealth such that, even if their motive for 
tipping in a particular case is not pecuniary, the risk of a severe monetary penalty wi l l  deter 
tipping. 
288 Much of the information analyzed by traders and arbitrageurs consists of  market ru­
mors and "soft" information. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that many significant 
corporate disclosures are l eaked to the extent that the price of the stock has already begun 
to reflect the information prior to any public disclosure of the information. See, e.g. , Gregg 
A.  Jarrell ,  Stock Trading Before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading or 
Market A nticipation, 5 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 225, 226-27 ( 1 989) (finding price of target compa­
nies increased prior to first public announcement of a tender offer or merger) ; Paul H .  Ma­
latesta & Rex Thompson, Partially Anticipated Events:  A Model of Stock Price Reactions 
with an Application to  Corporate A cquisitions, 14 J. FIN. EcoN. 237, 240 ( 1 985) (same ) ;  see 
also Levinson v. B asic, Inc . ,  786 F.2d 741 ,  744-45 (6th Cir. 1 986) (describing how stock price 
rose during merger negotiations despite public denials of corporate developments) ,  vacated,  
485 U.S.  224 ( 1 988). It may be virtually impossible for a market participant to engage in the 
necessary l ine-drawing in such cases. 
289 See supra note 15 (d iscussing Court's concern in Dirks that such a requirement would 
interfere with valuable function of market analysts) .  
290 In a recent prosecution in the Southern District of New York, for example,  the SEC 
sought preliminary i njunctive rel ief as well  as an order freezing the defendants' assets, based 
solely on circumstantial evidence of insider trading combined '>vith curiously timed trades. 
SEC v. Foundation Hai,  736 F .  Supp. 465, 471 -73 (S.D.N.Y.  1990 ) .  The d istrict court 
granted the requested relief but was reversed in part by the Second C ircuit, which, a lthough 
not condemning the SEC's fai lure even to identify the al leged tipper, found that the SEC 
had not established a prima facie case entitling it to injunctive relief. SEC v. Uni fund SAL, 
910 F.2d 1 028, 1037 (2d Cir. 1990) ;  see a lso SEC v. Heider, No. 90 Civ. 4636, 1 990 U.S. D ist. 
LEXIS 16246, at * 1 1 - 1 2  (S .D.N.Y.  Dec. 3, 1990) (denying motion to dismiss complaint that 
fai led to identify tipper). Defendant Heider explained his curiously timed trading to the 
SEC by stating that he " 'overheard discussion in a restaurant to the effect that the price of 
Conte! s tock would increase because something was going to happen with the company. ' " 
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SEC's stance as prosecuting on the basis of "curiously timed 
trades. "  Given the enforcement tools available to the SEC, it is 
difficult for traders to defend themselves against such prosecu­
tions , in which the SEC may require the trader to come up with 
independent justification291 for his curiously timed trades. 292 In ad­
dition , the proposed judicial and statutory tests that require the 
tippee to have actual or constructive knowledge that he has re­
ceived inside information are difficult to apply to the realities of 
tipping situations.293 
Nor does tippee trading implicate the economic obj ectives of 
early and complete disclosure that underlie regulation of insider 
trading. A tippee is not in a position to control disclosure or to 
manipulate corporate affairs to create trading opportunities. More­
over, to the extent that tipping is harmful to the firm's interests, 
the penalty for tipping should be borne by the tipper, who is re­
sponsible ;or protecting those interests.294 Finally, by imposing 
substantial civil liability on tippers, it is likely that the practice of 
tipping, whether for profit or otherwise, will be adequately 
Isabelle C lary, Court Freezes Assets in Suspected Contel  Insider Trading Case , UPI, July 
23, 1 990, availa b le in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file. 
""' For example, the defendant in United States v.  Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1 99 1 )  
( e n  bane ) ,  explained h i s  trades i n  Waldbaum stock t o  the SEC b y  stating that the trades 
were the product of research "consistent with previous purchases of Waldbaum stock and 
other retail food stocks and were supported by reports in  trade publications as well as the 
unusually high trading volume of the stock on Nov. 25." Id. at 555. 
292 The implication is that a trader has not simply done a good job of analysis. The SEC 
has taken the position that,  i f  the trader demonstrates a pattern of anticipating market 
information, such prescience indicates the use of inside information rather than effective 
research techniques. 
'"' In Chestman,  for example,  Ke ith Loeb testified on behalf of the government that he 
told C hestman he had "some definite, some accurate information" that would favorably af­
fect the price of Waldbaum stock .  947 F.2d at 555. Loeb did not explain the source of his 
information or the basis for his belief that it was favorable. Id. A similar example is pro­
vided by Dennis Levine's description of the information he gave to Ivan Boesky in his tips: 
I wasn't telling Ivan anything very specific-it was more a matter of suggesting 
that, say, his investment in XYZ Corp. seemed worth holding on to. I never 
told him my oblique suggestions were based on nonpublic information, but 
over time he evidently learned their value. 
Dennis B.  Levine, The Inside Story of A n  Inside Trader, FoRTUNE, May 2 1 ,  1 990, at 80. 
Levine did not disclose to Boesky his sources of information, which included both his em­
ployer,  Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. , and investment bankers at other brokerage firms. 
I d. 
29' Of  course, these values are not served to the extent that tipping may further the inter­
ests of the firm.  See Garten, supra note 220, at 626-32. 
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" nip [ped] in  the bud."295 
Although eliminating tippee liability would prevent prosecution 
of many outsiders for insider trading, the provision does not abol­
ish all remedies against those who acquire inside information 
through improper or illegal means. Outsiders who acquire informa­
tion through theft or the equivalent can be prosecuted under the 
existing criminal laws. A source of information that is otherwise 
injured or defrauded by an outsider trade also will be able to bring 
a civil claim under traditional common-law and contractual reme­
dies, such as a civil suit for theft of trade secrets or breach of a 
confidentiality agreement. Additionally, in the case of a lawyer ,  ac­
countant, psychiatrist, or other professional who misappropriates 
confidential client information, the breach of a professional rela­
tionship of trust may be remedied through disciplinary proceed­
ings,  which might result in disbarment, license revocation, or pub­
lic censure. 
D.  PENALTIES 
The penalties authorized under this proposal would be commen­
surate with those applicable to other violations of the securities 
laws. In particular, courts could order disgorgement from the tip­
per of up to three times any profit earned by insider trading.296 In 
addition, tippers, under this proposal, would be liable for up to 
three times the trading profits earned by their personal trading as 
well as the trading of their tippees. 
20' As the Supreme Court explained: 
The true insider or the broker-dealer is at  the fountainhead of the confidential  
information . . . .  If  the prophylactic purpose of the law is to restrict the use of 
al l  material ins ide information unti l  it is  made available to the investing pub­
l ic ,  then the  most effective means of carrying out  th is  policy i s  to  n ip  in the 
bud the source of the information, the tipper, by discouraging him from " mak­
ing the initial d isclosure which is the first step in the chain of  dissemination. "  
Bateman Eichler, H i ll Richards, Inc. v .  Berner, 4 7 2  U.S. 299, 3 1 6  ( 1985) (quoting Nathanson 
v.  Weis, Voisin,  Cannon, Inc. ,  325 F.  Supp. 50, 57 -58 (S .D.N.Y.  197 1 ) ) .  
206 The SEC might also be authorized to seek civil f ines to enhance the financial penalty 
for insider trading consistent with i ts recently provided power under Section 2 1 .  See 7 8  
U.S.C.A. § 78u(d ) ( 3 )  (West Supp. 199 1 )  (authorizing imposition of civil penalties for viola­
tions of securities laws ) .  
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CONCLUSION 
Congress and the courts have spent the last forty years attempt­
ing to articulate a rationale for regulating insider trading. Most of 
the justifications for the current system of prohibiting insider trad­
ing as securities fraud under SEC Rule lOb-5 are seriously flawed. 
Public perception of insider trading as a problem coupled with a 
securities industry that would be seriously injured by deregulation 
suggests that deregulation is unlikely. If regulation is to continue, 
Congress should replace the current regime with a statute that is 
clear and predictable. A statutory definition of insider trading 
would provide the requisite notice to traders of the potential ille­
gality of their conduct and would not chill legitimate trading, 
thereby promoting market efficiency. 
This Article 's proposal attempts to replace the current system of 
regulation with more of a bright-line test. In so doing, it proposes 
three substantial changes: ( 1 )  moving the emphasis in insider trad­
ing enforcement from criminal prosecution to civil disgorgement; 
(2) changing the system to place the full burden of tippee trading 
on the insiders who act as sources of the tips; and ( 3 )  replacing the 
concept of regulation based on the trader's fiduciary and other du­
ties with a system of regulation based on insider status. These 
changes would produce a logical, coherent approach to insider 
trading regulation. 
